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Kurzfassung
In dieser Dissertation wird ein neues Verfahren zur Messung von Zahlungsbereitschaften
pra¨sentiert. Das Verfahren beruht auf der Conjoint-Analyse, jedoch werden die Zahlungs-
bereitschaften am Ende der Befragung in einer zusa¨tzlichen Interviewszene erhoben. Die
Interviewszene wird in der Dissertation als “Price Estimation scene” (PE-Szene) bezeich-
net. Bei dieser Vorgehensweise wird der Preis nicht als Attribut in die Conjoint-Analyse
aufgenommen. Statt dessen wird die Austauschrate zwischen Zahlungsbereitschaft und
Conjoint-Utility in der PE-Szene gescha¨tzt.
In der PE-Szene wird den Befragten eine dynamische Sequenz von vollsta¨ndig spezi-
fizierten Produktprofilen pra¨sentiert. Jedes Produkt wird zu einem bestimmten Preis
angeboten, und das Kaufverhalten der Teilnehmer wird explizit erhoben. Sowohl die Selek-
tion der Produkte in der PE-Szene als auch die dynamische Vergabe der Preise basieren auf
dem Auswahlverhalten der Befragten und den in der vorangegangenen Conjoint-Analyse
gescha¨tzen Conjoint-Utilities.
Mit der PE-Szene werden individuell fu¨r jeden Befragten Zahlungsbereitschaften basierend
auf Auswahlverhalten gescha¨tzt. Am Ende der Befragung liegen die Zahlungsbereitschaften
fu¨r alle Produkte der Conjoint-Analyse vor. Defizite bestehender Ansa¨tze zur Erhebung
von Zahlungsbereitschaften, die auf der Conjoint-Analyse beruhen, werden u¨berwunden.
Die PE-Szene wurde in einer empirischen Untersuchung der Zahlungsbereitschaften fu¨r
Produktbu¨ndel unter den Kunden des Onlinevertriebs der Nokia in Deutschland erfolg-
reich getestet.
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Abstract
In this dissertation a new method is proposed to estimate willingness-to-pay (WTP). The
method works as an additional interview scene appended to conjoint analysis and it is
named throughout this dissertation as the Price Estimation scene (PE scene). In the
preceding conjoint analysis price is not included as an attribute. Instead the exchange-
rate between conjoint utilities and willingness-to-pay is estimated in the PE scene. This is
achieved by the use of product stimuli in addition to price scales that are adapted for each
respondent in the interview reflecting his or her previously estimated part-worth utilities.
In the PE scene the respondents are presented with a sequence of product choices with
assigned prices and indicate whether they would actually purchase each of the presented
product profiles.
The PE scene is a method to estimate willingness-to-pay at an individual level based only
on each respondent’s provided information. Shortcomings of existing approaches that use
conjoint analysis, such as a missing choice rule as well as problems that arise when price
is included as an attribute are overcome.
The PE scene was tested in an empirical investigation in which the WTPs of the customers
of the Nokia online shop in Germany for different product bundles were estimated.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Research Intention
Setting the right price for a product or service is one of the hardest things for a marketer.
In many cases the perception of a product or service by the customers is the cornerstone
to successful pricing. Unexploited diversification and pricing potentials are often the
main driving forces for dramatic price developments and the origin for diversified product
offerings.
An outstanding example is the formation of low-cost (or no-frill) airlines in Europe after
the liberalization of the European domestic aviation market was completed in 1997. By
the year 2002 low-cost airlines had gained substantial market shares. Furthermore, low-
cost carriers are expected to increase their market share in the coming years as can be
seen in Figure 1.1. Airlines such as Ryanair, EasyJet, and GO penetrated the market
with aggressive pricing strategies putting the established airlines under pressure. Unlike
established airlines, low-cost carriers offer little service on board (no frills), have higher
seat closeness, accept only direct booking, use cheap secondary airports, do not offer
flexibility on cancellations, and have enticingly low fares that rise only as a flight fill up.1
However, many flight customers prefer the reduced prices over additional service and
convenience as offered by established airlines and use no-frill flights instead. The aviation
market had a great unexploited potential which was not recognized by the established
airlines. With the new low cost alternative to traditional flying many passengers have
switched to the low-cost offerings, and new customers have entered the market that did
not fly so frequently previously.
The aviation example shows how important pricing is when a new business model is
implemented. Recognizing unexploited segments in a market is the key for designing a
1“Turbulent skies”. (2004, July 10). Economist.
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Figure 1.1: Market shares in the European aviation market in terms of percent passengers
(“Impact of Low Cost Airlines - Mercer Study”, Mercer Management Consulting, 2004).
marketing strategy. To make the right strategic decisions marketers need valid instruments
to estimate the preference structure of their customers. With such instruments they must
be able to forecast market response when existing marketing strategies are changed or
new marketing strategies are initiated.
Examples of such marketing strategies are the differentiation or diversification of existing
products, along with the introduction of new products. Product differentiation is the
modification of a product to make it more attractive by differentiating it from competitors’
products. Product diversification means providing different types of an existing product
to better serve different customer segments. Low-cost airlines entered the aviation market
with a differentiation strategy.
Following the daily news other interesting examples can found in the mobile phone in-
dustry. Mobile phones have changed dramatically over the last years. In the past mobile
phones were un-stylish, uncomfortably large and heavy, had small monochrome screens
and large antennas, and were only used for one thing: talking to other people.
Today’s latest models, are elegantly shaped pocket computers with high resolution color
screens. And in contrast to previous years mobile phones have become a uniquely per-
sonal item. Some phones designed for business users provide office functionalities, have
tiny keyboards, and are capable of sending an receiving e-mails in addition to text and
multimedia messaging. Other phones have satellite-positioning functions, high-resolution
cameras that take pictures and record and play video clips, have a music player, FM radio,
and can function as a game console. The mobile phone has become such an important
aspect of a user’s daily life that it has changed from being a mere ‘technological object’
to a key ‘social object’ (Srivastava, 2005).
Mobile phones are sold to a large number of consumers that have heterogeneous needs
2
Figure 1.2: Growth of global sales of mobile phones (“Battling for the palm of your hand
- Mobile phones”, Economist 2004, April 29th).
and requirements. Diversified phones are offered in all price classes, and the mayor mobile
phone companies Nokia, Motorola, Samsung, and Sony Ericsson offer product lines with
many different telephones.
The mobile phone industry has experienced a huge growth over the past years. In 2003 the
number of mobile phones in use worldwide was around 1.4 billion overtaking the number
of fixed-line phones. As illustrated in Figure 1.2, more than half a billion mobile phones
are sold every year. In 2004 mobile phone sales hit 683 million. This is an increase of
32% from the sales in 2003.2
Nokia, the number one manufacturer of mobile phones had a share of 30% of the overall
cell phone market in 2004. However, Nokia had to cut prices in order to stem market
share losses. Those price cuts have impacted profits, and for the year 2004 Nokia reported
a decrease in operating profit by 14% to e 4.330 million (e 5.011 million in 2003).3
It can easily be seen, that in the mobile phone market well planned marketing strategies
must be used, in order to best meet the different demand types in the market. Nokia
is doing its best to diversify, most notably into mobile gaming with its N-Gage handset,
which was released in fall 2003. Tracking down new trends and adapting to changing
consumer preferences is very important in order to consequently diversify the companies’
product line.
Even more important than keeping track of consumer preferences marketers must be able
to forecast the reaction to different pricing strategies. The Nokia N-Gage currently costs
2“Slower Growth Seen In ’05 For Mobile Phone Industry” (2005, January 27th). Investors Business
Daily.
3Nokia Press Release (2005, January 27th), http://www.nokia.com/results2004Q4e.pdf, visited Feb-
ruary 5th, 2005.
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229,- e.4 Is this a good price or is there unexploited market potential?
Huge profits gains can be realized with a clever pricing strategy, and sever profit losses
can be avoided. Pricing is the most important element of the marketing mix because
“price is the only marketing strategy variable that directly generates income. All the
other variables in the marketing mix generate costs: advertising and promotion, product
development, selling effort, distribution, packaging – all involve expenditures” (Monroe,
2003, p. 8). Furthermore, the price for a product is the marketing variable that can most
easily be adjusted. Even a small difference in price can have a determining impact on the
success of a marketing strategy.
This dissertation is about methods to estimate consumers’ preference structure and reac-
tions to different prices. We show by discussion, review of literature, and simulation with
real consumers, how different methods can be applied to forecast consumers’ response
behavior when they are confronted with varying products at ranging prices.
The best way to forecast market response is to perform experiments with different product
configurations. The reaction of the probands can be used as a predictor for the behavior of
the whole market. However, experiments depend heavily on whether the participants can
be chosen such that customer population of the target market is represented. Furthermore,
the experimental setup must closely mimic real market behavior. Experiments that meet
these requirements can be quite costly and time-consuming and are therefore not always
feasible (Nagle and Holden, 2002, p. 339-342).
Instead, a marketer needs a set of instruments to quickly estimate consumer behavior.
In order to use these instruments frequently they must be reasonable costly, easy to use,
and be applicable in a broad variety of market scenarios. If experiments cannot be used,
marketers must rely on surveying techniques. Therefore, the focus in this dissertation is
laid on surveying techniques to estimate customer reactions to different product offerings.
Different surveying techniques are discussed theoretically and by example and advantages
and disadvantages are emphasized.
One fundamental differentiation criterion for surveying techniques is that some estimate
price response behavior at the individual level and others at sample level. If the prefer-
ence structure of the members of a sample is very heterogeneous, response behavior at
sample level only represents a small fraction of the individuals. The number of customers
who actually have the predicted response behavior cannot be forecasted, and potentially
more homogeneous segments cannot be identified. For heterogeneous consumer markets
individual level surveying techniques are better suited, because sample heterogeneity and
possibly more homogeneous smaller segments can be recognized.
Another important property of surveying techniques is given by whether purchase behavior
is hypothesized or actually surveyed during the interview. Conjoint analysis, for example,
4Retail price in http://www.nokia-online-shop.de, visited February 5th, 2005.
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is a surveying technique that estimates preference structure but not choice behavior.
Estimating preference structure means, that for different competing products it can be
predicted which one is the most attractive, but it cannot be predicted whether the most
attractive product would actually be purchased. To avoid this problem marketers usually
assume a status quo product and hypothesize that every member of the sample would
purchase this product. Against the status quo product new or differentiated products are
tested.
When purchase behavior is ex-ante hypothesized, market expansion and contraction effects
at different prices cannot be predicted. Furthermore, a strong hypothesis about price
response behavior can be a great source of error.
Another method that is often used in pricing studies is discrete choice analysis which is
also referred to as choice based conjoint (CBC). In contrast to regular conjoint analysis this
surveying technique actually elicits choice behavior. During the interview the respondents
are asked to indicate whether they would purchase a product at a given price. However,
discrete choice analysis estimates consumer behavior at the aggregate level.
In the discussion of surveying techniques used in pricing studies we stress the drawbacks
of conjoint analysis and discrete choice analysis. Besides the strong status quo product
hypothesis conjoint analysis has another problem: When a pricing study is carried out by
means of conjoint analysis, it is normal that the price is included in the interview as yet
another attribute. This dissertation outlines problems that can arise from the inclusion of
price as an attribute. Discrete choice analysis does not suffer from these problems. The
drawback with discrete choice analysis is that price response behavior is not estimated
at the individual level. As described above, this can lead to several problems when the
degree of heterogeneity of the target market is unknown.
In view of existing methods we show that there is an instrument missing that estimates
price response behavior at the individual level and has the ability to elicit choice behavior.
We have developed such a new instrument. Firstly, it performs all estimations at the
individual level, and secondly it explicitly elicits price response behavior. This new method
is the main contribution of this dissertation.
The new method is a combination of conjoint analysis with an additional interview scene
in which choice behavior is surveyed. The additional interview scene is called Price Esti-
mation scene (PE scene).
In order to get estimates at the individual level conjoint analysis is the most powerful
approach as illustrated by its numerous applications in the past 30 years. For overviews
see Wittink and Cattin (1989), Wittink and Burhenne (1994), Baier (1999), Voeth (1999),
and Hartmann and Sattler (2002a,b). Therefore, a conjoint approach is useful if individual
level preference data is to be elicited.
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In the preceding conjoint analysis price is not included as an attribute as is usually done
in pricing studies with conjoint analysis. For each individual of the sample his or her pref-
erence structure is only estimated for the non-price attributes. Price enters the interview
in the following PE scene. In this scene price response behavior is then explicitly elicited
by presenting the individual different choice scenes. In each of these scenes a product
profile of the conjoint study is dynamically selected. The product profile is assigned a
price, and the respondent is asked to indicate whether he or she would buy that profile
at the given price. The PE scene is different for every respondent because it depends on
the preference structure estimated in the preceding conjoint analysis. Furthermore, the
sequence of choice scenes and the prices are adapted for each individual based upon his
or her choice behavior.
Our new method was tested in an empirical study with the customers of the online-
shop of Nokia in Germany. At the time of the study the shop was offering telephones with
contracts bundled together with suitable telephone accessories at discounted prices. In the
empirical study simulations with these product bundles and varying telephone accessories
were performed. It shows that the simulations can be used to design bundling strategies
for different product bundles. The benefit of bundling is that the heterogeneity of the
demand in the market is reduced, when customers with heterogeneous tastes switch from
single purchases to buying a bundle.
Estimating response behavior to different bundles for a heterogeneous customer base is
a very challenging task for a marketer and difficult questions are raised: Which of the
many possible bundles should be offered for sale? Should more than one bundle be offered
simultaneously? What are the best prices for the bundles? Should the components of the
bundles also be offered for single sales, or should they just be offered as a bundle? These
questions can be answered using the PE scene and performing simulations based on the
individual level price response estimations.
To gather the data an online survey was performed. It was realized as an adaptive conjoint
analysis (ACA) to which the PE scene was appended. The results of the simulations for
different bundle types of which some were actually offered in the online shop are presented
in this dissertation. The offerings of different single bundles and the simultaneous offering
of many bundles was simulated. Furthermore, the effect of the presence or absence of
single sales was investigated. Based upon the simulations we show how different pricing
strategies affect sales and profits. The performed simulations are only possible based upon
elicited individual level price response behavior.
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1.2 Structure of the Thesis
In Chapter 2 the reader is introduced to the role of pricing in the marketing mix. By
discussing recent developments in marketing it can be seen that pricing has turned from
cost oriented approaches to value based approaches. In value based approaches a marketer
estimates the perceived values of a product and sets a price in view of these valuations.
In cost based approaches the price of a product is primarily set in view of the costs. In
order to apply a value based approach the marketers need estimates for the valuations
the customers have for different product offerings. After the introduction to value based
pricing, its importance will be demonstrated by discussing practical applications published
in scientific journals. After this discussion we will focus on product bundling which is a
special type of pricing strategy. We give the reader an introduction to bundling because
different bundling strategies will be simulated in the empirical investigation.
Chapter 3 introduces different concepts, by which customer reactions to price are deter-
mined. The concepts investigated are the reservation price and the maximum price. Both
concepts subsume under the term willingness-to-pay (WTP). Although the concepts are
sometimes used synonymously, in this incidence there will be a distinction between the
two. This distinction is important for the discussion of different estimation procedures
and for the development of our new surveying procedure, the PE scene.
Chapter 4 provides an overview and critical discussion of state of the art instruments
marketers use to estimate price response behavior. By discussing advantages and draw-
backs of each of the techniques, it will be argued that a new method is needed by which
willingness-to-pay can be estimated at the individual level that does not rely on an ex-post
hypothesis about purchase behavior.
In Chapter 5 an introduction to conjoint analysis is offered, as the PE scene is an extension
of conjoint analysis. A focus is laid on the relevant parts of conjoint analysis to the new
method. Furthermore, an introduction to the software used will be given.
Chapter 6 illustrates the importance of conjoint analysis in pricing studies by providing
an overview of selected publications. Based upon these articles it is intended to show the
strengths and weaknesses of the existing approaches. Focusing on the effects that arise
from including price as yet another attribute in a conjoint study a number of arguments,
why the inclusion of price in a conjoint study is problematic, will be presented. These
arguments heavily influenced the design of the PE scene, which is based on a conjoint
analysis that does not have price included as an attribute.
In Chapter 7 the PE scene is developed. The underlying techniques to select product
profiles individually for each respondent are discussed, and the price selection mechanism
is introduced. Furthermore a discussion regarding the derivation of estimates of the
respondents’ WTPs for all possible product combinations that can be formed from the
7
attributes and levels of the conjoint analysis is given. Illustrative screenshots are presented
as well as sample results.
In Chapter 8 the empirical study with the customers of the Nokia online shop in Germany
will be presented. Simulations for different bundle types were performed. Some of the
bundles for which willingness-to-pay was estimated were actually offered in the online
shop at the time of the study. For a selection of different bundles price response behavior
at different prices were simulated. Additionally, the impact of the marketing strategies
pure-bundling and mixed-bundling was simulated. Based upon these simulations different
effects are presented and discussed, such as cannibalization effects and market expansion
and contraction.
In Chapter 9 the main findings and results are summarized and an outlook to future
research is provided.
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Chapter 2
Pricing in the Marketing Mix
In this chapter the role of pricing in the marketing mix is examined. An emphasis is placed
on its importance and sample applications from the literature in which pricing strategies
were developed alongside with the development of a marketing strategy are present. The
main objective of this is to familiarize the reader with pricing research in the context of
marketing. The importance of pricing also explains the great interest in the topic the
management of the Nokia online shop in Germany has.
It will be shown that pricing has turned from cost oriented approaches to value based
approaches. In value based approaches a marketer estimates the perceived values of a
product and sets a price in view of these valuations. This is an important development
because in order to estimate consumers’ valuations for different product offerings a mar-
keter needs reliable instruments for estimation.
Subsequent to the discussion regarding the role of pricing in the marketing-mix the next
focus is on bundling strategies. Bundling is a special type of pricing strategy. Different
types of bundling and underlying mechanisms will be introduced as simulations of different
bundling strategies are part of the empirical investigation of this thesis, which will be
presented in Chapter 8.
2.1 The Role of Pricing
Pricing is one of the most important elements of the marketing mix (Nagle and Holden
(2002, p. 13), Monroe (2003, p. 8)). It is the only element that generates income. All
other elements, such as advertising and promotion, product development, selling effort,
distribution, packaging and so forth, involve expenditures. The price at which a product is
finally offered interacts heavily with most other elements of the marketing mix. Setting the
“right” price for a product or service is the number-one problem facing many marketing
executives.
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There exist many definitions of price in literature. Kotler and Armstrong (2001, p. 371)
define price as “the amount of money charged for a product or service, or the sum of the
values that consumers exchange for the benefits of having or using the product or service”.
Monroe (2003, p. 5) defines price more formally as
P =
M
G
with
P : Price
M : Quantity of money or goods and services received by the seller
G : Quantity of goods and services received by the buyer.
To employ a good pricing strategy for products a company needs good estimates of the
amount of money customers are willing to pay for the offered products. In practice
many firms still do not apply sufficient pricing strategies for their products (Monroe,
2003, p. 19). Among many possible mistakes in pricing decisions pricing is often too
cost oriented, rather than being based on the values of the products as perceived by the
customers. Another source of foregone profit is too little product differentiation. Product
differentiation is the modification of a product to make it more attractive to a certain
group of customers differentiating it from competitors’ products. Differentiation aims at
dividing the customers into segments and optimizing the products for the specific needs
of the segments. Differentiation requires a sophisticated pricing strategy based on the
perceived values of the products (Kotler and Armstrong, 2001, p. 371).
Mostly, the pricing of a product is placed inside a marketing strategy at a higher level, such
as a skimming or penetration strategy. This strategy determines the surrounding factors
for pricing. Within a defined strategy a firm may wish to seek short-term objectives for a
single or a family of products. Among the most common objectives is profit maximization
of the current product, or increase of market share. Both objectives rely on thorough
knowledge of how the market will react to different pricing patterns. For such short-
term objectives price is the most important element. It is the most flexible element of
the marketing mix. It can be changed and adjusted quickly and short term adjustments
translate directly into changes in profit and market shares.
Many companies base their prices for products on the consumers’ perceived values. This
approach is called value-based pricing. In contrast to cost-based pricing marketers do
not design a product and marketing program and then set the price. Rather, price is
considered along with the other marketing variables before the marketing program is set.
The company estimates the perceived value of the product which is to price. Based on
the target value and target price the decisions about the design of the product and the
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Cost-Based Pricing
Product → Cost → Price → Value → Customers
Value-Based Pricing
Customers → Value → Price → Cost → Product
Figure 2.1: Cost-Based versus Value-Based Pricing (Nagle and Holden, 2002, p. 4).
costs can be incurred (Kotler and Armstrong, 2001, p. 386). The difference between
the two procedures is shown in Figure 2.1. Orienting pricing decisions towards value
rather than basing them on costs if more difficult, but the profit potential for having a
working value-oriented pricing strategy is far greater than with any other pricing approach
(Monroe, 2003, p. 192). On the other hand poor profits because of misinterpretations of
the consumers’ valuations are also possible. If the anticipation of the perceived value is
too high, and prices are set too high accordingly, the sales of the company will suffer. If
the products are underpriced, they produce less revenue.
Taking an orientation towards value indicates recognition that preferences of customers
are not constant but rather change (Monroe, 2003, p. 192). For developing a pricing
strategy based on value companies need to estimate the currently perceived values of
their products. In practice most firms attempt to measure the demand for their products
directly at different prices based upon historical sales data. This does not always lead
to the wanted results, because the demand often depends on the competitors’ prices.
Additionally, there exist other elements in the marketing mix that affect the demand, for
example an increase in advertising, or external effects such as holiday weekends. When
the demand for different products at different price levels is estimated based on historical
sales data, the marketer must be sure that all influencing effects on the sales data do not
vary. This proves to be difficult in competitive markets and is often not feasible (Kotler
and Armstrong, 2001, p. 381).
Therefore, marketers need to rely on other techniques. A thorough discussion of value
estimation techniques will be given in Chapter 4. At this point it is only necessary to
emphasize the importance of the knowledge of the values that customers currently attach
to products. This knowledge is substantial in order to develop a sophisticated pricing
strategy.
When a company introduces new products, different pricing strategies can be adopted.
If a single product is launched, this can either be a skimming or a penetration strategy.
Adopting a skimming strategy means charging a relatively high price for a short time for
the new innovative, or much-improved product. A penetration strategy involves setting a
lower price in order to achieve a large market share. When a new product is introduced in
combination with other new products or in the presence of existing products, a product-
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Strategy Description
Product line pricing Setting price steps between product line items
Optional-product pricing Pricing optional or accessory products sold with
the main product
Captive-product pricing Pricing products that must be used with the main
product
By-product pricing Pricing low-value by-products to get rid of them
Product bundle pricing Pricing bundles of products sold together
Table 2.1: Product-mix pricing strategies (Kotler and Armstrong, 2001, p. 401).
mix strategy is applied. Kotler and Armstrong (2001, p. 401) identify five product-
mix pricing strategies which are presented in Figure 2.1. All strategies target different
customer segments and rely heavily on correctly identifying the values customers attach
to the products the company offers.
2.2 Sample Applications of Pricing Studies
One of the techniques used to estimate the perceived value customers attach to products
is conjoint analysis. The method will be introduced in detail in Chapter 5. In this section
some selected cases in which researchers have attempted to develop a pricing strategy
based on perceived values are introduced. The cases presented estimate perceived values
by conjoint analysis. The context in which conjoint analysis has been applied with respect
to price ranges from product pricing, product/concept evaluation, product repositioning,
competitive analysis of products, to market segmentation (Green and Srinivasan, 1990).
The first example for estimation of perceived values is in the context of evaluation of
“really” new products. With really new products no competing products exist, and the
demand for them is created when the product is introduced. To understand the impor-
tance of different features and to develop a pricing strategy for such products conjoint
analysis can be applied. Green et al. (1997) used conjoint analysis to evaluate different
concepts for electronic toll collection in regional transportation in the New York - New
Jersey area. At this point there existed no such system, and the potential customers had
little experience with electronic toll collection. With the study Green et al. managed to
identify the key aspects of the system of which one was price. With the study the authors
estimated the perceived values the participants attached to the usage of different elec-
tronic toll collection systems. Based upon these findings market forecasts were performed
and the system was designed and successfully introduced.
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The second example is the repositioning of a pricing strategy for subscriptions to a per-
forming arts series. Currim et al. (1981) performed a conjoint analysis to test the impact
of different factors on subscriptions for a performing arts series. It was planned to offer
events bundled together in package subscriptions. Important questions among others were
how to set the discounted price for package sales and the price for single tickets. Statisti-
cal analysis of historical data did not provide the necessary variable variations to address
the outlined questions. Experimenting with prices was also not possible, because the
performing arts organization served only a regional geographic area, and thus were con-
cerned with potential ill-will if different customers from the same audience were sold the
same subscriptions at different prices. In addition to the conjoint study the respondents
were ask to provide information about their income. Based upon this information the
respondents were segmented. The study showed that the importance for price varied for
the different customers segments. With higher income the importance of price decreased,
and other factors such as prestige of actors became more important. Also, the importance
of package discount decreased for higher income segments. The study clearly indicated
the importance of a diversified pricing strategy for different customer segments. “The
challenge is to develop a strategy that responds to the price and discount indifference of
the high-income groups and the sensitivity of others” (Currim et al., 1981). Thorough
knowledge is needed of the size of the segments and estimates of willingness-to-pay for
tickets and packages in the different segments. Based upon estimates of the preference
structure and willingness-to-pay the marketing mix of the performing arts organization
was optimized, and sales and profits could be increased.
The third example is a pricing study carried out by Green and Krieger (1992) to estimate
the effect of the repositioning of a pharmaceutical firms medical treatment product used
in hospitals. The pharmaceutical firm’s product competes with two similar products
and holds a market share of about 29%. 365 conjoint interviews were performed with
responsible personnel of different hospitals. The conjoint study consisted of the product’s
relevant attributes and varying cost levels for patient treatment. Based upon the elicited
data the analysts were able to estimate the profit per single treatment under an optimal
product design (with an optimal price), assuming that the competitors held their product
profiles constant. Second, under the same assumptions the authors optimized a product
that would yield the highest market share. Third, another option was the introduction of
a new differentiated product besides the existing product. Market shares and profits for
this option were also estimated. With the estimation of the price response behavior to
different product configurations a successful repositioning strategy could be implemented.
Based upon their findings Green and Krieger (1992) point out the four most important
issues in product positioning and pricing:
1. Estimation of market shares for different product configurations.
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2. Optimization of product configurations under profit-return aspects.
3. Identification of customer segments.
4. Estimation of cannibalization effects.
A fourth example is the development of telephone tariffs (Eggenberger and Christof, 1996).
In view of the liberalization of the telephone market planned by the European Union
for 1998, the authors point out that the market would turn towards a buyer’s market.
Therefore it is important for new entrants to have estimations of preference structure
of all participants in the market. Eggenberger and Christof analyze relevant factors for
telephone tariffs in a liberalized telephone market by adaptive conjoint analysis. The two
most important factors are availability and price. Based upon the analyzed factors the
authors were able to segment the respondents of their interview in four clusters. Each of
the clusters had a different preference structure. Based upon the data they were able to
perform market forecasts under different scenarios. They suggest that a new telephone
provider should pay attention to the two most important factors: Price and availability.
In addition designing a marketing strategy for the business segment, the provider should
especially design products for different customer segments.
Another example for the estimation of perceived values in the context of new product
introduction is found in an article by Mahajan et al. (1982). For new product introductions
the authors emphasize the importance of estimating price demand curves for penetrating
existing markets as well as for developing markets. The authors perform a conjoint study
testing different brands of consumer nondurable goods at different prices.
Balderjahn (1991) applied conjoint analysis to estimate price response functions for per-
sonal computers. The market share of a new computer under different pricing schedules
was estimated, while the competing computers were held constant in price.
The list of sample applications published in scientific journals could be continued here.
However, we do not wish to present a comprehensive overview of possible applications,
but rather attempt to show the important impact that value estimation techniques play
in designing a marketing strategy in the literature as well as in practical applications.
2.3 Product Bundling
This section focuses on a special form of product differentiation, known as product
bundling. In product bundling products are grouped together for joint sales. Differ-
ent bundles as well as the unbundled products can be differentiated by suitable pricing
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strategies aimed at the customers’ valuations for the different offerings. As later in Chap-
ter 8 an empirical study on bundling will be discussed, this type of pricing strategy is
thoroughly studied here.
Product bundling is used in many fields of retailing. Well known examples are found
in the fast-food industry. Restaurants like McDonald’s, Burger King, and Pizza Hut
group food together as menus. In the software industry this is a common phenomenon
as well. For many years Microsoft has adopted this strategy. Different programs for text
processing, spread sheets, and presentation are sold together as MS Office. Other fields
are the tourism and the services industry, and so forth. See Wu¨bker (1999) or Simon and
Wu¨bker (1999, pp.18-21) for more applications.
A bundling strategy can be used for product repositioning or product differentiation. The
former is the altering of an existing product to make it more appealing to the market
place. In the latter one or more attributes of an existing product are modified to make
it different from others. Bundling an existing product together with additional features
or services can serve as a repositioning or differentiation strategy. In view of this Eppen
et al. (1991) suggest that bundles should be treated as new products.
Generally, bundling can be used for the introduction of new products bundled together
with existing products. An example for this is given in Simonin and Ruth (1995). The
authors perform a study to test for willingness-to-pay for a new product bundled together
with different tie-in products. They find that the valuation of the tie-in product affects
the valuation of the new product.
Product bundling has also been applied to the distribution of information goods, for ex-
ample newspaper articles, music, photographs, video clips, stock quotes, research reports,
and so forth. A discussion on bundling of information goods can be found in Varian
(1995), Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999a), Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999b), and Kephart
et al. (2001). Bundling information goods is a special case of bundling because these
goods typically do not have variable costs. Only fixed costs for the initial production of
the goods occur. Since variable costs can be neglected, very large bundles can be offered,
for example all video clips in contrast to a selected subset of video clips. However, the
dynamics underlying these bundling strategies differ from the dynamics of physical goods.
For this reason, they are not of interest in this dissertation and will not be considered in
the following.
The primary benefit of product bundling lies in the segmentation abilities, by which
consumer surplus can be extracted more effectively (Schmalensee (1984), Olderog and
Skiera (2000)). In marketing research bundling is often described as a form of price
discrimination. The most often cited taxonomy of price discrimination is found in Pigou
(1920, pp. 275). In this taxonomy three levels of discrimination exist.
First-degree price discrimination is also referred to as perfect price discrimination. It
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means that the supplier of some product can sell it to every customer at a different price.
Prices for different units of the product can also be varied from customer to customer.
Second-degree price discrimination means that the supplier sells different units of a prod-
uct for different prices. But every customer who buys the same amount of the product
pays the same price. Thus, the price depends on the amount of the product purchased.
In contrast to first-degree price discrimination it does not depend on who does the pur-
chasing. Volume discounts are a common example of this sort of pricing.
Third-degree price discrimination occurs when the supplier sells some product to different
customers groups or segments at different prices. But every unit of the product sold to
a group sells for the same price. This is the most common form of price discrimination.
Examples of this include student discounts, senior citizen’s discounts, and so forth. The
difference between second- and third-degree price discrimination lies in the objective,
which the differentiation is aimed at. In the former case the differentiation is based on
properties of the products, in the latter case on properties of the consumers.
As will be argued in the following, product bundling is a form of price discrimination
of the third degree. Price discrimination under product bundling depends on how much
the different customers are willing to pay. Under different product bundling strategies,
customers self-select into segments based upon this property.
For illustration of the underlying mechanism of product bundling we follow the well known
model of Adams and Yellen (1976). In this simple model two products are bundled
together. Suppose two products X and Y are offered for sale. The two products do
not depend on each other. Furthermore, a market with only one vendor of the products
is assumed and reselling of goods is prohibited. The vendor attempts to maximize her
profit. In such a monopolistic scenario the vendor can apply different bundling strategies.
The strategies we consider here are pure-unbundling, pure-bundling, and mixed-bundling.
Under pure-unbundling the products are only sold separately. Under pure-bundling the
products X and Y are only sold bundled together as one offering. Under mixed-bundling
the products are offered as a bundle and are also sold separately.
The marginal cost of supplying the two products is assumed to be independent of the
amount produced. The marginal cost of supplying the two products as a bundle is equal
to the costs of supplying the two products individually. Fixed costs are not considered in
this scenario.
The customers in the market each have a maximum amount of money they are willing to
pay for each of the products. Each of these prices is called willingness-to-pay (WTP). In
the following chapter willingness-to-pay will be defined more closely. At this point it is
only important to know that willingness-to-pay refers to the maximum amount of money
a person is willing to pay for some product.
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The WTPs for the two products are known individually and the consumers behave as
follows:
1. A consumer buys a product only if his or her willingness-to-pay is greater than the
price of the product. When a consumer buys a product he or she realizes a surplus,
which is the difference between the willingness-to-pay and the sales price.
2. In pure bundling the two products are viewed as one product by the consumers and
the WTPs for the two products sum up to the willingness-to-pay of the bundle.
This implies that there are no dependencies between the two products and the
corresponding WTPs.
3. In mixed-bundling consumers have the same valuations for the two products sold
separately and for the bundle. A consumer chooses the combination of products
that leaves the highest surplus.
Every customer buys at most one unit of each product. With these underlying assumptions
the sales volumes in the market can be depicted for all three strategies. The graphical
illustrations in figures 2.2 to 2.4 show different size segments of customers who buy one
of two products X and Y , or buy both products separately or in a bundle.
In Figure 2.2 customer segments are shown under a pure-unbundling scenario for two
products X and Y . The market is divided into four segments labelled from A to D by
the sales prices for the two products denoted by px and py. Segment A consists of the
customers who buy only product Y , segment B consists of the customer who buy both
products separately, and those who buy product X are in segment C. Segment D contains
the customers who buy nothing.
Customer segments under pure-bundling with a price pb for the bundle are shown in
Figure 2.3. The market is divided into two segments, A and B. Segment A consist of the
customers who buy the bundle, segment B consists of the customers who do not buy the
bundle.
Figure 2.4 shows the customer segments under mixed-bundling. The prices for the two
products are the same as under pure-unbundling, and the bundle price is the same as
under pure-bundling. By the prices px, py, and pb the market is divided into the four
segments A, B, C, and D. Note that segment B, which contains the buyers of the bundle,
is larger under mixed-bundling than the segment of the customers who buy both products
separately under pure-unbundling. Some of the customers who only bought product Y
under pure-unbundling have switched to buying the bundle. These customers are denoted
by a. Others have switched from buying product X to the bundle, denoted by c. Some
customers have even switched from not buying anything to the bundle, denoted by d.
Respectively, the segments A, C, and D are smaller than under pure-unbundling.
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wtpy
wtpxpx
py
A B
CD
A: Customers buying product Y
B: Customers buying both products
C: Customers buying product X
D: Customers buying nothing
wtpx: Willingness-to-pay for product X
wtpy: Willingness-to-pay for product Y
px: Price of product X
py: Price of product Y
Figure 2.2: Customer segments under pure-unbundling.
wtpy
wtpxpb
pb
A
B
A: Customers buying bundle B
B: Customers buying nothing
wtpx: Willingness-to-pay for product X
wtpy: Willingness-to-pay for product Y
pb: Price of the bundle B
Figure 2.3: Customer segments under pure-bundling.
wtpy
wtpxpx
py
A B
CD
pb
pb
a
c
d
A: Customers buying product Y
B: Customers buying bundle B
C: Customers buying product X
D: Customers buying nothing
a, c, d : Customers switched to bundle B
wtpx: Willingness-to-pay for product X
wtpy: Willingness-to-pay for product Y
px: Price of product X
py: Price of product Y
pb: Price of bundle B
Figure 2.4: Customer segments under mixed-bundling.
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Figure 2.5: Comparison of surplus derived from purchase of bundle and of product Y .
The reason why customers switch from a single product to the bundle is that they derive a
higher surplus from buying the bundle. This can be seen from the foreshortened Figure 2.5.
For willingness-to-pay α in area a the surplus from buying product Y is denoted by sy.
The surplus from buying the bundle is the sum of the perceived surplus from acquiring
both products denoted by s′y and s
′
x. The surplus from buying bundle B is higher than
the surplus from buying only product Y , s′y + s
′
x > sy. For this reason any customer who
has a willingness-to-pay in area a would prefer bundle B over product Y . The same holds
for product X, which is left out in Figure 2.5.
The customers in area d did not buy anything under pure-unbundling deriving zero sur-
plus. Since they derive a surplus from buying the bundle under mixed-bundling, they also
switch to buy the bundle.
The increase in sales is due to the fact that the segments have different sizes under the
different bundling strategies, because the customers behave differently.
With the assumption that the WTPs for the two products sum up to a willingness-to-pay
for the bundle, customers can be motivated to purchase the bundle, even though they
have a willingness-to-pay below the single price for one of the products. The exceeding
consumer surplus for the single product, which the customer would buy separately, is
transferred to the other product, and the customer switches to buy the bundle. For some
customers who did not buy anything under pure-unbundling the surplus from the purchase
of the discounted product bundle is spread on the two products. For the customers who
buy the bundle the heterogeneity of their WTPs is reduced by combining them to a single
willingness-to-pay for the combined product.
By a short numerical example the bundling mechanism of two products will be illustrated.
Suppose, there are four customers in a mobile phone market with properties similar to
those described above. A monopolistic vendor offers one type of telephone and one type
of headset for sale. Let the customers have individually known WTPs which are given in
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Customers Mobile Phone Headset Bundle (Phone + Headset)
1 90,- e 10,- e 100,- e
2 80,- e 30,- e 110,- e
3 70,- e 40,- e 110,- e
4 40,- e 50,- e 90,- e
Table 2.2: Example of product bundling and WTPs
Table 2.2.
Let price for the mobile phone be pm and for the headset ph. The unit costs for the two
devices are denoted by cm and ch. In our our example they are both 10,- e. Customer i
purchases a product if his or her willingness-to-pay exceeds the price of the product. The
willingness-to-pay for customer i and the mobile phone is denoted by WTP im and for the
headset by WTP ih.
The maximization problem for the profit function P for the customers 1 to 4 under pure-
unbundling can be formulated as follows:
max P =
n∑
i=1
αi · (pm − cm) + βi · (ph − ch)
subject to
αi · pm < WTP im ∀ i = 1, . . . , n
βi · ph < WTP ih ∀ i = 1, . . . , n
pm, ph ∈ R+
αi, βi ∈ {0, 1} .
Under pure-unbundling it would be optimal to offer the mobile phone at 79,99 e and the
headset at 39,99 e. Customers 1 and 2 would buy a phone. Customers 3 and 4 would
buy a headset. The vendor would realize a profit of 199,96 e (P ∗) from the sales of the
two products, by P ∗ = 2 · (79, 99− 10)+2 · (39, 99− 10). If the vendor offered the headset
at 29,99 e , customers 2, 3 and 4 would buy one. With the price for the mobile phone
unchanged this would lead to a profit of 199,95 e.
Let the price for the bundle consisting of the mobile phone and the headset be pb. The
willingness-to-pay customer i has for the bundle is WTP ib = WTP im+WTP ih. The unit
costs of the bundle are cb = cm + ch.
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The maximization problem for the profit function P for the customers 1 to 4 under pure-
bundling can be formulated as follows:
max P =
n∑
i=1
γi · (pb − cb)
subject to
γi · pb < WTP ib ∀ i = 1, . . . , n
pb ∈ R+
γi ∈ {0, 1} .
Under pure-bundling it would be optimal to offer the bundle at 89,99 e. All customers
would buy the bundle. The vendor would realize a maximal profit (P ∗) of 279,96 e.
In this market it would be more profitable to employ a pure-bundling strategy than a
pure-unbundling strategy.
For mixed-bundling the maximization problem for the profit function P for the customers
1 to 4 can be formulated as follows:
max P =
n∑
i=1
αi · (pm − cm) + βi · (ph − ch) + γi · (pb − cb)
subject to
αi · pm < WTP im ∀ i = 1, . . . , n
γi · (WTP ib − pb) < αi · (WTP im − pm) ∀ i = 1, . . . , n
βi · ph < WTP ih ∀ i = 1, . . . , n
γi · (WTP ib − pb) < βi · (WTP ih − ph) ∀ i = 1, . . . , n
pb < pm + ph ∀ i = 1, . . . , n
γi · pb < WTP ib ∀ i = 1, . . . , n
pm, ph, pb ∈ R+
αi, βi, γi ∈ {0, 1} .
Under mixed-bundling the bundle is offered at a price below the sum of the prices of the
bundled products. Otherwise, there is no incentive for any customer to buy the bundle
because the components can be bought separately. With a mixed-bundling strategy it
would be optimal to offer the mobile phone at 89,99 e, the headset at 49,99 e, and the
bundle at 109,99 e. Customer 1 would only buy the phone, customers 2 and 3 would buy
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the bundle, and customer 4 would only buy the headset. This would lead to a profit of
319,96 e (P ∗), by P ∗ = 89, 99 − 10 + 2 · (109, 99 − 10) + 49, 99 − 10. In this market it
would be optimal for the vendor to employ a mixed-bundling strategy, because it leads to
higher profits than a pure-bundling or a pure-unbundling strategy.
As can be seen from the example, the profitability of the different bundling strategies de-
pends on the structure of the consumers’ WTPs and on the cost structure of the products.
In order to select the optimal strategy the marketer requires knowledge of the individual
WTPs of all consumers in the market and of the cost structure of the products. These
are the main findings that Adams and Yellen (1976) draw from their model. As shown in
the empirical investigation for bundling in the Nokia online shop, these two are the main
criteria to select a bundling strategy.
Building upon the model of Adams and Yellen (1976) other researchers have general-
ized the findings by assuming populations of consumers with different distributions of
willingness-to-pay. Schmalensee (1984) extended the model for the two product case from
individually known WTPs to a distribution of WTPs and analyzes the bundling strategies
more formally. He aimed at drawing general findings about the relationship between the
WTPs for the bundled products and the variable cost structure. For his model he assumes
a bivariate normal distribution for the WTPs. He explains his choice as follows:
The frequency with which normal distributions arise in the social sciences
makes the Gaussian family a plausible choice to describe the distribution of
tastes in a population of buyers.
(Schmalensee, 1984)
With this assumption Schmalensee (1984) numerically confirmed that the correlation be-
tween WTPs for different products influences the benefit of bundling strategies. If WTPs
for two products are negatively correlated, that is one is high, the other one is low, or
vice versa, bundled sales with optimal prices lead to higher profits. The structure of
the variable costs of the products is also very important. An essential prerequisite for a
bundling strategy is that the WTPs of the consumers are higher than the variable costs.
With these findings Schmalensee provided conditions under which the use of the different
strategies yields the highest profits.
Note that other authors, such as Fu¨rderer (1999) and Olderog and Skiera (2000), also
assumed that WTPs for product bundles are normally distributed. In the empirical in-
vestigation in this thesis this assumption will be challenged.
Similar results as found by Schmalensee (1984) were derived from a simulation performed
by Olderog and Skiera (2000). Their main findings were that the relationship between the
variable costs and the WTPs is more important than the correlation between the WTPs.
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They found that bundling of products that have a similar profitability (price - costs) leads
to higher profits than bundling products that have different profitability.
Other researchers have provided optimization approaches for larger bundling problems, as
for example Hanson and Martin (1990) and Fu¨rderer (1999). Other authors provided qual-
itative guidelines derived from empirical findings to design bundling strategies. Examples
are Eppen et al. (1991) and Simon and Wu¨bker (1999).
2.4 Summary
This chapter focussed on the role of pricing in the marketing mix, demonstrating its im-
portance and presented sample applications from the literature in which pricing strategies
were developed alongside with the development of a marketing strategy. Our empirical
investigation aims at the optimization of the pricing strategy of the Nokia online shop in
Germany for bundled sales, and pricing of products is of ample importance to the operator
of the shop.
In more detail product bundling as a pricing strategy was discussed. A special focus was
laid on different types of product bundling and the underlying mechanisms were compared.
We have argued that a consumer’s behavior to different bundling strategies depends on his
or her’s willingness-to-pay (WTP) for the bundled components. To show this, graphical
illustrations were presented, and by a short numerical example it was demonstrated how
different bundling strategies yield different profits.
For the research on product bundling the main findings of the corresponding literature
were presented. The main findings are that the products’ variable costs and the correla-
tion between the consumers’ WTPs for the different products play an essential role when
a bundling strategy is employed. It is a prerequisite for bundling that the WTPs of the
consumers targeted by bundling are higher than the variable costs of the bundled prod-
ucts. Some researchers suggested that bundling is more profitable, when the individual
consumer’s WTPs for the different products are negatively correlated. When the cus-
tomers buy the bundle, the heterogeneity of their WTPs is reduced by combining them
to one willingness-to-pay for the combined product.
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Chapter 3
Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) in
Marketing
“Pricing decisions can be complex and difficult, but they are some of the most important
marketing decision variables a manager faces” (Monroe and Cox, 2001).
In designing a pricing strategy, the basis is to set the prices for the goods in view of
how much the customers are willing to pay for each of the goods. It is important for the
marketer to predict how many of the offered products will be bought at different prices. To
predict the demand for different products at different prices the marketer needs a profound
understanding of the reaction of his or her customers to different pricing schedules.
There are two distinct concepts that determine how much a customer is willing to pay
for goods or services. These are the maximum price and the reservation price. Both will
be introduced and discussed in this chapter. In addition to discussing how consumers
make choices for or against goods offered at different prices, it will be illustrated how this
behavior differs depending on which concept (maximum price or reservation price) the
consumer applies internally.
The main argument is that often a marketer cannot distinguish between the two concepts.
Therefore, the subsuming term willingness-to-pay (WTP) is used by practitioners as well
as by researchers.
Also, it will be rationalized in this chapter that it is reasonable not to distinguish between
the maximum price and the reservation price if a pricing strategy is designed. The reason
is that regardless of the underlying concept the consumer reaction has the same behavior.
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3.1 Maximum Price
The first concept introduced is the maximum price. Following Nagle and Holden (2002,
chap. 4) we define it as follows:
Definition 1 Maximum Price
The maximum price (pmax) of a product is formed by a consumer as the perceived reference
price of the reference product plus the differentiation value between the reference product
and the product of interest.
Formally the maximum price for a product can be expresses as
pmax = pref + pdiff .
The maximum price is denoted by pmax, the reference value is pref , and pdiff is the differ-
entiation value.
The reference value for one unit of a product is the cost of the competing product that
the customer views as the best alternative. The differentiation value is the value of any
differences between the product of interest and the reference product.
It will be illustrated how the maximum price works by example: Suppose a hot summer
day at the beach.1 The value of a cool drink is extremely high for most people - perhaps
as high as 10,- e for a bottle of cold water. Economists refer to this value as use value,
or the utility gained from a product. If a vendor walked the beach trying to sell water at
10,- e , the people would probably not be willing to pay what the product is really worth
to them. They might assume or even know that a competing seller would give them a
better deal. A competing seller could be a supermarket which is located just across the
street from the beach. Of course a thirsty person had to walk over to the supermarket,
but there he or she could probably buy a bottle of water at the price of 2,- e.
In order to set a good price the knowledge of the utility of a product only helps a marketer
in rare occasions. Knowing what economists call exchange value and what marketers call
economic value to the customer is more helpful. This value is determined mainly by what
alternatives are available for the customer. In the above example people might be willing
to pay 4,- e for a bottle of water from a vendor at the beach, rather than walking to a
supermarket across the street. Looking closely at the example, by offering the product “at
the beach”, the vendor is offering a differentiated product compared to the same product
at the supermarket. The differentiated product is worth more to the people who are lying
on the beach.
Customer behavior based on economic value can be summarized as follows:
1Example adapted from Nagle and Holden (2002, p. 74).
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A products ‘economic value,’ then, is the price of the customer’s best alterna-
tive (called the reference value) plus the value of whatever differentiates the
offering from the alternative (called the differentiation value). Differentiation
value may have both positive and negative elements. [...] Economic Value is
the maximum price that a ‘smart shopper,’ fully informed about the market
and seeking the best value, would pay.
Nagle and Holden (2002, p. 75)
The economic value a person assigns to a product depends heavily on the circumstances
under which it is offered (Balderjahn, 2003, p. 389). Suppose it was Sunday and the
supermarket across the street from the beach was closed and the next best alternative
was driving 10 minutes to the closest gas station to get a bottle of water. Perhaps then a
person at the beach would be willing to pay 6,- e for a bottle of water from the walking
vendor. It is important to notice, if either the reference value or the differentiation value
changes, the maximum price changes as well.
Different purchase situations under which products are offered are an important issue
especially in pricing studies. To approximate real choices of different offerings, the re-
spondents must be put in a situation as close as possible to the real purchasing situation.
If a pricing study for different products in an online shop is conducted, it has to take place
online in a shop-like environment with the same look-and-feel and offered information as
the real shop.
In order to develop a pricing strategy based on economic value Nagle and Holden (2002,
pp. 76-82) suggest the separate measurement of reference value and differentiation value.
Measurement of the reference value is easier. Often a substituting product can be iden-
tified or an average value of the alternative offerings can be calculated. Measuring the
differentiation value is more challenging. The differentiating factors of the product being
evaluated have to be identified. For each of the factors the positive or negative differenti-
ation value has to be estimated. For objective factors this can often be done by analyzing
consumer behavior, for example by analyzing costs of repair that occur when an infe-
rior product is used. For subjective factors differentiation values can be estimated by
surveying techniques.
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3.2 Reservation Price
Different to the maximum price is the concept of the reservation price. This concept can
be described as follows:
Economists call a person’s maximum willingness to pay for something that
person’s reservation price. The reservation price is the highest price that
a given person will accept and still purchase the good. In other words, a
person’s reservation price is the price at which he or she is just indifferent
between purchasing or not purchasing the good.
Varian (2003, p. 4)
Unlike the maximum price the reservation price does not depend on a reference product.
The reservation price for a product is a monetary equivalent of what the product is really
worth to the consumer. That is the utility of the product. At the reservation price the
consumer extracts the same surplus from purchasing and not purchasing the product. For
this dissertation the reservation price is defined as follows:
Definition 2 Reservation Price
The reservation price (pres) of some product is the price at which the consumer is indiffer-
ent between consuming or not consuming the good (or any other good of the same product
class) at all.
Following Srinivasan (1982, p. 82) a product class is defined to be a set of products from
which the utility of consumption is additive separable from all other consumption.
To illustrate the reservation price suppose a different example2: In a small town there
is a small university which has a number of dormitories on campus. The university has
more students than rooms in the dormitories. Every student prefers to live on campus,
because the campus is located outside of town. For every student there is some maximum
amount of money he or she is willing to pay to live on campus. Consider the student who
is willing to pay the most, say 100,- e per month. If the rent for the rooms was set at
that price, exactly one room would be rented - to the one student who was willing to pay
100,- e. The price this student is willing to pay is the reservation price. At this price the
student is essentially indifferent to living on campus or not.
Consider the student with the second highest maximum amount of money the or she is
willing to pay. Let that amount be 85,- e. If the rooms were offered at that price, two
rooms would be rented - to the two students who are willing to pay at least as much
2Example adapted from (Varian, 2003, chap. 1)
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as 85,- e. The student who pays 85,- e pays exactly his or her reservation price. The
student with a reservation price of 100,- e pays a price below the reservation price and
realizes a consumer surplus.
The consumer surplus is the difference between what the consumer would be willing to
pay and what the consumer actually has to pay (Mansfield and Yohe, 2004, p. 93). From
this we derive the definition of the consumer surplus as follows:
Definition 3 Consumer Surplus
The consumer surplus realized from purchasing a product is the monetary difference be-
tween the products utility, represented by the reservation price, and the sales price.
3.3 Willingness-to-pay
There is a fundamental difference in the two examples. For the person at the beach the
reservation price for a bottle of water was 10,- e. But the highest price he or she was
willing to pay was only 4,- e. For the student with the highest reservation price of 100,- e
for a room on campus the highest price he or she was willing to pay was also 100,- e.
In the example with the bottle of water at the beach, the person was willing to pay the
maximum price. In the example with the rooms on campus, the student was willing to
pay the reservation price.
The difference lies in the circumstances under which the products are offered. The cir-
cumstances influence how much an individual is willing to pay for a product. For the
example with the rooms on campus the student has no alternative to living on campus
but to rent the room at the offered price. So, the choice is either to live on campus or not
to live on campus. In the example with the bottle of water there are competing vendors
selling slightly differentiated products. On the beach competition can be observed, for
the room rental on campus there is just one landlord.
How much a person is willing to pay depends on the perceived economic value and on the
utility of the good. These two values determine whether the price a person is willing to
accept is the reservation price or the maximum price. If a person believes that there is no
alternative offering, the highest amount of money he or she is willingness to pay equals
the utility of the good and is the reservation price. If a person perceives an alternative
offering with an economic value below utility, the highest price he or she would accept
equals the economic value of the product and is the maximum price.
When a marketer observes a price at which a consumer switches from purchasing to
not purchasing or vice versa, often it cannot be determined whether that was a reser-
vation price or a maximum price. In this case a more general term for this price is
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Figure 3.1: Purchase situation pmax ≤ pres with four products.
applied. Following Dowdeswell (1995, Annex 6, Glossary) this price is defined here as the
willingness-to-pay.
Definition 4 Willingness-to-pay (WTP)
The willingness-to-pay is the highest price an individual is willing to accept to pay for
some good or service.
Based on the circumstances outlined above two purchase situations can be identified:
Purchase situation pmax ≤ pres: The reservation price is higher than or
equal to the maximum price.
Purchase situation pmax > pres: The reservation price is below the max-
imum price.
In purchase situation pmax ≤ pres the reservation price remains an unobservable variable
because willingness-to-pay is determined by the maximum price. Consider the example
with the bottle of water at the beach. Although the person had a higher reservation price,
the observed willingness-to-pay was only 4,- e.
In purchase situation pmax > pres willingness-to-pay is determined by the reservation price.
In the example for of the rooms on campus the marketer can observe that all students
who did not rent a room at 100,- e had a reservation price below this amount. When
the price is lowered step by step and more students rent rooms, the reservation prices of
these students can be observed.
Note that in this example the maximum price equals the current rent, as there is no alter-
native. The reference product is the same room in the dormitory, and the differentiation
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Figure 3.2: Purchase situation pmax > pres with four products.
value is zero. For the student who rented a rom for 100,- e, the purchase situation was
pmax = pres.
For the graphical presentations of the two purchase situations a different example will
be used. Think of the market of PDAs (personal digital assistant). The price of a PDA
ranges from approximately 100,- e to a couple of hundred. There exist many different
brands, and many vendors offer a great variety of competing products. For any type of
PDA offered at a selected price there exists an alternative offering, hence, competition
always exists. A person who buys a PDA has a reservation price above or equal to the
sales price. A person who chooses not to have a PDA simply does not value them high
enough to actually purchase one. He or she has a reservation price below the maximum
price.
Figure 3.1 shows purchase situation pmax ≤ pres for one consumer who is facing four
different PDAs offered at different prices. The consumer has a very high utility for PDAs
and therefore a reservation prices well above the usual market prices. The reservation
prices for different products are denoted by the reservation price line pres. The consumer
perceives the product offerings 1 to 4 as having different economic values. These economic
values are formed from the perceived sales price of the reference product pref offset by
the differentiation values. From the economic values of the products the maximum prices
are formed. The maximum prices for the four products lie on the maximum price line,
denoted by pmax. PDAs 2 and 3 are offered at prices above the consumer’s maximum
prices. Therefore, the consumer would not buy any of these two. PDAs 1 and 4 are
priced below the consumer’s maximum prices. Out of these two the consumer chooses
one, which offers the highest consumer surplus, that is, the positive differential between
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the reservation price and sales price. The consumer chooses product 1.
Figure 3.2 shows purchase situation pmax > pres for a different consumer facing four
different PDAs. This consumer does not need a PDA. When he or she builds a maximum
price, for any product offering this price will be somewhere in the usual price range of
PDAs. Since the consumer does not need one, for every product offering he or she has a
reservation price below the maximum price. The consumer’s reservation prices are denoted
by the reservation price line pres, the maximum prices by the maximum price line pmax.
Since the reservation price line is below the maximum price line, the consumer chooses not
to buy any product offering, and it can be seen that the lower price of the two concepts
determines the willingness-to-pay.
3.4 Treatment of Willingness-to-Pay in Marketing
Usually a marketer is not interested in whether willingness-to-pay is determined by the
reservation price or the maximum price. It is more important to correctly predict con-
sumers’ choice behavior when they are presented different products at different prices.
The fact that marketers are not so much interested in the difference between the reserva-
tion price and the maximum price can be seen from the following quotes from the current
marketing literature. The quotes show that researchers do not distinguish clearly between
the two concepts.
... each customer has a maximum price they are willing to pay for a given
product which equals the product’s value to the customer. This price is the
consumer’s reservation price for the product. The consumer compares her
reservation price for each product with its purchase price and chooses the
product that offers the largest differential.
Kalish and Nelson (1991)
... the upper price threshold is referred to as the buyer’s reservation price.
Regardless of the term used, it recognizes that at a specific point in time there
is a maximum price that buyers are willing to pay for a product or service.
Monroe and Cox (2001)
The reservation price is the maximum price a consumer is willing to pay for a
certain good. Since the reservation price is the upper limit of the acceptable
price range for a product, it corresponds directly with the perceived value of
the good. If a consumer purchases a good at a price below the perceived value,
he or she realizes a consumer surplus.
Balderjahn (2003, p. 389)
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Upon examination of literature there does not appear to be any discussion in the marketing
literature on the differentiation between reservation price and maximum price. We will
investigate in the next section whether the missing differentiation is reasonable.
3.5 Linearity and Parallelism of Different Concepts
In Figures 3.1 and 3.2 it is assumed there are two important properties for the curves
describing the reservation price and the maximum price: Firstly, the curves are linear and
secondly they are parallel.
If these two properties are true, a marketer need not know whether willingness-to-pay
is determined by reservation price or by maximum price because the only difference is
whether the value scale reflects utility or economic value. Both scales can be represented
by an interval scale with the same unit length and can therefore be transformed onto
one another by addition or subtraction. Both properties of the curves, linearity and
parallelism, will be justified in the following.
Starting with linearity of the relationship between utility and price as expressed by the
reservation price line, and between economic value and price as expressed by the maximum
price line. The intuition of the argumentation is that if a consumer does not buy a
product at a certain price, he or she saves the corresponding amount of money for later
consumption. We believe that a consumer perceives additional 2,- e for consumption to
be twice as beneficial as an additional 1,- e. If this is true, the two relationships must be
linear.
Investigating this relationship further exploits a concept that economists refer to as the
composite good. In any purchase situation money that is not spent on some good is
automatically spent on the composite good. The composite good stands for everything
else a consumer might want to consumer other the good of the current purchase situation
(Varian, 2003, p. 21).
If a consumer does not buy a product in a certain purchase situation, he or she auto-
matically spends the money on the composite good. For the amount of money which can
be spent on the composite good, the consumer will choose a combination that yields the
highest possible consumer surplus.
If the same consumer spends the same amount of money on the composite good a second
time, he or she will again choose a combination that yields the highest possible consumer
surplus. Because the composite good is infinitely large and arbitrarily divisible, the con-
sumer can always find a combination that yields the same highest possible consumer
surplus as the first time. Since the same amount of money is spent, the utility values
of the two combinations must be the same, in order that the surpluses are the same.
Therefore, the relationship between utility and price must be linear.
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The assumption of a linear relationship between utility and price was also used by other
authors. Jedidi and Zhang (2002) for instance define the composite good to have a linear
utility function.
The linearity between economic value and price, that is, the maximum price, will now be
examined. It is only necessary to have look at purchase situation pmax ≤ pres, because
only then the consumers’ purchase behavior is determined by the maximum price. In this
situation a consumer does not accept the price for a product if it exceeds the maximum
price.
Here it is assumed that the product the consumer is currently faced with belongs to a
class of products. In addition to the definition of a product class given in Section 3.2, we
define that for each class of products there exists only one reference product, for which the
consumer has a perceived market price. This implies that if a consumer perceives different
reference products for similar goods, these goods belong to different product classes.
As there is only one reference product in a class the differentiation of all other products
is perceived in terms of utility. Therefore, the maximum price of every product is offset
to the price of the reference product by a price that reflects the differentiating amount
of utility. Because the relationship between utility and price is linear, the relationship
between the economic values of the products in the class and price must also be linear.
From this argument it follows directly that the reservation price line and the maximum
price line must also be parallel. This is due to the fact that the difference in terms of
utility of the products in a class corresponds to the same price difference. This does not
depend on whether the prices are offset to the maximum price or the reservation price of
the reference product.
In Figure 3.3 a purchase situation pmax ≤ pres is shown. The curves of the reservation
price pres and the maximum price pmax are linear and parallel. The line representing the
reservation price goes through the natural origin of the utility scale. In terms of utility all
products can be compared even if they belong to different product classes. If a product
has zero utility, a consumer would not pay any money for acquiring the good.
At the intersection of the maximum price line and the utility scale the consumer would not
pay any money for a product, even though it has a positive utility value. The intersection
represents the zero point of the economic value scale of the product class. Because the
differences between the products of the class are measured in terms of utility, it follows
that the economic value scale is an additive transformation of the utility scale.
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Figure 3.3: Maximum price and reservation price for a product class.
3.6 Excursion: Economic Theory
on Reservation Price
By applying standard economic theory it can also be shown that the relationship between
utility and price must be linear. The argument depends on the assumption that the
composite good has a linear utility function.
Following Varian (2003, p. 63) a utility function for two products X and Γ can be
formulated as
U(x, γ) = uX(x) + uΓ(γ). (3.1)
Hereby x is the amount of some product X, for which the reservation price is not known,
and γ denotes the amount of the composite product Γ. We assume that the function
U(x, γ) is quasilinear, that is, can be written as in Equation (3.1) with uΓ(γ) contributing
linearly to the utility and uX(x) being any monotone increasing function with uX(0) = 0
and uΓ(0) = 0.
U(1, γ) > U(0, γ′) where γ′ > γ. (3.2)
On the left hand side of this equation the utility is given for an individual who consumes
one unit of product X and consumes some amount of the composite good. On the right
hand side of the equation the customer does not consume product X and therefore con-
sumes a greater amount of the composite good denoted by γ′. An individual will choose
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to consume product X if he or she derives a higher utility from consuming the product
than from not consuming it.
As shown in Section 3.2 the reservation price for a product X is defined as the price at
which the consumer is just indifferent between consuming good X or not consuming it.
Therefore, the reservation price p∗X for one unit of product X is found, when the customer
is indifferent between purchasing or not purchasing the product. Formally, indifference
can be expressed by the following condition:
U(1, γ) = U(0, γ′) where γ′ > γ. (3.3)
When consuming the goods X and Γ at the unit prices pX and pΓ, each consumer is
confronted with an individual budget constraint which can be defined as m = pXx+ pΓγ.
Since the composite good is defined to be arbitrarily divisible, the price for one unit of Γ
can be set to 1 (Varian, 2003, p. 21). For the consumption and non consumption of one
unit of product X the following equations derived from the budget constraint hold
γ = m− pX (3.4)
γ′ = m. (3.5)
For the sake of formal simplicity and since only the case of buying one or zero units of
X is considered, let uX denote the utility of consuming one unit of product X, that is
uX := uX(1). Using the quasilinear utility function in Equation (3.1) the condition for
indifference in Equation (3.3) can be rewritten as
uX + uΓ(γ) = uΓ(γ
′). (3.6)
Since uΓ(γ) is linear with uΓ(0) = 0, it can be replaced with a line with slope k and
intercept 0 in Equation (3.6) resulting in
uX + k · γ = k · γ′. (3.7)
Applying the budget constraint from Equations (3.4) and (3.5) the following condition for
the consumption of one unit of product X at the reservation price p∗X can be formulated
uX + k · (m− p∗X) = k ·m. (3.8)
Applying some simple arithmetic to the equation m can be eliminated. Then, if the utility
and the reservation price for one unit of product X is known, the slope k of the utility
function of the composite product Γ can be calculated by
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k =
uX
p∗X
. (3.9)
Economically, the factor k represents the exchange rate between utility and money. With
the factor k the reservation price for any product configuration for which the utility is
known can be calculated.
3.7 Excursion: Cardinal versus Ordinal Utility
Economists of the nineteenth century treated utility as measurable in a cardinal sense.
This changed in the twentieth-century. In modern economics utility is treated as measur-
able in an ordinal sense (Mansfield and Yohe, 2004, p. 56). The treatment of utility in an
ordinal sense provides an ordering according to preference of different product bundles.
Any numbers attached to this ordering do not bear any information besides bundles with
a higher number being preferred over a bundles with a lower number. A utility func-
tion is “simply a way to represent or summarize a preference or ordering. The numerical
magnitudes of utility levels have no intrinsic meaning” (Varian, 2003, p. 69). This less
restrictive assumption is sufficient to model most scenarios in economics.
However, describing a preference structure in terms of a ranking is not always sufficient
in a marketing context. For a marketer it is important to know, how much more some
individuals prefer one alternative over another. Though it is difficult for a consumer to
state how much more he or she likes some bundle over another (say twice as much), a
cardinal scale exists.
A consumer can very well state that he or she likes some product a lot more than another,
compared to two other products between which the consumer is almost indifferent. Even
though these differences cannot be elicited from consumers directly, they can be estimated
by analyzing a sufficient number of preference decisions.
Consider a simple example. Some conjoint analysis procedure estimates utility values for
the attributes of a car for one specific consumer. These values form an additive utility
function, which represents the preference structure of the consumer.
Suppose only the attributes brand and color are relevant, because the other attributes are
held constant. The attribute’s levels and estimated part-worths are given in Table 3.1.
Then, four different cars can be constructed from the attributes: A green Mercedes with
utility 11, a blue Mercedes with utility 12, a green Honda with utility 4, and a blue Honda
with utility 5. These utility scores not only permit a ranking of the cars, blue Mercedes
(12)  green Mercedes (11)  blue Honda (5)  green Honda (4), as in ordinal utility
theory, but the utility scores also permit the conclusion that having a Mercedes over a
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Brand Part-Worth
Mercedes 10
Honda 3
Color Part-Worth
Green 1
Blue 2
Table 3.1: Example of cardinal utility.
Honda, regardless of the color, is a lot better than having a Honda in the preferred color.
In other words, with everything else equal only little is gained from having a blue Honda
instead of a green Honda (5− 4 = 1). Much more is gained from having a green Mercedes
than having a blue Honda (11− 5 = 6).
Marketing instruments to estimate preference structure from consumers treat utility at
least in a cardinal sense. In conjoint analysis, for example, every product is assumed
to consist of a certain number of attributes. These attributes are assigned numerical
values representing cardinal utility. In pricing studies these cardinal utility values are
assigned relative of even absolute prices. With absolute prices, such as estimations of
willingness-to-pay, the utility scores are used as ratio scales.
3.8 Summary
In this chapter the concepts maximum price (pmax) and reservation price (pres) were
introduced and discussed. For a consumer there exist two types of purchase situations,
pmax ≤ pres and pmax > pres. In both situations the amount of money a consumer is
willing to pay for a good is determined by the lower concept. That is, in the former the
consumer is willing to pay pmax in the latter the consumer is willing to pay pres.
From examples of the current marketing literature we have demonstrated that researchers
usually do not distinguish between the two concepts. If one does not distinguish between
the two, the term willingness-to-pay can be used. Under this term both concepts subsume.
We have proposed a justification that willingness-to-pay can be used when the marketer
is only interested in the consumers’ purchase behavior when they are confronted with
different prices. The justification depends on the argument that the reservation price and
the maximum price have a linear relationship with the products utility. Furthermore,
the reservation price line and the maximum price line are parallel. Hence, consumer
choice based on maximum price and on reservation price have the same behavior, and the
only difference is an additive transformation. Therefore willingness-to-pay is a sufficient
concept and can be applied when consumer purchase behavior is analyzed.
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Chapter 4
Measuring Willingness-to-Pay
In many companies pricing decisions are made without profound understanding of the
likely response of the buyers and competitors. These companies do not conduct pricing
research and as a result do not have a serious pricing strategy in a marketing sense. They
rather have something that could be called an intuitive pricing strategy. Several studies
indicate that only 8% to 15% of the companies conduct serious pricing research to develop
effective pricing strategies (Monroe and Cox, 2001). Other studies have shown that 49.9%
of the surveyed companies adjust prices once or less in a typical year. Further, only 13%
of the prices that were changed were a result of a scheduled review of the current pricing
policy (Monroe, 2003, p. 19).
In contrast to what seems to be common practice, managers consider the knowledge of
customers’ response behavior to different prices to be the cornerstone of most marketing
strategies, particularly in the areas of product development, value audits, and competitive
strategy (Anderson et al., 1993).
On the importance of valid estimates of willingness-to-pay (WTP) researchers agree with
managers. Balderjahn (2003, p. 387) considers valid estimates of willingness-to-pay to be
essential for developing an optimal pricing strategy in marketing. Such estimates can be
used to forecast market response to price changes and for modeling demand functions.
In this chapter different methods that are applied for measuring willingness-to-pay are
introduced. We classify these methods and give references to substantial theoretical and
empirical work. The advantages and drawbacks of the methods are discussed. The discus-
sion of the different methods clearly indicates that the best method that should be used
does not exist. Rather it depends on the objective of the marketer. If costly methods can
be applied and quick results are not of main interest, different pricing strategies can be
tested with field experiments in real market settings. If estimations of willingness-to-pay
are needed frequently, it can be more efficient to apply less time consuming and less costly
surveying techniques.
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4.2. Market Data 4.3 Experiments
WTP Estmation
Field ExperimentsLaboratory
Experiments
Expert / Salesforce
Surveys
4.5 Indirect Surveys4.4 Direct Surveys
Customer Surveys Conjoint Analysis Discrete Choice
Analysis
Observations Surveys
Acutions / BDM
Figure 4.1: Classification of methods for estimation of willingness-to-pay.
At the end of the chapter it will be demonstrated that within indirect surveying there is a
method missing which has both the ability to estimate willingness-to-pay at the individual
level based on each respondents information and explicitly elicits choice behavior during
the interview.
4.1 Classification of Methods
A classification of methods to estimate willingness-to-pay is presented in Figure 4.1. On
the highest level the methods can be distinguished whether they are surveys or based on
data from observations. Taking a closer look at observations, real data can be used, such
as market data, or experiments can be performed. Experiments can further be divided in
field experiments and laboratory experiments. Within field experiments one can further
distinguish, whether the probands are aware they are participating in an experiment or
not. Observations are also referred to as revealed preference.
Looking at surveys for estimation of willingness-to-pay there exist direct surveys and indi-
rect surveys. Preference data derived from surveys is also referred to as stated preference.
In direct surveys probands are asked to state how much they would be willing to pay for
some product. In indirect surveys some sort of rating or ranking procedure for different
products is applied. Conjoint analysis is an indirect surveying method.
A different classification can be found in Marbeau (1987). The author distinguishes the
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measurement methods on the highest level, whether they are monadic tests or competitive
tests. In the former price information is elicited without considering a competitive context.
In the latter a competitive context is present.
Balderjahn (2003) distinguishes estimation methods on the highest level, whether they
elicit price information at the individual level or at aggregate level.
Nagle and Holden (2002) classify techniques for measuring price sensitivity at the high-
est level into uncontrolled and experimentally controlled measurement of the variables.
Further they classify the techniques based on the variable measurement, dividing into
measurement of purchase behavior and measurement of purchase intention.
All classifications are capable in order to describe methods for estimations of willingness-
to-pay. However, the structure of this chapter is based on the classification presented in
Figure 4.1.
4.2 Analysis of Market Data
Often market data is used to estimate demand curves. As shown in Figure 4.1, market
data are classified as observations. Usually it contains sales data.
There exist three kinds of sales data suitable for estimation of willingness-to-pay: (1)
historical sales data - the companies’ own sales records, (2) panel data - individual pur-
chase data from members of a customer panel, and (3) store scanner data - sales records
from individual sales outlets. Using historical data is based on the assumption that past
demands can be used to predict future market behavior. This implies that the product
for which future demand is estimated has only been exposed to minor variations in the
product profile. This also applies to competitors and consumers. A problem is that often
historical data does not contain the necessary price variations to cover the desired spec-
trum of WTPs. If the price variations are too small, response to variations outside of
the market data can only be hypothesized. The necessary price variation often appears
to be a pitfall when analyzing historical sales data. Sattler and Nitschke (2003) classify
estimation of willingness-to-pay based upon market data as not feasible, since only very
few datasets contain the necessary variations. Demand curves based upon sales data is
usually modeled with regression techniques. But this is only possible if the requirements
of the independent variables are met (cf. Balderjahn (2003, p. 399) and Nessim and
Dodge (1995, p. 72)).
Note that historical sales data is often available only at the aggregate level. The data
is aggregated over time and different stores are combined. Single customers are usually
not identified, which makes individual level estimations impossible. This is different with
panel data. The actual prices paid for products are observed at the individual level. The
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drawbacks are that having a customer panel is very costly to companies. Furthermore, it
is often questionable, whether the customer panel adequately represents the market as a
whole (Nagle and Holden, 2002, p. 335).
Scanner data is usually aggregated at store level. It is usually not aggregated over time.
Therefore it is useful for observing response to short time price variations. Because of the
store level aggregation, individual level repeated purchase behavior cannot be extracted
from scanner data.
Using market data the researcher can only observe whether an individual or a group had a
willingness-to-pay above the product price, because the product was actually purchased.
Customers who refused to purchase the product are not reported in historical sales data.
4.3 Experiments
Generally experiments can be distinguished between laboratory experiments and field
experiments. Both types can be applied in pricing studies. In laboratory experiments
purchase behavior is typically simulated by giving the probands an amount of money and
asking them to spend the money on a specific selection of goods. The goods and prices
are varied systematically. Methods for accessing price response of this form have been by
applied by Silk and Urban (1978) in their well-know ASSESSOR procedure. In laboratory
experiments the results are obtained quickly. A drawback is that the probands are aware
of the experimental situation. This might lead to subjects becoming more rational of
their purchase behavior compared to their normal shopping behavior which can lead to
low external validity (Nessim and Dodge, 1995, p.74). Another source of bias might be
the artificial setup as described above, in which the proband either does not take real
possession of the goods purchased, or does not use his or her own money (Nagle and
Holden, 2002, p. 341).
Field experiments or in-store purchase experiments do not suffer from the problem of the
artificial setup because they are performed in the natural environment of the consumers.
Depending on the experimental setup the proband knows that he or she is participating
in an experiment. Field experiments are often carried out in form of test markets. In
different test markets the prices are systematically varied and the consumers’ responses
are analyzed. A crucial issue is to select test markets as similar to the target market as
possible.
The drawback of field or in-store experiments lies primarily in the relatively high costs
(Nagle and Holden, 2002, p. 341). Generally, both types of experiments are costly com-
pared to surveying techniques. Sattler and Nitschke (2003) also identify the high costs
performing test markets and other field experiments as the main disadvantage of this type
of estimation techniques.
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4.3.1 Vickrey Auction
A special case of laboratory experiments are auctions. Auctions have been intensively
tested to elicit willingness-to-pay.
If a seller knew the true valuations of the customers, there would be no need for an auction.
The seller would simply sell the good to the bidder with the highest valuation at a price
close or equal to that valuation. If the seller is uncertain about customers valuations, an
auction is a valuable instrument to sell the item at a good price. Therefore, an auction is
useful to gain knowledge of consumers’ valuations of a good and can therefore be used to
reveal consumers’ valuations of goods to facilitate future pricing decisions.
According to Wertenbroch and Skiera incentives to reveal true willingness-to-pay can
be provided with Vickrey auctions (Vickrey, 1961). “Vickrey suggests that incentive
compatibility is ensured if a given bid determines only whether the bidder has the right to
buy the good that is auctioned off” (Wertenbroch and Skiera, 2002). The auction takes
place in sealed form, and the purchase price is determined by the second highest bid. A
participant in a Vickrey auction submits a bid containing how much he or she would be
willing to pay in sealed form, for example in a closed envelope. If the participant has the
highest bid, he or she wins the auction. However, the participant only has to pay the price
of the second highest bid. Therefore, if n participants bid in a Vickrey auction the n’th
highest bid wins the auction at the price of the n−1’th highest bid. With this mechanism
the participants are provided an incentive to reveal their true bid, because they must buy
the good if their bid wins the auction (Vickrey, 1961).
Consider a Vickrey auction with two participants Anton and Beatrix. The item for sale
is worth 100 e to Anton and 99 e to Beatrix. Assume that Beatrix bids her exact
willingness-to-pay of 99 e. If Anton also bids his true willingness-to-pay of 100 e , he
wins the auction and only pays the amount of Beatrix’s bid of 99 e. He realizes a positive
surplus of 1 e. If Anton bids below his true valuation, for example 95 e, he will not
win the auction. Furthermore, Beatrix wins and pays a price that Anton also would have
accepted. Now consider a third bidder Christian who has a valuation of 101 e and bids
this valuation. If Anton bids above his true valuation, for example 105 e , he wins the
auction and has to pay 101 e for the item. He has to pay more than his true valuation
and therefore realizes a negative surplus. The example shows that it is always optimal
for Anton to bid his true valuation in a Vickrey auction. The same holds for Beatrix and
Christian.
Skiera and Revenstorff (1999) tested the ability of Vickrey auctions to reveal consumers’
WTPs. The authors test a sample of slightly more than 50 MBA students at the University
of Kiel in the year 1996. Different mobile-phone contracts were offered in a Vickrey
auction. The contracts had different conditions, and the bids were placed for the monthly
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base fee. The mechanism of the auction was described to the students, and the optimal
bidding strategy was explained (which is bidding the true valuation).
As is common in preference measurement the authors used holdouts to test the estimated
preferences. Holdouts are used to test if the estimated preference structure can be used to
correctly predict preference or choice for a number different products. These products for
which the preference structure is tested are called holdouts. In Skiera and Revenstorff’s
experiment the probands were asked to rank different mobile-phone contracts given a base
fee. Only probands were considered, who had at least on bid above one of the holdout
stimuli. With this the probands who would not accept any of the offered contracts were
rejected from the experiment. Out of the remaining probands, a fraction of roughly 20%,
the most preferred choice could be predicted based on the bids. Whether the estimated
WTPs correspond to real purchase behavior, was not tested in this study.
Based on an additional questionnaire the probands seemed to have a good understand-
ing of the mechanism of the auction. The optimal bidding strategy was less clear to the
probands. The bids of the probands are positively correlated to information about mon-
etary income and probability of renewing a contract in the near future. Therefore, the
bids seem to be reasonable.
In a different experimental setting Sattler and Nitschke (2003) compared different meth-
ods to estimate willingness-to-pay. In their experiment they tested for external validity
by requiring the respondents to purchase an item at a willingness-to-pay estimated by one
of the different methods. One of the tested instruments was the Vickrey auction another
was a first-price auction. In a first-price auction the bidder with the highest bid wins and
purchases the item at the price of his or her own bid. Sattler and Nitschke (2003) find
that the Vickrey auctions in addition to the first-price auctions both tend to overestimate
consumers willingness-to-pay. The authors suppose that this effect is due to the overbid-
ding phenomenon. The overbidding phenomenon occurs when bidders strategically place
bids above their true willingness-to-pay to increase their chance of winning (Kagel et al.,
1987).
Based upon the empirical evidence presented in the literature the use of Vickrey auctions
cannot clearly be suggest nor discouraged for the estimation of willingness-to-pay.
4.3.2 Becker, DeGroot and Marshak Procedure
If one accepts that experimental auctions, such as the Vickrey auction, can be used to
estimate willingness-to-pay, there is a vast field of research of how to design such auctions.
Another method that is incentive compatible, in the sense that the best strategy for the
bidders is to bid their true willingness-to-pay, is the well-known BDM procedure named
after Becker, DeGroot and Marshak (Becker et al., 1964). In BDM every participant
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simultaneously submits an offer price to purchase a product. Then, a sale price is randomly
drawn from a distribution of prices. The possible prices cover an interval from zero to a
price greater than the anticipated maximum price, which any bidder would submit. The
bidders whose bids are greater than the sale price receive a unit of the good and pay
an amount equal to the sale price. The mechanism is incentive compatible for the same
reason as the Vickrey auction: A given bid determines only whether the bidder has the
right to buy the good that is auctioned off. The price is set by some mechanism and is
below the participants bid.
BDM was tested by a number of researchers for its ability to forecast willingness-to-pay.
Wertenbroch and Skiera (2002) tested it in a field experiment. The authors find BDM a
feasible, reliable, and valid market research procedure. The participants of the experiment
easily understood the BDM method and hardly any of the approached individuals refused
to participate. Data was easily gathered in several hundred interviews. Reliability was
determined by comparing mean WTPs across four daily respondent sub-samples. Validity
was determined by relating the estimated WTPs to data from an additional questionnaire
asking the respondents to rate their desire of the tested products.
In a laboratory experiment Wertenbroch and Skiera (2002) tested BDM in combination
with a purchase obligation. After the experiment the participants rated how satisfied they
were with their purchase. The buyers as well as the non-buyers were extremely satisfied
with the outcome of the BDM experiment. This result indicates that BDM does not suffer
from the overbidding bias, which is found in some Vickrey auctions.
In a recently published study Noussair et al. (2004) compare the Vickrey auction with the
BDM mechanism. The authors test the two mechanisms with respect to firstly a bias of
bids to the true valuation of the objects being auctioned, and secondly which mechanism
leads to bids closer to the true valuation, and thirdly which mechanism converges towards
the true valuations more rapidly. In their experimental setup the optimal bidding strategy
(bidding the true valuation) is not explained to the probands. The aim of their study is
to measure the probands ability to find that strategy under the two mechanisms.
A large experiment was carried out in France with almost 200 probands chosen by drawing
names randomly from a local telephone directory. The probands bid for different consumer
goods. Each proband was assigned a true valuation drawn randomly from a predefined
distribution of valuations. Without going into the details of the experimental setup, the
authors find that under the Vickrey auction the bias from the true valuation is more
rapidly reduced. That is, the probands learn the best bidding strategy more quickly.
Another measure, the dispersion of bids, is also narrowed more rapidly under the Vickrey
auction than under the BDM mechanism. The authors argue that the reason for this
difference lies in the fact that a deviation from the optimal strategy is more costly under
the Vickrey auction than under the BDM mechanism. Therefore, the probands learn the
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bidding strategy quicker under the Vickrey auction. Another reason is that the Vickrey
auction seems to be easier to understand than the BDM mechanism. With respect to
these results the authors report “our research indicates that, given the procedures we
have used in our study, the Vickrey auction is preferable to the BDM mechanism as an
instrument for the elicitation of the willingness-to-pay for private goods” (Noussair et al.,
2004).
The applied research of experimental auctions to estimate willingness-to-pay is rather lim-
ited. Still, the underlying auction mechanisms make this approach an appealing research
area for estimation of willingness-to-pay.
4.4 Direct Surveys
According to the classification direct surveys can be distinguished between expert judg-
ments and customer surveys.
4.4.1 Expert judgements
Expert judgements is one of the most frequently used methods for estimating customers
willingness-to-pay in order to estimate demand at different price levels. They can be
performed more quickly and at lower costs compared to interviewing customers.
For expert judgments usually sales or marketing people predict the willingness-to-pay
of their customers. Since sales representatives work directly in the market and in close
connection with the consumer, they are aware of the structure of competition and are
sensitive to trends in consumer needs. Therefore, interviewing sales people is an important
source of information for demand estimates. Nevertheless, the opinion of sales people
might be biased because of colliding objectives between the marketer and the sales force.
Usually the sales force’s rewarding system is tied to sales volume. This can result in
intentionally or unintentionally overstated or understated estimates (Nessim and Dodge,
1995, p. 70).
Letting marketing experts estimate product demand under different price schedules might
suffer from the distance to the market and the consumers. In contrast to estimates
provided by sales people there are no incentives to over- or understate true estimates.
However, an opinion of a single expert is always a subjective point of view. Usually there
are less marketing people in a company than sales people. Resting upon opinions of few
marketing people might also lead to erroneous forecasts of future demand.
This type of survey is best applicable to environments with a small number of customers.
In such environments the customers are known well enough to correctly predict WTPs.
With larger and heterogeneous customer bases this becomes a critical issue.
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Despite the shortcomings of expert judgments described above, they are an important
source of information because an educated guess is better than a random selection of a
presumably adequate price from a number of price possibilities (Nessim and Dodge, 1995,
p. 70).
Other authors, for example Balderjahn (2003, p. 391), label expert judgments as a poor
marketing instrument with low validity and discourage from its use.
4.4.2 Customer Surveys
Naturally, if one attempts to forecast consumer behavior in response to different prices, a
good way is to ask the customers.
One of the oldest methods for estimation of willingness-to-pay is the direct survey. One
of the first applications was the psychological price method developed by Stoetzel (1954).
Stoetzel’s idea was that there is a maximum and minimum price for a product. These
studies consisted only of two questions as formulated by Marbeau (1987):
1. Above which price would you definitely not buy the product, because you can’t
afford it or because you did’t think it was worth the money?
2. Below which price would you say you would not buy the product because you would
start to suspect the quality?
Directly asking the respondents to indicate acceptable prices is referred to as the direct
approach. Other researchers have build upon this method and research in this area became
quite popular (e.g., Abrams (1964), Gabor et al. (1970), and Stout (1969)).
Van Westendorp (1976) introduced the NSS price sensitivity meter, consisting of four
questions. Two additional questions to the questions developed by Stoetzel ask for a
reasonable cheap price and a reasonable expensive price. Applications of NSS can be still
found in commercial applications.1
Several recent methods for direct customer surveying have established themselves. An
example is the commercial tool BASES Price Advisor from ACNielsen.2 This procedure
presents the probands with several typical product profiles. These product profiles can
be in an early conceptual phase or already marketable. The probands are then asked to
name prices at which they consider a product to have a very good value, an average value,
and a somewhat poor value. From the responses buying probabilities for different prices
1E.g., the Czech company GFL offers NSS to determine critical price ranges for new or re-launched
products, http://www.gfk.cz/en/offer/solution/pricing.aspx, visited June 25th, 2004.
2For details see the online resource under http://www.bases.com, visited June 17th, 2004.
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are derived. According to Balderjahn (2003, p. 392) “a somewhat poor” value could be
interpreted as a reservation price.
Instead of directly asking the maximum price for a product, the respondent can be shown
a product profile with an assigned price. The respondent then indicates whether he or she
would actually buy the product at that price. This is sometimes referred to as an indirect
approach to customer surveying (Marbeau, 1987). Indirect approaches are discussed in
the next section.
Directly surveying customers has some flaws:
1. By directly eliciting willingness-to-pay from customers, there is an unnatural focus
on price.
2. Customers do not necessarily have an incentive to reveal their true willingness-to-
pay. They might overstate prices because of prestige effects or understate prices
because of consumer collaboration effects. Nessim and Dodge (1995, p. 72) suppose
that “buyers in direct responding may also attempt to quote artificially lower prices,
since many of them perceive their role as conscientious buyers as that of helping to
keep prices down”. Nagle and Holden (2002, p. 344) observe the opposite behav-
ior. To not appear stingy to the researcher respondents could also overstate their
willingness-to-pay.
3. Even if customers reveal their true valuations of a good, this valuation does not
necessarily translate intro real purchasing behavior (Nessim and Dodge, 1995, p.
72).
4. Directly asking for WTPs especially for complex and unfamiliar goods is a cog-
nitively challenging task for respondents (Brown et al., 1996). While it remains
unclear whether this leads to over- or understating of true valuations a bias is likely
to occur.3
5. The perceived valuation of a product is not necessarily stable. Buyers often mis-
judge the price of a product, especially if it is not a high frequency purchase or an
indispensable good (Marbeau, 1987). On a shopping trip an individual might have
a too high or too low expectation of the price for a product. Directly asked, the
individual would state a willingness-to-pay that matches this expected price. When
the individual finds out the usual market price for the product during the shop-
ping trip and still decides to purchase, he or she has adapted the willingness-to-pay
accordingly.
3This effect will also occur in Vickrey auctions, cf. Section 4.3.1. In this type of auctions the partic-
ipants also have to name a price they are willing to pay for a product. If this product is unfamiliar or
complex, this is a difficult task.
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A large empirical comparison between a field experiment, a laboratory experiment, and
a personal interview was carried out by Stout (1969). In the experiment the prices for
different products were varied and the changes in demand were measured. The results
showed significant quantity changes on systematic price changes in the field experiment.
As expected, the demand for the products decreased as the prices were raised and vice
versa. For the other two methods no significant changes in demand for the products
could be measured and raised and lowered prices. The personal interview even contained
reversals. For some respondents the demand increased when the prices were raised.
Directly asking customers their WTPs for different product seems not to be a reliable
method. Balderjahn (2003, p. 402) explicitly alludes to the distortional effects of direct
surveys and advise against its use. (Nagle and Holden, 2002, p. 345) states that “the
results of such studies are at best useless and are potentially highly misleading”.
4.5 Indirect Surveys
In contrast to directly asking respondents for their WTPs, they can be presented product
profiles with a price assigned and be asked to indicate whether they would purchase the
good at that price. In an approach proposed by Camron and James (1987), the authors
suggest to present to a random sample of probands random product profiles with assigned
prices. “Across the selection of product scenarios, the investigator is free to vary not only
the proposed price, but also the levels of all other product attributes. Each consumer’s
willingness or unwillingness to purchase the specific product at the designated price is
recorded. If the experimental design includes variability in the levels of prices, product
attributes, and consumer characteristics, the researcher will be able to us the statistical
techniques [...] to calibrate the demand function” (Camron and James, 1987).
Since the respondent is presented a number of products with assigned prices, a real pur-
chase situation is mimicked more closely than in direct surveys in which the respondent
has to state an acceptable price. Furthermore, it is cognitively easier for a respondent to
decide whether a specific price for a product is acceptable, than to directly assign a price
(Brown et al., 1996). When the respondent is presented competing product alternatives,
he or she can be asked to select his most preferred choice or apply a preference ordering.
Applications of this type are presented in the next two sections.
4.5.1 Conjoint Analysis
Conjoint analysis is a technique designed to elicit individuals’ preference structures for
types of products. When this technique is used, different product alternatives, systemati-
cally varying the attributes of the product, are presented to the respondent. A product’s
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attribute is a set of possible realizations. These realizations are referred to as the at-
tribute’s levels. An example of one of many attributes of a car is its color. The levels
could be red, white, black, and so forth. The respondent is presented a number of product
profiles consisting of realizations of the product’s attributes and brings them in a rank or-
der. This rank order is used to estimate the relative contribution of the different attribute
levels to the overall valuation.
Conjoint analysis has been used for measuring willingness-to-pay by many authors, (e.g.,
Hanson and Martin (1990), Eppen et al. (1991), and Venkatesh and Mahajan (1993)).
Usually price is included in the conjoint analysis and treated as an attribute or feature of
the product. As for the other attributes the contribution of price to the overall valuation
is computed for different levels of price. When a participant has completed a conjoint
analysis, it can be predicted which product out of a number of available products with
assigned prices is most attractive.
From the preference information it cannot be estimated whether the respondent would also
buy the product at the assigned price. Therefore, researchers usually assume some kind
of status quo product at a price the respondent would actually accept. This product is
used as an anchor against which all other products are priced. For example, the marketer
assumes some product configuration with a price as the status quo product, and then
adjusts the price of some other product such that it becomes equally attractive as the
status quo product. This approach relies heavily on the assumption that the respondents
would accept the status quo product at the given price. If the consumers were not willing
to pay the price for the status quo product in the first place, they would also not be
willing to pay the estimated prices for other product configurations.
One attractive approach to estimate willingness-to-pay by conjoint analysis was proposed
by Voeth and Hahn (1998). This method does not rely on a status quo product. Instead,
the probands bring the product profiles in a rank order and then insert a so-called Limit-
card. Up to the position of the Limit-card the respondent would be willing to purchase
the product profile at the indicated price, below the Limit-card the respondent would not
purchase the product. The authors label their approach Limit-conjoint-analysis. Voeth
and Hahn understand the position of the Limit-card as the origin (the absolute zero) of
utility. They then transform the estimated contributions of the product features onto a
ratio scale. Based upon this scale a price for each product profile can be found such that
each has a utility of zero to the respondent. These prices are the respondent’s WTPs for
the products. An illustration of the transformation onto a ratio scale is given in Figure 4.2.
A similar approach was used in an empirical study by Sattler and Nitschke (2003), who let
the probands order different product profiles with prices and ask them to indicate those
which they would actually purchase. The stimulus with the lowest overall part-worth is
used as anchor point to calculate all other WTPs.
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Figure 4.2: Individual transformation of utility scores onto a ratio scale with a Limit-card
(Voeth and Hahn, 1998).
Unlike regular conjoint analysis in which the researcher selects a status quo product, the
respondent selects the status quo product, which is the position of the Limit-card. With
this the main source of error, selecting an inappropriate status quo product, is avoided.
One drawback still arises from the configuration of prices by the researcher. In a conjoint
interview the attribute price is usually configured to cover the range of usual market
prices. This is problematic for respondents who have a willingness-to-pay way above or
below the average market price. These respondents rate or rank a large number of profiles
with prices assigned that are far displaced from their willingness-to-pay. It can happen
that the relevant product stimuli are only presented in very few conjoint questions and
therefore few relevant data-points are elicited.
4.5.2 Discrete Choice Analysis
In discrete choice analysis the respondents choose between alternative products (McFad-
den (1980), McFadden (1986)). Discrete choice analysis is also referred to as choice-based
conjoint analysis (Louviere and Woodworth, 1983). The connection to conjoint analysis
lies in the ability of both methods to decompose products into attribute levels and es-
timate part-worth utilities for these levels. Methodologically the two methods are quite
different. Whereas conjoint analysis estimates the part-worths for each respondent indi-
vidually based on the respondents’ data only, estimates with discrete choice analysis are
obtained only at the aggregate level using the data of all respondents. For discrete choice
analysis a latent utility structure for the population that is surveyed is estimated instead
of the utility structure for each member of the population individually.
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The utility structure is estimated based on a choice set available to all probands. Every
choice can be fully described in terms of its attributes. The probands are presented
different choices at the same time and indicate which one they would actually choose.
Often the respondents are provided a no-choice alternative, to indicate that they would
not choose any of the presented product profiles.
A latent preference for every choice in the evoked set is assumed to exist at the aggregate
level. The evoked set refers to the set of possible products or brands the respondent is
currently considering in the decision process. This latent preference is estimated based
on choices between different product profiles the probands make during the analysis.
For every proband the utility value for a choice is modeled consisting of a deterministic
component, that represents the latent preference structure at the aggregate level, and
a random component. The random component is due to fluctuations in perceptions,
attitudes, or other unmeasured factors (McFadden, 1986). Depending on whether the
random component is normally or logarithmically distributed, the model is referred to as
a probit-model or a logit-model. The more common model is the logit model.
Based upon random utility theory, the utility that an individual i assigns to some alter-
native can be described as
Ui = Vi + i.
In this notation Ui is the unobservable, but true utility of alternative i. Vi is the observable
or systematic component of utility and i is the random component.
Price is included as an attribute of the product profile and the levels cover the range of the
possible and meaningful prices. The probability for the choice for a specific alternative i
from a specific choice set can be described by the multinomial logit model
PC(i) = EXP(Vi) /
∑
j∈C
EXP(Vj).
“In this model, C = {1, 2, ...,M} denotes a set of available alternatives, indexed from
1 to M , and P is the probability that an individual when presented with this set will
choose alternative i” (McFadden, 1986). Note that V does not depend on the individual.
This parameter describes the latent preference structure of the population. The unknown
parameters Vj for all alternatives j ∈ C are typically estimated from the data by a
maximum likelihood procedure. The probability for a product PC is used as a market-
forecast and can be viewed as the potential market share.
Since part-worths for different prices are estimated, a change in price can be expressed in
terms of change in utility. The exchange rate between utility and price can be calculated.
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Given this exchange rate the willingness-to-pay for any product profile relative to the
most preferred choice in an individual’s evoked set can be calculated. An example of an
empirical study using this approach can be reviewed in Balderjahn (1991).
As can be seen from the estimation procedure described above, discrete choice modeling
aims at estimating preference structure at the aggregate level. In this approach it is not
possible to directly estimate part-worths at the individual level because usually too few
data points are elicited. This is due to the fact that the observation of a choice out of
an evoked set only contains information about the chosen product and not about the
remaining products. This is different in conjoint analysis in which a ranking or rating
of all products is provided by the respondent. Therefore, the preference structure for an
individual can be estimated based upon the data elicited in the corresponding conjoint
interview. An individual’s preference structure cannot be estimated from the data elicited
in a single discrete choice interview.
In many applications, for example in order to forecast the market share of a new product,
aggregate level estimation of preference is sufficient. However, in many situations it is
desirable to obtain estimates of every individual’s preference structure. From data elicited
by discrete choice analysis part-worth estimations at the individual level can be obtained
in a postprocessing task utilizing a hierarchical Bayes approach. This approach will be
described in the next section.
4.5.3 Hierarchical Bayes
From data collected by a discrete choice task part-worths at the individual level cannot
directly be estimated because the dataset is too sparse. In such cases Hierarchical Bayes
(HB) Methods can be used to recover individual preference heterogeneity even with in-
sufficient degrees of freedom (Lenk et al., 1996). Especially HB can be used to estimate
individual part-worths for choice data (Allenby and Ginter, 1995). To obtain individual
level estimations a “Monte Carlo Markov Chain” method (MCMC) can be used which
utilizes a “Bayesian” approach to estimate the part-worths.
In a HB approach the part-worths of the individual probands are assumed to be drawn
from a multivariate normal distribution. With this assumption the probability of one
specific realization of the part-worths drawn from one specific multivariate normal distri-
bution given a dataset can be expressed by utilizing Bayes’s rule as
p(Hj | y) = p(y | Hj) · p(Hj)
p(y)
.
In this notation Hj describes one hypothesis of a sequence of hypothesis, j = 1, 2 . . .. Each
hypothesis contains the parameters of the multivariate normal distribution from which the
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part-worths of the individuals are drawn. The probability of one specific realizations of
the part-worths for each individual from the distribution of the hypothesis is p(Hj). The
dataset is represented by the symbol y. Since the data set is the same for all hypotheses,
it can be regarded as a constant. With p(y) being constant for all Hj’s the equation can
be rewritten as the proportional relationship
p(Hj | y) ∝ p(y | Hj) · p(Hj).
It can be seen that the posterior probability that a hypothesis given the data is true has
a proportional relationship to the likelihood of seeing the data given the hypothesis times
the prior probability of the hypothesis.
The parameters of each subsequent hypothesis are formed only based upon the current
parameters of the multivariate normal distribution. The parameters are selected such that
the fit of the model to the dataset is improved in each step. Repeating this process many
times makes this an MCMC approach.
The Hierarchical Bayes approach is called “hierarchical” because it consists of two lev-
els. At the upper level the vector of part-worths for each individual i is drawn from a
multivariate normal distribution described by
bi ∼ N(α,C)
in which α is a vector which contains the means and C a matrix which contains the
variances and covariances of the part-worths of the population.
At the lower level a logit model is assumed for each individual describing the probability
of choosing the selected products in the choice tasks in the dataset. See the previous
section for details of the multinomial logit model.
The procedure starts with initial estimates for bi for all individuals and estimates for α
and C. To simplify the notation the estimates of the part-worths for all individuals are
denoted by the vector b in the following. With the parameters α, C, and b the following
steps are repeated for a large number of times:
1. Estimate a new realization of part-worths bnew which fits the dataset better than
the previous one taking the current α and C into account. This estimation is done
with a “Metropolis-Hastings” algorithm which contains the “Bayesian” nature of
the process.
2. With the new vector bnew and the dataset C a new vector αnew is estimated.
3. With the new vector bnew and the new vector αnew a new matrix Cnew is estimated.
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The subsequent estimations of αnew and Cnew can be done with straight-forward statistical
techniques (cf. Sawtooth Software Inc. (2003)).
In the “Metropolis-Hastings” algorithm the vector bnew is produced by adding a small
random perturbation to each element of the current vector b. The likelihood of the data
given bnew is estimated with the logit model. The prior probability that bnew is drawn from
the multivariate normal distribution N(α,C) is estimated. According to Bayes’ theorem,
the posterior probability that the parameters α and C of the model and the realization
bnew given the data is true is proportional to the likelihood of seeing the data given the
parameters of the model times the probability that the realization bnew is drawn from
the model. The new vector is accepted if the posterior probability is greater than the
current posterior probability with the current vector b. Otherwise, bnew is accepted with
a probability equal to the ratio between the new and the current posterior probability.
By repeating the procedure a large number of times the estimations for the parameters α,
C, and b converge. Once a desired convergence rate is reached, the process is continued
for a large number of iterations. From these iterations the average values for the elements
of the b’s are used for the final estimation of b.
By considering the multivariate normal distribution describing the part-worths of all re-
spondents the procedure “offers a very powerful way for ‘borrowing’ information from
every respondent in the dataset to improve the accuracy and stability of each individual’s
part worths” (Orme, 2003, p. 5). The borrowing of information is achieved by estimat-
ing the underlying multivariate normal distribution that describes the part-worths of the
respondents.
Several empirical investigations have shown that individual level part-worths estimated
with HB have a comparable internal validity as estimations based on conjoint analysis
when the same amount of information is given for the estimation procedures. The benefit
of HB estimation is that it can be used with sparse data to produce individual level
estimations with high internal validity (cf. Lenk et al. (1996) and Sawtooth Software Inc.
(2003)).
4.6 Empirical Evidence
An early comparisons between direct surveys eliciting willingness-to-pay, conjoint analysis
using ranking, and conjoint analysis using rating was performed by Kalish and Nelson
(1991). The experiment was conducted among undergraduate and first year graduate
students of different business classes. The authors tested the three approaches in terms of
their predictive validity on holdout products. The products of the experiment were airline
tickets described on the non-price attributes service level, seating room, and non-stop. In
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the direct survey the respondents were asked to name their willingness-to-pay for different
product configurations. Willingness-to-pay was explained to the students as the amount
of money that would make them indifferent between purchasing the ticket and keeping the
money. For the two conjoint approaches prices covering the usual range of typical prices
in the market were assigned to the product configurations. For the ranking the students
were asked to bring the products into a preference order, for the rating the students were
asked to distribute a number of rating points over the presented products. The main goal
of Kalish and Nelson’s experiment was to test for internal validity by predicting holdout
products. At the end of every survey the participants were presented four product profiles
(so-called holdouts) with assigned prices and were asked to indicate their preferred choice.
The predicted choices derived from the data of the three surveys were compared to the
actual choices of the respondents. The predictive validity of the conjoint models based
on rankings as well as the model based on ratings clearly outperform the model fit from
the directly elicited WTPs. 62% of the first choices were correctly predicted in the two
conjoint approaches compared to only 46% for the direct survey. The authors find that
directly surveying willingness-to-pay “is not as robust to respondent involvement as are
ranks or ratings” (Kalish and Nelson, 1991).
More recently researchers tested different approaches to estimate willingness-to-pay for
external validity. Sattler and Nitschke (2003) performed an empirical comparison of the
methods direct enquiry, conjoint analysis, first-price auction, and Vickrey auction. The
authors elicited willingness-to-pay for different prepaid telephone cards among students.
Each of the students was exposed to all four instruments in random order. Based upon
the estimates of willingness-to-pay derived from the four instruments Sattler and Nitschke
systematically tested for differences. Furthermore, they tested for external validity by
requiring a sub-sample of each instrument to purchase a telephone card at the indicated
willingness-to-pay. One of the elicitation methods was randomly selected for each student,
and the student was required to buy a telephone card. All approaches except the two
auction mechanisms differ pairwise significantly in estimations for WTPs. The results of
the study indicate that willingness-to-pay is systematically higher in hypothetical settings
where the probands do not have to make a purchase at the end. In real settings, with a
purchase at the end, the estimated WTPs are systematically lower. These findings are
consistent with other studies, for example Harrison and Rutstro¨m (2004) and Wertenbroch
and Skiera (2002). Sattler and Nitschke find this bias for the methods conjoint analysis,
ascending auction, and Vickrey auction. The authors could not observe it in the direct
enquiry. Note that in the real setting with a purchase at the end the estimated WTPs
also differ significantly pairwise between the four methods. Therefore, the authors cannot
draw a conclusion which method mimics real market best and should be advised for use.
In a different study Backhaus and Brzoska (2004) used a Vickrey auction to test external
validity of WTPs estimated by a conjoint procedure and by discrete choice analysis.
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The authors assume that the Vickrey auction is feasible to elicit true product valuations
and therefore can be used to test hypothetical procedures for external validity. For the
conjoint procedure a Limit-card was used as described above. The object of their study is a
selection of four different DVD players for which the probands could place bids in a Vickrey
auction after completing one of the two interviews. Backhaus and Brzoska constructed a
price-response curve for each player from the observed bidding data. Price response curves
were also constructed based upon the data elicited by conjoint analysis and by discrete
choice analysis. The authors then compared the curves of the WTPs. The comparison
showed that the two hypothetical procedures substantially overestimated the willingness-
to-pay for the participants of the experiment. At the aggregate level the overestimation
of the conjoint approach was smaller than the overestimation of discrete choice analysis.
However, at the individual level underestimations of WTPs also occurred which lessens
the overestimation at the aggregate level. Based upon their empirical findings Sattler and
Nitschke (2003) advise against the use of conjoint analysis with price as an attribute and
discrete choice analysis to estimate willingness-to-pay.
4.7 Summary
In this chapter different methods to estimate consumers’ WTPs for different products have
been discussed. The methods were classified into four classes: Analysis of market data,
experiments, direct surveys, and indirect surveys. All methods have different advantages
and drawbacks.
Market data represent real purchase behavior. Therefore, willingness-to-pay derived from
the real demand is very reliable and has a high external validity. However, in many
marketing situations market data cannot be used. For products that are not yet released
in the market, for example new or differentiated products, there exists no market data.
Also, often the prices in the market do not contain the necessary price variations. Without
such price variations demand at different price levels cannot be estimated.
Using experiments the problem of missing products or price variations can be overcome.
In this approach willingness-to-pay for different products is also estimated by observing
purchase behavior. In an experiment the products and prices can easily be adapted such
that the participants are presented the necessary variations. Depending on the artificial
setup the participants are more or less aware they are participating in an experiment.
However, experiments are time-consuming and costly. Therefore they are not suitable in
many management situations.
Less time-consuming and costly are surveys. In surveys the respondents only state their
choice or desire for a number of products. Real purchase behavior is not observed.
Within surveys a distinction is made between direct surveys and indirects surveys. When
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willingness-to-pay is estimated with a direct survey, the respondent is directly asked to
state how much he or she is willing to pay. This approach has a number of possible
biases. Often it is difficult to state a willingness-to-pay for an unfamiliar product. Also,
respondents sometimes overstate their willingness-to-pay because of prestige effects, or un-
derstate their willingness-to-pay because of customer collaborations effects (help to keep
the prices down).
Within surveys an indirect approach is the preferred method for the estimation of willing-
ness-to-pay. In indirect approaches the respondents are presented a number of different
products with assigned prices and have to choose the most preferred one or have to apply a
ranking to the products. Based upon the choices the respondents make, or the rank order
they apply, WTPs for the different products can be estimated by statistical techniques.
We have discussed two types of indirect surveys: Conjoint analysis and discrete choice
analysis (also referred to as choice based conjoint). Both can be used by marketers to
estimate willingness-to-pay. Conjoint analysis estimates the WTPs for the respondents at
the individual level based on every respondent’s data. In discrete choice analysis shares
of WTPs are estimated at sample level. For this the data provided by the whole sample
of respondents is used.
Estimation of willingness-to-pay at the individual level is important if the market for
which price response is to be estimated is heterogeneous. For heterogeneous samples or
samples for which the degree of heterogeneity is not known, individual level estimation is
better suited.
However, it is possible to estimate individual level WTPs from choice data. For this
task a Hierarchical Bayes approach can be used. The estimations for every individual are
performed by using information provided by the whole sample of the respondents. It is
not possible to estimate willingness-to-pay for each respondent based on the individual’s
choice data only.
In conjoint analysis individual level willingness-to-pay is estimated based on each respon-
dent’s data only. But other than discrete choice analysis the classical conjoint analysis
approach does not have a decision process included in the interview. That is, the respon-
dent is never asked whether he or she would actually buy a product. The respondent only
applies a preference order for the presented products. With respect to the presentation
technique to the respondent this is regarded as the main disadvantage of conjoint analysis
compared to discrete choice analysis. Letting the respondent choose rather than rate or
rank mimics real purchase behavior more closely.
To estimate product choice at different prices based on conjoint data marketers usually
assume a status quo product. The respondents of the interview are a priori believed to
buy this product. The willingness-to-pay for a competing product is then estimated as the
price at which the respondent would switch away from the status quo product. With this
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Market
data
Ex-
periments
Direct
surveys
Indirect surveys
Conjoint
analysis
Discrete
choice
analysis
Real
purchase behavior
Yes Some-
times
No (by
definition)
No (by
definition)
No (by
definition)
Flexible product &
price variations
No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-efficient &
cheap
No No Yes Yes Yes
Observed choice be-
havior
Yes Yes No No Yes
Individual level es-
timations based on
each respondent’s
data
No No Yes Yes No
Table 4.1: Characteristics of different estimation techniques for willingness-to-pay.
approach WTPs cannot be estimated for customers who would not buy the status quo
product in the first place or have a different status quo product. To avoid this respondents
can be allowed to select a status quo product themselves.
An overview of the discussed characteristics of the four methods to estimate willingness-to-
pay is presented in Table 4.1. By definition, the difference between the first two methods
and the surveying techniques is that in the latter the respondents do not purchase any-
thing. Table 4.1 shows that within indirect surveying there is a method missing that
combines the advantages of the two presented techniques. The advantages and drawbacks
of conjoint analysis and discrete choice analysis are the ability of the former to perform es-
timations of willingness-to-pay at the individual level based on each individual’s provided
information and of the latter to elicit choice behavior during the interview.
In view of this we have developed a new estimation procedure that firstly performs all
estimations at the individual level and secondly elicits choice behavior during the inter-
view. This surveying technique will be presented in Chapter 7. The new procedure works
as an extension of conjoint analysis. In order to discuss how this extension is integrated
into conjoint analysis we will discuss conjoint analysis first. An introduction covering the
relevant parts of conjoint analysis is presented in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 5
Conjoint Analysis
In the previous chapter the ongoing research in the estimation of willingness-to-pay (WTP)
was reviewed, providing an overview of the different methods and discussing advantages
and disadvantages. Also, reviewed were the different methods in respect of their ability
to estimate consumers’ preferences at the individual level.
In Chapter 7 a new procedure to estimate consumers’ willingness-to-pay for different
products will be presented. This procedure works as an additional interview scene in
combination with conjoint analysis, and we named it PE scene. This new approach uses
previously elicited preference structure at the individual level as input.
Because the PE scene is an extension of conjoint analysis an introduction to conjoint
analysis is given in this chapter. The intention of this chapter is not to give the reader
a comprehensive overview of conjoint techniques. The interested reader is referred to
Gustafsson et al. (2000). Instead the reader is given an idea of how different conjoint
techniques work. The goal is to show how conjoint analysis can be combined with the PE
scene. In view of this different techniques are discussed especially focusing on adaptive
conjoint analysis (ACA), because in our empirical investigation the PE scene was combined
with ACA.
5.1 Introduction
Conjoint Analysis is a decompositional method in which the probands are presented a
selection of stimuli consisting of different attributes or components and state their prefer-
ences. These attributes have different levels. From these preferences utilities of the levels
of the attributes are derived. The utilities can then be used to predict future preferences.
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Conjoint Analysis
Self-Explicated
Methods
Trade-OffFull Profile Hybrid Conjoint
Analysis
Adaptive Conjoint
Analysis (ACA)
Figure 5.1: Classification of conjoint methods based on data gathering techniques.
MarketVision Research describes this process as follows:
...conjoint methods, though, share the basic tenet of decomposing products
into their component parts to analyze how decisions are made and then predict
how decisions will be made in the future. That is, conjoint analysis is used
to understand the importance of different product components or product
features, as well as to determine how decisions are likely to be influenced by
the inclusion, exclusion, or degree of that feature.
(MarketVision Research, 2002, p. 1)
The first paper in a scientific journal on the applicability of conjoint analysis to consumer
behavior was published by Green and Rao (1971). In the following years many papers
were published on the topic discussing different algorithms and applications. Conjoint
analysis quickly became widely used and is today an integral part of market analysis in
marketing as can be reviewed in various papers about applications of conjoint analysis
(e.g., Wittink and Cattin (1989), Wittink and Burhenne (1994), Voeth (1999), Hartmann
and Sattler (2002a), and Hartmann and Sattler (2002b)).
Green and Srinivasan (1990) define conjoint analysis to be “any decompositional method
that estimates the structure of a consumer’s preference (i.e., estimates preference para-
meters such as part-worths, importance weights, ideal points), given his or her overall
evaluations of a set of alternatives that are prespecified in terms of levels of different at-
tributes”. As Green and Srinivasan here we will narrow this definition to methods that
estimate the preference structure of the respondents at the individual level. This is done,
because individual level preference data is utilized in the PE scene.
Conjoint methods can be distinguished in terms of their data gathering and presentation
techniques. A taxonomy of different conjoint methods based on this is presented in Fig-
ure 5.1. In this taxonomy the methods are restricted to pure conjoint methods. Other
authors, for example Carroll and Green (1995), suggest a broader taxonomy for conjoint
methods regarding all methods that have the ability to estimate part-worths.
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Throughout this dissertation we do not consider discrete choice analysis to be a conjoint
method. The main similarity between discrete choices and conjoint analysis lies in the
presentation technique to the probands and that decompositional part-worths are being
estimated. Because of this similarity discrete analysis is also referred to as choice-based
conjoint (CBC). Nevertheless, the underlying preference model and the parameter esti-
mation techniques are different. Furthermore, the approach estimates part-worths only
at the aggregate level, in contrast to the main advantage of conjoint analysis which is
part-worth estimation at the individual level (Balderjahn, 2003, pp. 400-401). Therefore,
we will not discuss discrete choice analysis in the context of conjoint analysis. For an
overview of discrete choice analysis see Section 4.5.2.
Prior to starting this discussion of different conjoint methods an introduction of some key
terms will be given. In conjoint analysis products are considered to be decomposable into
their features. These features are called attributes. The realizations of such an attribute
are called levels. Consider a mobile phone: The features of such a telephone include
display and ring-tone. In a conjoint study regarding mobile phones the features display
and ring-tone would be considered as attributes. The realizations of these attributes could
be color display versus monochrome display or different display sizes. The realizations of
ring-tones could be the number of melodies or simple and polyphonic ring-tones. These
realizations are the levels of the attributes.
In a conjoint study part-worths are estimated for all attribute levels. That is each level is
assigned a number, such that the respondents’ preference structure based on the attributes
and levels is represented. Part-worths are also referred to as part-worth utilities or utilities
and will be used synonymously. The measurement focusing on the different attributes is
called importance. The importance of one attribute is based on the level’s part-worths
and simply describes the range of the part-worths from the least preferred to the most
preferred level.
The conjoint methods considered here have the underlying assumption, “that the utility
of a product is the sum of the values attaching to its separate attribute levels” (Johnson,
2001). This assumption is referred to as an additive compensatory model (Young, 1973).
In this model the utility of a product is calculated as the sum of the part-worths of the
levels of all attributes. The model is called compensatory because it is assumed that high
and low part-worths of attribute levels compensate one another. Consider the mobile
phone again: Some individual might prefer a color display over a monochrome display.
Additionally, the individual attaches much more value to having polyphonic ring-tones
than to the type of display. Then, he or she might prefer a telephone with a monochrome
display and polyphonic ring-tones over a telephone with a color display and simple ring-
tones. In this case the gain from polyphonic ring-tones has compensated the loss from
having a monochrome display.
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Telephone 1 Telephone 2 Telephone 3 Telephone 4
monochrome monochrome color color
simple polyphonic simple polyphonic
Figure 5.2: Full profile conjoint cards for telephones with the attributes display and ring-
tone.
The rank order for telephones for this individual could be:
1. Polyphonic ring-tones and color display
2. Polyphonic ring-tones and monochrome display
3. Simple ring-tones and color display
4. Simple ring-tones and monochrome display
The rank order of the products is formed based upon the part-worths. The utility of each
product is calculated as the sum of the part-worths. The calculated values for all possible
products represent the preference structure of the respondent.
5.2 Full Profile
The classic conjoint method is full profile conjoint analysis (Green and Rao, 1971). In full
profile conjoint analysis the probands are presented product profiles that are described as
a combination of the levels of all attributes. These full profile stimuli are presented on
cards with textual and/or graphical descriptions of the products. Reusing the example
with the mobile phones, suppose a study regarding the features ring-tone and display. In
the design of the conjoint analysis the attribute ring-tone could have the levels simple and
polyphonic. The attribute display could have the levels color and monochrome. With
two attributes both having two levels each 22 = 4 stimuli cards can be constructed. A
possible textual presentation of the cards is given in Figure 5.2.
Typically, the respondents would bring the product cards in a preference order. This
approach is called full profile ranking. The presentation of a product described in terms
of attributes and levels is also referred to as a product stimulus.
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Using the additive compensatory model the utility structure of a respondent for the prod-
uct stimuli based upon the attributes a and the corresponding levels l, can be described
as follows:
yc =
A∑
a=1
La∑
l=1
βal · xal
with
yc : Rank of product card c
βal : Unknown part-worth of level l of attribute a
xal =
 1 if product card c has level l of attribute a0 otherwise.
From the rankings of the product cards the parameters βal of the respondent’s preference
structure can be fitted. If the rankings of the respondent are treated using an ordinal
scale, typically MONANOVA (Kruskal, 1965) is applied. If the rankings are assumed
to be equidistant, they can be treated using an interval scale. Then OLS regression or
ANOVA can be applied. Various studies have shown that different estimation procedures
do not lead to significantly different results (e.g., Cattin and Wittink (1976), Carmone
et al. (1978), and Wittink and Cattin (1981)).
Usually a conjoint study is much larger than in the example given above. In order to
fit the part-worths of the attribute levels a sufficient number of stimuli cards containing
the levels must be presented to the respondent. Once the part-worths are fitted, a utility
score for any stimulus composed from the attributes and levels can be predicted using
the same additive composition rule. Note that a score can also be calculated for product
stimuli that were not actually presented to the respondent during the study.
If the number of product cards is large, the probands are sometimes asked to pile the cards
in several piles ranging from “very attractive” to “not attractive at all” in order to reduce
cognitive overhead. The piles are then ranked separately. As the number of attributes and
levels increases, the number of stimuli combinations increases exponentially. A study with
two attributes with 3 levels each has 32 = 9 stimuli combinations. A product described
on five attributes consisting of three levels each leads to 35 = 243 stimuli combinations.
A design plan presenting the respondent with all possible stimuli is called a full factorial
design. Sometimes interaction effects between attribute levels occur. Certain combina-
tions of attribute levels might lead to a higher or lower valuation of the product stimulus
than when they do not occur together. For example, if a certain combination of attribute
levels does not make sense, this would lead to a lower overall valuation and affects the pa-
rameter fitting. If interactions between attribute levels do not occur, only main effects are
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studied. Most conjoint studies estimate main effects, and interaction effects are assumed
to not exists (Green and Srinivasan, 1990).
In conjoint studies estimating main effects the respondents need not rank all possible
stimuli. When the number of stimuli is reduced, this is called a fractional factorial design.
A reduced selection of stimuli should represent the full number of stimuli as close as
possible. This is usually done using an orthogonal design (Addelmann, 1962). In an
orthogonal design the proportional frequency of occurrence of any attribute level in the
full design is maintained in the reduced design. That is, for any combination of two
attributes the levels of one attribute must occur with equal frequency with the levels of
the other attribute. A discussion of various kinds of fractional factorials can be found in
Green et al. (1978).
Apart from ranking in full profile conjoint ratings can be used. Instead of ranking the
alternatives the respondents rate them on a (say) 1-7 attractiveness scale (Huber, 1997)
or a (say) 0-100 purchase likelihood scale (Mahajan et al., 1982). The estimation of the
part-worths works analog to the estimation procedure for ranking data as described above.
5.3 Trade-Off Method
In contrast to the full profile method the trade-off method confronts the respondent with
only two attributes at a time (Johnson, 1974). This is done for all attribute pairs. The
pairs are presented to the respondent in so-called trade-off tables or trade-off matrices,
which list all possible combinations of attribute levels. The intention of using trade-offs
instead of full profiles is to reduce the information overload that occurs on part of the
respondent when all possible attributes are present in a product stimulus (Green and
Srinivasan, 1978).
Using the mobile phone example, assume a third attribute color (for the telephone) with
the levels black, white, and silver. A possible realization of the trade-off tables for a
conjoint study on the attributes display, ring-tone, and color is presented in Figure 5.3.
For all trade-off tables the respondent has to rank the level combinations by distributing
numbers ranging from 1 (least preferred) to 4 (most preferred) for the Table 5.3(a), and
1 to 6 for Tables 5.3(b) and 5.3(c).
In view of the presentation technique, the drawback with trade-off matrices is that by
decomposing the factors into two-at-a-time partial profiles, there is a sacrifice of realism to
the respondent (Green and Srinivasan, 1978). In this sense full-profiles are more realistic.
The trade-off method is rarely used in practice (Wittink and Cattin, 1989).
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Ring-Tone
Simple Polyphonic
D
is
p
la
y
Monochrome · · · · · ·
Color · · · · · ·
(a) Trade-off table with attributes ring-tone and display
Ring-Tone
Simple Polyphonic
C
o
lo
r Black · · · · · ·
White · · · · · ·
Silver · · · · · ·
(b) Trade-off table with attributes ring-tone and color
Display
Monochrome Color
C
o
lo
r Black · · · · · ·
White · · · · · ·
Silver · · · · · ·
(c) Trade-off table with attributes display and color
Figure 5.3: Example Trade-Off cards.
5.4 Self-Explicated Methods
Amulti-attribute utility function can be constructed from a compositional model or from a
decompositional model. The distinction comes from the underlying estimation procedure.
Decompositional models are derived from decision or rating observations of product pro-
files. Based upon these observations a parameter estimation technique is applied. These
estimates of the parameters are the part-worths. The utility function is then constructed
as the sum of the estimated part-worths. Full profile and trade-offs are decompositional
methods. The respondent is presented different product profiles and ranks or rates the
attractiveness. These observations are then decomposed into part-worths for the different
levels.
In contrast self-explicated methods are compositional, because the respondent is asked to
rate the different levels directly. A typical compositional procedure entails the following
steps (cf. Fischbein (1967) and Green and Krieger (1996)):
1. The decision maker rates the desirability of each of a set of possible levels of each
of a set of attributes on (say) a 0-10 scale.
2. Following this, the decision maker rates the importance of each attribute on (say)
a 0-10 scale. In this model, a part-worth is defined as the product of importance
times the associated level’s desirability.
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The utility function is constructed as the sum of the explicated part-worths. An estimation
procedure, where respondents explicitly state attitudes towards attributes and levels is
called a self-explicated task.
In the strict definition of conjoint analysis limited to decompositional methods, self-
explicated approaches do not belong to the family of conjoint methods (Green and Srini-
vasan, 1978). Nevertheless they are mentioned here, because they are used in combination
with decompositional methods in hybrid models and adaptive conjoint analysis.
5.5 Hybrid Models
Hybrid conjoint analysis contains compositional and decompositional elements. They
”combine the ease of administration of self-explicated data with the greater realism af-
forded by decompositional models” (Green and Krieger, 1996). They have been designed
for simplification on behalf of the respondent, especially when the number of attributes
and levels is large. Hybrid models were originally introduced by Green et al. (1981).
In hybrid models every respondent is first presented a self-explicated task on all attributes
and levels as described in the previous section. With the data obtained preliminary part-
worths are calculated for each respondent.
After this every respondent is presented a limited number of full-profile stimuli for eval-
uation. The number of profiles is reduced in order to reduce information overload. The
profiles are chosen and presented to all respondents in such a way that each profile is at
least rated by one. The evaluations are pooled and group level part-worth estimates are
calculated by dummy variable regression (Green et al., 1981).
The part-worths at the individual level are then fitted with data from the group level
estimates of the full profile task by multiple regression analysis. Several empirical studies
have shown that cross-validity of hybrid models is better than self-explicated models alone.
However, full-profile models appear to be superior of hybrid models (Green and Krieger,
1996).
In newer hybrid models part-worths from a self-explicated task are fitted with individual
level estimates from full-profile conjoint. If the number of full profiles is reasonable and an
orthogonal design can be applied, individual level part-worth estimates can be calculated
for all attributes and levels. This can increase the internal validity measured on holdout
scores of hybrid models (Green and Krieger, 1996).
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5.6 Adaptive Conjoint Analysis
Adaptive conjoint analysis (ACA) was developed in the beginning of the 1980’s when the
technological possibility arose to perform computer-administered interviews (Johnson,
1987). In many marketing studies great numbers of product configurations had to be
examined which made static paper and pencil conjoint studies with orthogonal designs
time consuming and costly. The design of ACA provides a more efficient conjoint method
when the number of attributes is large.
Utilizing information from a self-explicated task Johnson (2001) developed an adaptive
approach to presenting partial profiles to respondents. Similar to the trade-off method
the partial profiles consisted of no more than two attributes. The respondent is presented
two partial profiles next to each other and is asked to indicate his or her preference. The
task of comparing two partial profiles at a time is a trade-off task and is know as paired
comparison.
If the within order of attribute levels is known along with the importance of the attributes
relative to each other, in some cases the ranking or selection of one partial profile over
another is implicitly given. If one partial profile dominates another on all attribute levels,
a ranking or selection need not be asked from the respondent. Omitting these questions
the number of questions being asked can be reduced. This procedure allows studies with
larger number of attributes and levels as in other conjoint approaches.
The stimuli for paired comparison in ACA are chosen to reduce the uncertainty in the
part-worths being estimated. That is, the questions are the most difficult for the re-
spondent to answer and therefore bear the most new information. The attribute levels
being used in these questions are the ones that have been used the least in the preceding
interview in order to approximate an orthogonal design. After each question the part-
worths are updated, and with the new information the next question is selected by the
same procedure. Because the questions during the interview are constructed based on the
respondents prior answers, this form of conjoint analysis is called adaptive.
ACA was introduced as a microcomputer package by Johnson (1987) and has been dis-
cussed by many authors (e.g., Green et al. (1991) and Johnson (1991)). The package
was novel in that it combined a computer-based interactive surveying technique with cus-
tomized stimulus presentations to the respondents. The original ACA software package
is distributed by Sawtooth Software Inc.1 The software used in the empirical study in
this dissertation is a modular re-implementation called jAC (Java Adaptive Conjoint)
programmed in JavaTM developed by Schmidt-Thieme (2004).
ACA consists of four phases (Johnson, 1987). Each phase will be discussed in the following.
1http://www.sawtooth.com
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An example of a conjoint study is accessories for mobile telephones. One accessory could
be a headset. The levels for headset are the different types. Other attributes are a data
cable to connect the telephone to a personal computer, an extra battery charger, and car
accessories to connect the telephone to the car stereo. Since the study is about additional
accessories, each attribute has a non-level. Screenshots of jAC are used to illustrate the
example.
Phase I: Each respondent brings the levels of the attributes in hierarchical order according
to his or her preferences.
For the attribute headset in the example different headset models which are levels of the
attribute headset are ordered by the respondent. This is illustrated in Figure 5.4. The
attribute headset consists of the levels “HS-3”, “HS-10”, and “no-headset”. The respon-
dent only needs to order the first two levels, because the level “no-headset” implicitly has
the lowest preference.
Sometimes the levels of an attribute have a natural ordering and are therefore not ordered
by the respondents. This is the case for binary attributes which are either present or
absent. If the attribute data cable of the example only consists of two levels “with” and
“without”, the rank order is implicitly given. The rank order would be set to “with data
cable” followed by “without data cable”.
Phase II: The respondent is presented the best and the worst level of each attribute
as obtained from phase I. The respondent then indicates the importance of the different
attributes on a 1 to 4 rating scale with equal intervals.
A screenshot of the example is given in Figure 5.5. In a combined presentation of the four
attributes the respondent indicates the importance on a 1 to 4 scale by clicking one of the
four buttons for each attribute. The attributes are referred to by their names. Not shown
in Figure 5.5 but in the supplementing text it is pointed out to the respondent that the
inclusion of the most preferred level is to be rated against the absence of the attribute.
By definition the absence of the level is the least preferred attribute level.
Note that the first two phases of ACA are a self-explicated task.
Phase III: Each respondent is presented a set of paired partial profiles. The two profiles
are shown side by side on the screen. The respondent indicates on a nine point equal-
interval scale his or her preference for one of the options.
Figure 5.6 shows a screenshot of phase III of jAC. The two partial profiles are described
textually and graphically. The respondent indicates which profile he or she prefers and
to what extent. This is done by positioning the slider below those profiles at the desired
value. Internally the indicated values are rounded and transformed onto a -4 to 4 nine-
point scale.
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Figure 5.4: Screenshot jAC Phase I.
Figure 5.5: Screenshot jAC Phase II.
Figure 5.6: Screenshot jAC Phase III.
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Phase IV: Each respondent is presented a number of full profile concepts, so-called
calibrating concepts, for which he or she has to indicate a purchase probability from 0%
to 100% on a so-called purchase-likelihood scale. These profile presentations are used to
calibrate the utilities obtained in the preceding phases. Furthermore, if the analysis does
not include price, the calibrating concepts are used to normalize the estimated part-worths
between the respondents onto a comparable scale.
The ranking information from phase I as presented in Figure 5.4 is processed such that
the resulting values are centered around zero and scaled to unity. Consider the attribute
headset with the levels “HS-3”, “HS-10”, and “no-headset”. With three levels and the
preference order assigned by the respondent the procedure works as follows: The levels
are first set to the values of the reversed order. That is, the most preferred level has the
value 3, the second the value 2, and the least the value 1. Then, the average level value
is subtracted. The resulting values for the levels are 1.0, 0.0, -1.0. Finally, the values are
scaled to unity. The level’s values would then be transformed to 0.5, 0.0, -0.5 (Sawtooth
Software Inc., 2002). This procedure has the characteristic that the same intervals are
assumed between the attributes levels. Green et al. (1991) point out that this might
not describe the preference valuation of the respondents properly and suggest the use of
different scales in the self explicated task allowing different intervals at a finer granularity.
The importance stated in phase II is used to scale the ranges of level values of the attributes
relative to one another. The importance ratings elicited as shown in Figure 5.5 have values
from 1.0 to 4.0. These values are simply used as multipliers for the attribute levels. If the
respondent indicates an importance of 3 for an attribute with three levels with the values
0.5, 0.0, -0.5, these values are transformed to 1.5, 0.0, -1.5 (Sawtooth Software Inc., 2002).
The values for the attribute levels are used as initial estimates of the attribute level’s util-
ities for phase III. With each answer the respondent provides the estimates are updated.
The updating procedure is modeled as a multiple linear regression model.
Xbn ∼ Y
In this modelX is a matrix of predictor variables with a column for each of the independent
variables. Each attribute level is modeled as one independent variable. Each of the n rows
is one observation, which is a stimulus presented to the respondent for evaluation. In the
vector Y the first n responses are coded. As in standard multiple regression, the regression
coefficients can be estimated by
bn = (X
′X)−1X ′Y.
Before the first graded pair is presented to the respondent, the matrix X is set to the
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identity matrix. The vectors b and Y are set to the preliminary estimates from the self-
explicated task. For the first updating the layout of the regression is expanded to
[
X
z′
]
bn+1 ∼
[
Y
r
]
.
Into the vector z the presented attribute levels are coded. An element is set to 1 if the
corresponding level appeared in the partial profile on the right of the screen, -1 if in
the partial profile on the left of the screen, and 0 if it did not appear in either one. The
response vector r is coded with values from +4 to -4 according to the position of the slider
as set by the respondent, as for example in Figure 5.6. A positive value represents an offset
to the right, a negative value to the left, and 0 means indifference (Sawtooth Software
Inc., 2002). With the expanded layout the updated the updated regression coefficients
bn+1 can be computed.
The presentation of graded-pairs is continued until a specified goodness-of-fit threshold is
reached or a maximum number of pairs are rated. As proposed by Johnson (1987), the
recommended number of pairs in jAC is 3 · (N − n − 1) − N , where N is the number of
levels of all attributes and n the number of attributes.
An important issue in phase III is the selection of the partial profiles to be presented to
the respondent. The selection has two main objectives. First, the observations obtained
from the pairs should be spread as evenly as possible over all attribute levels, and the
columns of the design matrix should be as orthogonal as possible. Second, pairs should
be chosen nearly equal in attractiveness.
This can be achieved as follows (Sawtooth Software Inc., 2002):
1. Count the number of times each pair of attributes has appeared together in any
concept. Pick a set of attributes at random from among those whose members have
previously appeared together the fewest times.
2. For each of the chosen attributes, repeat similar logic to find levels that have been
paired least frequently.
3. Examine all possible ways of combining these levels into concepts. Find the pair
of concepts most nearly equal in attractiveness, using the current estimates of the
respondent’s utilities.
4. Randomly determine which concept will appear on each side of the screen.
In the pairs section of ACA the partial product profiles are described on two to three
attributes. Empirical work has shown that this is best practice, and little is gained from
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displaying partial profiles described on more attributes (e.g., Agarwal (1989)). The use of
two to three attributes is also suggested in the Sawtooth’s ACA technical paper (Sawtooth
Software Inc., 2002).
The use of partial profiles in the pairs section implies a strong “all else equal” context,
that is, the omitted attributes are supposed to have some level which is equal for both
partial profiles. This is often criticized to be an unrealistic scenario for the respondents
because real product profiles are rarely described and varied on two to three attributes
only (Green et al., 1991). However, the problem of unrealistic scenarios does not occur
in the example with the mobile phone accessories, because attributes not shown in the
paired comparison task are simply assumed to be absent.
5.7 Integrating Estimation of Willingness-to-pay
The new estimation procedure for willingness-to-pay (PE scene), which is presented in
Chapter 7, uses individual level preference structure as input. For this part-worths esti-
mated by conjoint analysis are used.
The empirical investigation presented in Chapter 8 is carried out as an online survey.
Therefore, the conjoint interview should not be too long, in order to achieve a high
completion rate. ACA is especially designed to handle a large number of attributes, as it
has the ability to reduce the number of questions the respondents are asked. It is therefore
well suited for our empirical investigation.
ACA has successfully been implemented in many conjoint studies and was the most fre-
quently chosen method in Europe (Wittink and Burhenne, 1994) and the USA in the
1990s (Orme, 2003). The advantage of ACA over other conjoint methods is that it is a
combined presentation and estimation computer package. With a web-frontend it can be
used for online surveying.
For our empirical investigation a software is needed which can easily be adapted, in order
to integrate the new interview scene to estimate willingness-to-pay. The interviewing
software used in our empirical investigation is a re-implementation of ACA called jAC
(Schmidt-Thieme, 2004). The frame work is implemented in the JavaTMprogramming
language and has a modular design. The modular design makes it easy to integrate new
interview scenes. For our empirical investigation the calibration scene (phase IV) was
replaced by the new PE scene.
Between the different interview scenes the data from all previous phases is passed along. At
the end of the third phase, the part-worths for the attribute levels are already estimated.
After this phase the part-worths are simply passed to the PE scene. The part-worths and
the underlying attributes and levels are the only input the PE scene needs. Therefore, it
is easy to omit the calibration scene, and replace it with the PE scene.
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One of the most difficult things in designing a conjoint study after the attributes and
levels have been selected properly is the wording and graphical presentation to the re-
spondents. Thorough pretesting and discussion with testers is necessary to make sure
the objective of the interview is anchored correctly in the respondents heads. This is all
the more important for online interviews, because there is no interviewer supervising the
interviewees. The powerful web-frontend of jAC has all the flexibility needed to position
texts and graphics freely on the clients screen and provides interactive elements that make
the interview interesting and entertaining.
5.8 Summary
In this chapter an overview of conjoint analysis was presented. The different methods
were distinguished based upon a classification of their presentation techniques to the
respondent. The different conjoint methods of the classification were introduced and
compared with one another. A special focus was put on adaptive conjoint analysis (ACA),
because this conjoint method is used in the empirical investigation of this thesis.
The empirical study is an online survey, hence it is important to keep it as short as
possible. ACA has the ability to handle large number of attributes because it reduces the
number of questions asked during the interview. Furthermore, it is a computer package,
and has a web front-end. Because of these reasons, we chose to use ACA for our empirical
investigation.
ACA consists of four phases, two self-explicated tasks, the adaptive part and a calibration
scene. The four phases were discussed in detail. A special focus was laid on the selection
of the product stimuli and the parameter estimation techniques in the adaptive part of
ACA.
The calibration scene of ACA is not used in our empirical study, because it is replaced
by the price estimation scene (PE scene). Nevertheless, the original calibration scene was
also presented in this chapter. In this chapter it was shown how the PE scene is combined
with ACA.
Screenshots from a re-implementation of ACA called jAC (Schmidt-Thieme, 2004) were
presented. This re-implementation will also be used for the empirical investigation pre-
sented in Chapter 8. In the empirical investigation a new interview scene, in which
willingness-to-pay is estimated, is integrated into ACA. It was outlined, how this is done
with the jAC framework.
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Chapter 6
Conjoint Analysis in Pricing Studies
This chapter discusses how pricing studies are performed when conjoint analysis is applied.
The general approach is to include price in the conjoint study as yet another attribute.
We will explain how this is done, and review a selection of publications which explicitly
focus on the estimation of willingness-to-pay (WTP).
Subsequent to this it will be developed what problems can arise from traditional ap-
proaches when price is included as an attribute. Three problems that can be identified
will be the main focus of attention. These are (1) theoretical problems, (2) practical prob-
lems, and (3) estimation problems. Each of these problems will be discussed in detail.
These problems will be emphasized and it will be illustrated how they can be overcome
when the new estimation approach, the PE scene, is applied.
6.1 Introduction
According to the literature pricing studies are one of the most important applications of
conjoint analysis (e.g., Gustafsson et al. (2000, pp. 6-7)).
In a study on conjoint applications in the US in the years 1981-1985 Wittink and Cattin
(1989) surveyed 59 companies who carried out 1062 conjoint studies. 38% of the identified
studies were pricing studies. In a similar study on the application of conjoint analysis in
the European market in the years 1986-1991 Wittink and Burhenne (1994) surveyed 66
companies and reported a total of 956 conjoint studies. Out of these 46% were pricing
studies. Baier (1999) carried out a smaller study in the German market. 8 companies were
interviewed and 382 conjoint studies were identified, of which 62% were pricing studies.
Hartmann and Sattler (2002a,b) surveyed 54 marketing research institutes in Germany,
Austria, and Switzerland in the year 2001. These institutes performed a total of 304
studies regarding preference measurement. 121 studies were documented in greater detail
by the marketing research institutes, showing that 48% were pricing studies.
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Not only surveys of the usage of conjoint analysis show the importance of pricing research.
Publications of the application of conjoint analysis in scientific journals also illustrates
their importance. In a broad review Voeth (1999) summarizes the publications on conjoint
analysis in German between the years 1976-1998. Most of the identified 150 studies were
published in the 1990s. 31 studies explicitly focused on pricing.
Some of the best examples from the literature regarding pricing studies performed by
conjoint analysis in important German and English scientific journals are Currim et al.
(1981), Mahajan et al. (1982), Goldberg et al. (1984), Green and Krieger (1990), Balder-
jahn (1991), Green and Krieger (1992), Balderjahn (1994), Eggenberger and Christof
(1996), and Green et al. (1997). As can be seen from practical applications and jour-
nal publications, pricing studies are an important field of conjoint analysis. Apparently,
conjoint analysis is a method which is well suited for pricing studies (Diller, 2000, p. 202).
In order to design a pricing strategy exceptionally insightful knowledge is needed regarding
to the reaction of customers to different price schemes. Questions like the following
must be answered: How many customers will buy a certain product at different price
levels? What does the preference structure of the customers look like for different product
configurations under different prices? Can variations of a specific feature for different
products be assigned a monetary equivalent? Can customers be classified based upon
their preference structure? With conjoint analysis researchers and marketing experts
attempt to answer these questions.
The major approach in pricing studies by conjoint analysis is incorporating the price in
the study as an additional attribute (e.g., Green and Srinivasan (1990), Orme (2001)).
The levels of the attribute price are then assigned part-worth utilities like the other
attributes, and relative utility differences between combinations of attributes can then
be computed. For different part-worth utilities of price points interpolation heuristics are
applied. For example consider an attribute price with two levels. Similar to other conjoint
attributes, part-worths are estimated for the two price levels. Between the two price levels
interpolation heuristics are applied estimating a utility for every price point between the
two price levels.
With a utility score for every possible price the preference of the respondents for every
product price combination can be computed. With the additional information which
products the customers would actually buy (and not only prefer) the marketing questions
stated above can be answered.
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6.2 Selected Publication on the Estimation of
Willingness-to-Pay
The following paragraphs discuss five publications in chronological order. These are the
publications by Kohli and Mahajan (1991), Wu¨bker and Mahajan (1999), Jedidi and
Zhang (2002), Sattler and Nitschke (2003), and Backhaus and Brzoska (2004). The pub-
lications serve well to show the development in the estimation of willingness-to-pay by
conjoint analysis over the past 15 years. In these studies the authors estimate willingness-
to-pay from conjoint data which include price as an attribute.
Study 1 by Kohli and Mahajan (1991):
According to literature the first work explicitly focusing on the estimation of willingness-
to-pay and using conjoint analysis is from Kohli and Mahajan (1991). The authors define
willingness-to-pay as follows: “We assume that a consumer’s reservation price for a new
product is determined by his or her (estimated) utility for the product in relationship to
the price and utility for his or her most preferred product among all product offerings in
his or her evoked set”. The consumer’s evoked set is the unique choice between a number
of products, of which one, and only one, can and will be purchased. The definition the
authors used for reservation price corresponds to our definition of the maximum price in
Section 3.1. The authors do not attempt to measure the economic reservation price how
we defined it in Section 3.2.
Formally Kohli and Mahajan model the estimation of willingness-to-pay price based on
conjoint data as follows:
uit|∼p + ui(p) ≥ u∗i + .
In this notation some individual i prefers some product t over some status quo product
that has the utility u∗i . The status quo product has the highest estimated utility of any
currently available product in consumer i’s evoked set. Product t is preferred if the sum
of the part-worths of the non-price attributes uit|∼p and the part-worth due to price ui(p)
is higher than the utility of the status quo product plus some arbitrarily small number .
In the reminder of their work the authors assume that the observed WTPs are drawn from
a normal distribution. They estimate this distribution and describe shares of preference
for different products at different prices based upon the distribution’s density function.
Kohli and Mahajan present an empirical application, in which they test different apart-
ment concepts among MBA students. The preference structure for the concepts is es-
timated for each individual by conjoint analysis. Price is included as an attribute and
modeled as a continuous linear variable in the multi-attribute preference function. A sta-
tus quo apartment is assumed to be given at a fixed price. This status quo apartment is
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Attributes
Price (DM) Bundle
L
e
v
e
ls
2.50 French Fries (large)
5.00 Big Mac
7.50 Drink (medium)
9.00 Big Mac and French Fries
10.50 French Fries, Big Mac and Drink
Table 6.1: Attributes and levels for bundle types and price used in a conjoint analysis at
McDonald’s restaurant by Wu¨bker and Mahajan (1999).
the same for every respondent. Against this apartment the prices for all other concepts
at which the respondents would switch away are calculated.
Note, that the prerequisite for a correct forecast of a respondent’s willingness-to-pay is
that every respondent perceives the status quo apartment the best alternative in his or
her evoked set. Furthermore, every respondent must be willing to accept the current price
of the status quo apartment. Therefore, the estimated procedure as proposed by Kohli
and Mahajan (1991) can only correctly predict price response behavior for respondents
who would accept the status quo product.
Study 2 by Wu¨bker and Mahajan (1999):
Wu¨bker and Mahajan apply a reservation price model to a bundling scenario building
upon the article of Kohli and Mahajan (1991). Their concept of reservation price also
corresponds to the maximum price concept. In their work the authors extend the approach
of Kohli and Mahajan by not only estimating willingness-to-pay for individual items, but
also to estimate willingness-to-pay for product bundles.
The authors achieve this by viewing each product bundle as an individual item. For the
different bundle types a conjoint design consisting only of the two attributes bundle and
price is used. The levels of the attribute bundle are different bundle combinations, the
level for the attribute price are a fitted pricing range for the different combinations. The
definition of their attributes and levels is shown in Table 6.1.
Out of the 25 possible attribute level combinations the authors limit themselves to seven
that seem feasible in order to avoid stimuli that are too cheap or too expensive. Wu¨bker
and Mahajan use adaptive conjoint analysis (ACA) to estimate the respondents’ preference
structure. Based upon the conjoint data a maximum price for the three-item bundle
French Fries, Big Mac and Drink is calculated for each respondent such that he or she
prefers that bundle over the consumption of any other bundle for which the price is set
at the regular list price of McDonald’s restaurant. For example if the most preferred
choice in the evoked set was the two-item bundle Big Mac and French Fries at the regular
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price, the price for the bundle French Fries, Big Mac and Drink was altered such that
the individual would prefer the three-item bundle.
An empirical study was carried out and for every price in the conjoint design a part-worth
utility was estimated. Between the part-worths of the price levels interpolation heuristics
were applied. This resulted in a piecewise linear relationship between utility and price.
However, the authors did not present a justification on why piecewise interpolation was
used.
Wu¨bker and Mahajan compared the resulting maximum prices for different product bun-
dles to self-stated willingness-to-pay elicited in a direct questioning. The authors find
that self-stated willingness-to-pay yields higher values than the conjoint approach. They
suspect this effect results from the isolated perception of price in the direct questioning,
especially that no alternative alternative options (other bundles) were being offered.
Study 3 by Jedidi and Zhang (2002):
Jedidi and Zhang also develop upon the article of Kohli and Mahajan (1991) but depart
in adopting a different definition of willingness-to-pay. They use the standard definition of
consumer reservation price in economics. Furthermore, the authors dismiss the assumption
of unconditional category purchase, with which they refer to the assumption that the
introduction of a new product solely affects consumers within a purchase category. This
means that they do not utilize the assumption that every respondent would accept a
fixed status quo product. The assumption of unconditional category purchase does not
hold when new products are introduced that attract consumers, who did not buy in that
category before. The attracting of new consumers is called market-expansion.
Jedidi and Zhang define the reservation price in their work as “a consumer’s reservation
price for a specific product is simply the price at which the consumer is indifferent between
buying and not buying the product, given the consumption alternatives available to the
consumer”. This definition corresponds with our definition of the reservation price and is
different than our definition of the maximum price.
To our knowledge the Jedidi and Zhang are the first who have applied the concept reser-
vation price in a conjoint study. They also emphasize this distinction between early work
estimating maximum price and their approach by “they (Kohli and Mahajan, 1991) [ital-
ics added] define reservation price for a product as the maximum price the consumer is
willing to pay to switch away from the most preferred choice in her evoked set to the
product in question. Thus, a consumer’s reservation price for a product depends not only
on the additional value the product provides, but also on how much the consumer pays
for her most preferred choice”. According to the authors the assumption of a status quo
product for each consumer facilitates the discussion. With this facilitation it cannot be
assessed whether the price of a new product expands or contracts the market.
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Hard Disc Part-Worth
100 GB 10
200 GB 15
Price Part-Worth
500 e 10
100 e 50
Table 6.2: Example of attributes price and hard disc with assigned levels and estimated
part-worths.
Formally, Jedidi and Zhang present the condition of the reservation price ri(P ) that some
individual i has for some product P as
Ui
(
P,
mi − ri(P )
pyi
)
− Ui
(
0,
mi
pyi
)
≡ 0.
As in economic theory the individual has a utility function Ui(P, yi) for the consumption
of the product and the consumption of some amount of the composite product yi. The
amount of the composite product consumed by the individual is expressed in terms of a
budget constraint mi = p
y
i yi + p and the price p for product P .
1 Note that the authors
allow the unit price pyi for the composite product yi differ for each individual.
Jedidi and Zhang interpolate between the levels of the attributes and extrapolate to zero.
The derived utility for the absence of the attribute is assigned zero monetary value. Offset
to this utility score, the exchange rate between utility and price is applied to calculate
the reservation prices.
This will be illustrated by an brief example with the attributes price and size of hard disc
as shown in Table 6.2. The part-worths of the attribute levels are estimated by conjoint
analysis.
The linear extrapolation of the size of hard drive to 0 GB leads to 5 utility units. This can
be seen in the upper part of Table 6.2. Since 5 utility units is equivalent to the absence
of hard drive, the authors derive that the respondent would pay no money for 5 utility
units. The exchange rate between utility and price in this example calculates to 10 e per
utility unit ((500 e - 100 e ) / (50 - 10) = 10). Using the exchange rate between utility
and price and subtracting the utility for which the respondent would pay no money the
authors calculate the reservation price for the levels of hard disc. For 100 GB hard drive
the reservation price of the respondent would be 50 e (calculated by (10 - 5) · 10 e =
50 e). Jedidi and Zhang (2002) label their approach Augmented Conjoint Analysis.
The authors present an empirical study carried out amongst MBA students at a major
U.S. university. The probands were presented a conjoint design for notebooks consisting
1Compare the excursion on economic theory and reservation price in Section 3.6.
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Traditional MSS Augmented MSS
NNB ENB NNB ENB no purchase
Penetration 48,3% 51,7% 11,1% 38,9% 50,0%
Skimming 69,6% 30,4% 33,3% 18,5% 48,1%
Product Line 56,4% 23,6% 33,4% 18,5% 48,1%
Table 6.3: Comparison of traditional conjoint analysis with augmented approach (Jedidi
and Zhang, 2002).
of the attributes price, brand, memory, speed, and hard drive with either two or three
levels. The data was collected with a traditional conjoint measurement method. Overall
the sample consisted of 848 useable observations from 53 subjects.
For the market entry strategies penetration, skimming, and product line market share
simulations were carried out. With a penetration strategy the market is entered with
a low-cost product, skimming aims at the high price segment, and with a product line
strategy two differentiated products are introduced at both ends of the possible price
range. The simulation was performed for the entry with a new notebook (NNB) on a
market with one existing notebook (ENB).
From the estimated conjoint coefficients a traditional market share simulation (Tradi-
tional MSS) was carried out and was compared with the augmented estimation approach
(Augmented MSS) suggested by Jedidi and Zhang. Some of the results of the market
share simulations for the three pricing strategies are shown in Table 6.3. With the price
of the existing notebook held constant the optimal prices for the market entry strategies
were used for the simulation.
The estimation of a reservation price permits the simulation of a no-purchase share (Aug-
mented MSS). The no-purchase consists of the respondents who would buy neither note-
book under the different pricing strategies. Traditional market share simulation (Tradi-
tional MSS) cannot estimate the fraction of customers who decline to purchase any of the
product offerings.
As can be seen from the results in Table 6.3, the knowledge of reservation prices changes
the division of the market between the new- and the old notebook substantially. Tradi-
tional MSS promises an appealing market share for a new notebook under a penetration
strategy leading to a market share of 48,3%. However, traditional MSS cannot simulate
the share of non-buyers but only the shares of customers for the new- and the existing
notebook. With share of customers not buying any notebook, the use of a penetration
strategy for the new notebook appears less promising. With augmented MSS the share of
non-buyers is estimated to 50% and the share for the new notebook is estimated to only
11,1%.
In order to test the validity of their model Jedidi and Zhang compute the correlation
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between self-stated reservation prices and estimated reservation prices for the new product.
They find a positive correlation between the two values across the consumer population.
Jedidi and Zhang have impressively shown the importance of the estimation of willingness-
to-pay in market share simulations. In many use cases it is absolutely necessary to estimate
the fraction of consumers who do not enter or leave the market under certain pricing
strategies. Without this knowledge the possibility of large forecasting errors can occur.
However, the authors reuse conjoint data which does not include a decision rule. That
is, the respondents are never asked whether they would really purchase a certain product
at a specific price. The dataset resulting from the conjoint analysis is enriched with the
assumption of choice behavior through the use of interpolation heuristics.
Study 4 by Sattler and Nitschke (2003):
Sattler and Nitschke elicit willingness-to-pay by conjoint analysis similar to Kohli and
Mahajan (1991). But instead of assuming the same status quo product for each participant
on the conjoint study, the respondents are asked to indicate which products they would
actually purchase at a given price. This is done by the Limit-conjoint procedure proposed
by Voeth and Hahn (1998) which was already mentioned in Section 4.5.1. In this procedure
price is included as an attribute in the conjoint study. First a standard conjoint analysis
is performed. At the end each respondent is asked to rank the presented product stimuli
and to indicate which of the offers he or she would actually purchase at the given price.
The offer that yields the lowest utility and is still marked as having potential for purchase
by the respondent is considered to be the limit of the products, the respondent is willing
to accept. Sattler and Nitschke then use this limit as the status quo product. As do Kohli
and Mahajan (1991), the authors calculate prices for all product combinations such that
they yield the same utility as the status quo product. These prices are then considered
to be the willingness-to-pay for each product.
Letting every respondent indicate his or her own status quo product, Sattler and Nitschke
have added a choice rule to conjoint analysis. Therefore, they need not use interpolation
heuristics to find a utility value that yield a monetary equivalent as was suggested by
Jedidi and Zhang (2002).
Sattler and Nitschke test the described conjoint procedure against the direct elicitation
of willingness-to-pay, and find minor differences. More important, they could not find a
systematic deviation in the same direction. For some products the self stated willingness-
to-pay was higher than derived from conjoint data, for other products it was lower.
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Study 5 by Backhaus and Brzoska (2004):
The last empirical investigation on willingness-to-pay presented here is a study by Back-
haus and Brzoska (2004). They tested the Limit-conjoint procedure as used by Sattler and
Nitschke (2003) and a choice based approach for external validity. This was different to
the other studies, in which only internal validity was tested by comparing the estimations
of willingness-to-pay by the conjoint procedures with self-stated willingness-to-pay.
With both estimation methods price response functions were estimated. In order to
test external validity the authors performed an auction with the respondents, in which
the products of the studies were sold. From this revealed purchase behavior also price
response functions were estimated and compared to the price response functions based
on the other two methods. The revealed purchase behavior was used as external validity
measurement.
The results of their study indicate that the Limit-conjoint approach as well as the choice
based approach yield low external validity. For both price response behavior for the tested
products is over-predicted. The conjoint approach yields better external validity than the
choice based approach at the aggregate level. However, at the individual level the conjoint
approach over- and under-estimates the respondents’ willingness-to-pay compared to the
revealed behavior in the auction. It remains unclear whether the better predictive validity
of the conjoint analysis at the aggregate level stems from over- and under-estimation of
willingness-to-pay averaging one another out at the aggregate level.
However, the empirical evidence Backhaus and Brzoska provide is discomforting for the
research on surveying techniques for willingness-to-pay.
6.3 Identifying Problems of Current Approaches
In the last section it was shown how conjoint analysis is applied in pricing studies. In all
studies price was incorporated in the conjoint design as an additional attribute. It is our
opinion that this approach has some problems which will be discussed in the following. Our
reasons for emphasizing these problems is that an alternative approach for the estimation
of willingness-to-pay by conjoint analysis without including price in the conjoint study
can be provided.
Including price as yet another attribute in conjoint analysis suffers from three problems:
1. Theoretical Problem: By treating price as an attribute in a conjoint study part-
worth utilities are estimated for the presented price levels. By definition price does
not have a utility, rather it reflects an exchange rate between different utility scales,
implying, the price of goods do not influence the goods’ utility. Rather, it denotes
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how much of alternative consumption (with the associated utility) has to be given
up to consume the good.
2. Practical Problem: The inclusion of price leads to several unwanted effects. In a
conjoint study the occurrence of interactions between price and other attributes
are likely to occur that violate the additive-compensatory model. Further crucial
effects are the price effect, the range effect, the number of levels effect that occurs
when price is included as an attribute. Last but not least, problems calculating the
interpolation heuristics between utility and price can occur, when more than two
price levels are used.
3. Estimation Problem: Traditional conjoint analysis does not incorporate a decision
rule. That is, only preference structure is estimated and not choices for or against
different products. When the objective is to estimate willingness-to-pay, researchers
need choice information. This information is usually added to the data by assuming
or explicitly asking the respondents for a status quo product with an associated
willingness-to-pay. This might not be sufficient for an accurate estimation.
6.3.1 Theoretical Problems
In neoclassical economic theory of consumer behavior price is treated as an exogenous
variable. It bears no more information to a customer besides how many units of different
goods he or she may consume before the budget is exhausted. This treatment of price
permits the construction of choice behavior and indifference curves as well as demand
functions. In these neoclassical approaches price enters any model solely through a budget
constraint (cf. Varian (2003, chap. 5-6)).
Nevertheless, besides an allocative function of the budget constraint, price does bear
some kind of information to the customer. Price provides evidence of quality, as was first
documented by Scitovsky (1945). On this topic a great number of empirical studies have
been carried out, an overview is given in Rao (1993). These studies indicate mixed
relationships between quality and price. A very low price might be perceived as an
indicator of low quality, vice versa a very high price might be perceived as an indicator
for high quality.
There also exist goods for which the allocative effect of price is reversed. For these products
preference for buying increases as a direct function of price. They are called Veblen goods,
examples are expensive wines and perfumes. Decreasing their prices decreases consumers’
preference for buying them because they are no longer perceived as exclusive or high
status products (Leibenstein, 1950). However, these types of products are not considered
in this work.
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In general this dissertation does not focus on the informational effect of price. Instead,
focus is placed on the estimation of the willingness-to-pay consumers have for “normal”
products. If some product is priced above some customer’s willingness-to-pay, it might
bear some positive quality signal, but the customer will not buy it.
As was shown in the previous chapter, when conjoint analysis is used in pricing studies
for general consumer goods the common approach is to include price as an attribute of
the study. For the different price levels used in the study, part-worths are estimated.
Preference structure for different products at different prices can then be estimated.
By assigning part-worths utilities to the price levels of the study, price is treated funda-
mentally different than in neoclassical economic theory. Rao and Gautschi (1982) empha-
sized the distinction economists and conjoint analysts make with regard to the treatment
of price. The approach of the latter is data-based rather than theory-based. The con-
joint analyst would simply treat price as another attribute in the multi-attribute utility
function because it makes estimation of response behavior simple.
Srinivasan (1982) responded to the argumentation of Rao and Gautschi (1982) that the
distinct treatment of price is not so great after all and should not cause theoretical prob-
lems. When willingness-to-pay is determined by the reservation price, measured utility
can be expressed in terms of price (cf. Section 3.2). With the reservation price determin-
ing a consumer’s choice behavior, the consumption of the product reduces the amount
of money that can be spent on all other goods subject to a budget constraint. Consum-
ing less of the composite good reduces the consumers’ derived utility from consuming
the composite good. Using this argument the utility function of two goods, the good of
interest and the composite good, can be re-arranged into a utility function of only the
good of interest with price included as an attribute that attaches value to the product (cf.
Ratchford (1979) and Srinivasan (1982)). Using this argument researchers treat price as
an attribute in multi-attribute preference measurement.
However, here it is believed that willingness-to-pay for a product is seldom determined
solely by the reservation price. Often it is determined by the maximum price (cf. Sec-
tion 3.1). Under this concept the argument of Srinivasan appears not to hold. Under
maximum price a product is viewed in comparison to perceived alternative offerings, so-
called reference products. When the price of the best alternative offered changes, the
willingness-to-pay for the product in question also changes. However, the utility of the
composite good remains unchanged.
6.3.2 Practical Problems
When price is included in a conjoint study, the respondent is asked to rank, order, or
compare different product configurations which have a price assigned. It is possible that
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some of these product configurations have an unfairly high price to some respondents or
appear to be a very good deal. When this happens the respondents fail to compare this
stimulus with other stimuli. This would lead to a non consistent ranking or rating. These
stimuli would be rated artificially low or high. If this happens, the additive-compensatory
model is violated and interactions between certain price levels with other attribute levels
have occurred. This is likely to happen in a conjoint study with price as an attribute
(Weiber and Rosendahl, 1997).
The price effect occurs when the number of attributes becomes large. In conjoint studies
with many attributes of which one is price the importance of price tends to be understated,
and the degree of understatement increases as the number of attributes increases (Orme,
2003).
Practitioners attempt to overcome this problem by calibrating the importance of price in
a post process. In such a post process a number of product profiles are presented of which
the respondents are asked to select their preferred choice. The most preferred choice is
also predicted based on the utility scores estimated by the conjoint analysis. When some
of the predictions fail, the importance of the attribute price is re-scaled by some factor.
This factor is simply a positive number with which each price part-worth is multiplied.
The factor is chosen such that the hit rate of the predictions is increased. One of the
identified sources of the price effect is that respondents cannot process more than six
attributes. Attributes are assumed to contribute additively to the utility of the product
profile. When the respondent cannot process all presented attributes, the additivity of
the underlying model is violated (Williams and Kilroy, 2000).
The range effect is a well studied effect in psychophysics (e.g., Parducci (1974)). If the
physical range of attribute levels in an experiment is altered, the range of the stimuli
responses is also altered (Verlegh et al., 2002). This is important for price, because price
does not have a natural upper or lower limit. In a traditional price study using conjoint
analysis determining the range of acceptable prices is crucial. Choosing a price range that
is very wide, covering all possible prices, the resulting importance of the attribute price
will be larger, than if a narrow range was chosen.
Another important effect in conjoint analysis is the number-of-levels effect. This effect
in conjoint analysis has been studied by many authors (e.g., Wittink et al. (1989) and
Steenkamp and Wittnik (1994)). Increasing the number of levels of an attribute increases
the attributes importance significantly (Green and Srinivasan, 1990). The number-of-
levels effect is even stronger than the range effect (Verlegh et al., 2002). Again, since
price does not have a natural number of levels, the conjoint analyst must decide how many
levels to use. In many incidences certain price levels are of special interest to a researcher.
In such a case the researcher faces the dilemma that inserting the intermediate levels of
interest, increases the estimated importance of price. Green and Srinivasan (1990) assume
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Attribute levels Part-worths
Feature X 3
Feature Y 2
10 e 4
15 e 2
20 e 1
Table 6.4: Example with three price levels.
that the number-of-levels effect stems from an increase of attention towards attributes with
more levels. Another explanation could be that respondents tend to distribute ratings of
levels uniformly over a fixed mental response scale. Then, increasing the number of levels
increases the amount of the scale used (Verlegh et al., 2002).
The price effect, the range effect, and the number-of-levels effect cannot be avoided for
price, when it is included as an attribute in a conjoint study.
Another problem occurs by using more than two price levels. The estimation procedure
for attribute level parameters is usually not constrained to support a natural ordering of
the levels. But price has a natural ordering - a higher price level should have a lower part-
worth than a lower price level. In unconstrained estimation it is possible and sometimes
expected that the natural ordering of part-worths of price levels contains reversals (Orme,
2001) . Practitioners get around this problems by using as few levels as possible. When
designing a conjoint study with price as an attribute Orme (2002) advises: “It’s usually
better to have more data at each price point than to have thinner measurements at more
price points. Measuring too many points along a quantitative function can result in
troublesome reversals. If you cover the entire range of interest with fewer levels, you can
interpolate between levels...”.
If more than two price levels are used, it is often difficult to decide how interpolation
heuristics should be applied to estimate an exchange rate between utility and price. This
will be illustrated by a small example. Suppose a conjoint analysis with two binary
non-price attributes called feature X and feature Y which can either be present or absent.
Part-worths are estimated for the features. Let the absence of any of the two features have
a part-worth of zero. Another attribute is price which has three levels. The part-worths
for features X and Y as well as for the price levels are given in Table 6.4
The change in utility between the first two price levels (10,- e and 15,- e ) is 2 (4 - 2).
Using this value to compute the exchange rate between price and utility results in 2,50 e
per utility unit (5,- e / 2). Applying this exchange rate the monetary equivalent for the
inclusion of the features X and Y can be computed. The inclusion of feature X is worth
7,50 e (3 · 3,50 e). The inclusion of feature Y is worth 5,- e.
If the change in utility between the second and the third price level (15,- e and 20,- e)
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is used, an exchange rate of 5,- e per utility unit is calculated. This exchange rate leads
to different estimated monetary valuations for the inclusion of the features X and Y . If
the endpoints of the price scale are used, that is the first and the third price level (10,- e
and 20,- e), even another the exchange rate can be calculated, which is 3,33 e per utility
unit.
If more than two price levels are used, the researcher cannot decide which exchange rate
best fits the true valuation of the respondents. A common solution when more than two
price levels are used is to analyze the utility of price using a single coefficient assuming
that the price relationship is approximately linear (Orme, 2001). This results in one
single interpolation heuristic. With this approach the decision problem regarding which
interpolation heuristic to use is avoided.
6.3.3 Estimation Problems
Traditional conjoint analysis does not include a way to estimate choice behavior. In
particular, the respondent cannot indicate that he or she would refuse to accept an offer at
a certain price level, even though he or she would prefer that offer over others. Indication
of refusal to accept is explicitly present in discrete choice analysis and is presented to
the respondent as a no-purchase option. Forecasting choice behavior based on conjoint
data can only hypothesize that a respondent would actually purchase one of the product
stimuli at a certain price level. If the respondent was really willing to purchase in the
category of studied products, a new product stimulus could be assigned a price, such that
the respondent would choose that product over his or her most preferred alternative. This
was done in the empirical study by Kohli and Mahajan (1991) which was presented in
Section 6.2.
A product category is also referred to as a product class, in a sense that the utility
from consumption in that class is additive separable from all other consumption (Strotz,
1957). Offsetting a price to the most attractive offering in a category is common practice
in pricing studies (e.g., Balderjahn (2003) and Venkatesh and Mahajan (1993)). If the
researcher does not know whether the respondent would actually purchase in that category,
the conjoint data cannot be used to mimic market behavior (cf. Balderjahn (1993) and
Weiber and Rosendahl (1997)).
Recently a variation of conjoint analysis was introduced in which every respondent is
directly asked to indicate which product stimuli with assigned price would actually be
considered for purchasing (Voeth and Hahn, 1998). This is done with a so-called “Limit-
card” which is positioned in the rank order based on the utility scores of the product
stimuli. This card marks the position above which the respondent would purchase the
offering at the assigned price and below which he or she would refuse to purchase . This
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approach was used in the empirical investigations by Sattler et al. (2001) and Backhaus
and Brzoska (2004), also presented in Section 6.2.
However, the estimation of the exchange rate between utility and price for all product
stimuli and the all possible prices only relies on one indicated status quo product. This is
the product just above the Limit-card. We believe that it would be better to elicit more
data points in order to fit the exchange rate between utility and price. Therefore we will
propose a method that uses more than one status quo product in order to predict the
willingness-to-pay for all other products.
6.4 Summary
In this chapter short comings of pricing studies by means of conjoint analysis were thor-
oughly discussed beginning with presenting five empirical investigations on willingness-
to-pay by conjoint analysis that illustrate recent developments in this field.
The general approach in pricing studies with conjoint analysis is to include price in the
conjoint design as yet another attribute. This approach suffers from three problems which
have been discussed in detail. The reason for emphasizing the problems that occur from
including price as an attribute is that we propose a new method to estimate willingness-
to-pay which is also based on a conjoint analysis, but in which price is not included as an
attribute.
The identified problems are firstly theoretical problems, secondly practical problems, and
thirdly estimation problems. Each one is summarized in the following:
(1) By treating price as an attribute in a conjoint study part-worths are estimated for
the presented price levels as for the other attributes. By definition the price of a product
does not have a utility, rather it reflects the foregone alternative consumption (with the
associated utility) if the product is purchased.
(2) For practical application the inclusion of price might have several unwanted effects.
These are the price effect, the range effect, the number of levels effect, and the occurrence
of interactions between price and other attributes. These effects were discussed and il-
lustrated with small examples. It was further shown that the application of interpolation
between different price levels can be difficult if more than two price levels are used in the
conjoint study.
(3) Traditional conjoint analysis does not incorporate a decision rule. Without a decision
rule actual purchase behavior can only be hypothesized. Recently, the estimation of
choice behavior was added to conjoint analysis by letting the respondents indicate which
products they would actually consider for purchasing. However, this approach delivers
only one data point. This data point is a single product for which the willingness-to-pay is
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known. Based on this data point the willingness-to-pay is estimated for all other products.
We have argued that one data point might not provide enough information.
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Chapter 7
Price Estimation Scene (PE Scene)
In this chapter a novel approach to estimate willingness-to-pay (WTP) is presented. In
previous chapters it has been established that it is important to have a surveying instru-
ment that can estimate willingness-to-pay at the individual level based on each respon-
dent’s provided information only. The method is as an additional interview scene which
is an extension to conjoint analysis. We call this new interview scene “Price Estimation
Scene” (PE scene).
However, in the preceding conjoint analysis price is not incorporate as an attribute. For
the configured products of the study the conjoint interview is only used to estimate each
respondent’s preference structure based on the non-price attributes. In Chapter 5 it
was demonstrated that conjoint analysis is a well suited instrument to provide such a
preference structure for different product configurations. The outcome of conjoint analysis
are cardinally scaled utility scores for all product configurations that can be formed by
the configured attributes and levels.
By not having to incorporate price as another attribute in the conjoint analysis, the prob-
lems that arise from the inclusion of price are avoided as discussed in detail in Chapter 6.
In the PE scene a function is estimated that maps the utility scores from the conjoint
analysis on a price scale. With this function the willingness-to-pay for any product that
can be formed by the attributes of the conjoint study can be calculated. This is done by
inserting the product’s associated utility value in the function.
With the PE scene the problem is overcome that conjoint analysis does not incorporate
a decision rule: The new scene is realized as a choice scene, similar to discrete choice
analysis.
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Figure 7.1: Example: Screenshot of a PE Scene.
7.1 Presentation to the Respondent
In the PE scene every respondent is presented a series of screens. A single screen consists
of a full product stimulus with an assigned price. The product stimulus is presented with
full textual and graphical information about the product offered to mimic a real purchase
situation as close as possible. The respondent is asked to indicate if he or she would
actually purchase the product at the given price.
By allowing the respondent to indicate whether a product stimulus at an assigned price is
acceptable, the problem of a missing decision rule in pricing studies with conjoint analysis
is overcome as was also discussed in the previous chapter.
The respondent is presented a number of screens with different product profiles at dynam-
ically set prices. Every time, the respondent has the option to take the offer or leave it.
An example of a screen in the PE scene, similar to the ones used in the empirical study
discussed in Chapter 8, is shown in Figure 7.1. In this figure the respondent is presented
a product bundle consisting of a telephone NOKIA 6220, an extra rechargeable battery,
and an additional battery charger station. The price for the bundle is dynamically set to
110,49 e based on the utility estimations from the preceding conjoint analysis. The re-
spondent indicates whether the offer is acceptable or not by clicking on one of the buttons
below the stimulus.
In every PE scene the respondent provides information whether he or she accepts a product
at a given price or refuses to accept it. If the respondent refuses the product, an upper
bound for price at the current utility level of the product range is found. If the respondent
accepts the product in a PE scene, a lower bound for price at the given utility level is
found.
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For example, if the respondent did not accept a product stimulus at a certain price he
or she would also refuse to accept any other product that only yields the same utility
or an even lower utility at the same price. Obviously, the respondent would also refuse
to accept any product configuration with the same or a lower utility offered at a higher
price. Therefore, the price which was marked as not acceptable is an upper bound for the
current utility level.
If the respondent accepted the price, a lower bound was found. He or she would also
accept any lower price for a product configuration with the same or a higher utility.
7.2 Estimation of Willingness-to-Pay and
Selection of Product Stimuli
With the sequence of screens in the PE scene we iteratively search for borders in the
utility × price space. Upper and lower bounds for price and utility are narrowed to a
desired accuracy. When the desired accuracy is reached, the middle between the bounds
represents an estimation of the respondent’s willingness-to-pay at that utility level. Any
product at that utility level has this estimated willingness-to-pay. This means, for these
products at the estimated willingness-to-pay, the respondent would be indifferent be-
tween accepting or refusing the offer. By this procedure one or many estimates for
〈utility, price〉-points that represent willingness-to-pay can be found.
Based upon the estimates found by the search procedure a model can be fitted that maps
utility on price. As argued in Chapter 3, from a theoretical point of view the use of a
linear model seems to be appropriate to describe the choice behavior of respondents.
The use of linear models is also a common approach in social sciences. For narrow ranges
of observed values linear models produce a similar good fit as other models (Naert and
Leeflang, 1978, pp. 66-67 and pp. 110-113). The assumption of a linear model for price
is also common in pricing studies. In traditional conjoint analysis often a vector model is
used to model continuous variables such as travel time or price (cf. Green and Srinivasan
(1978)). The vector model assumes a linear relationship between the attribute’s levels
and the estimated part-worths. When other models are applied such as the part-worth
model, practitioners often use no more that two price levels and inter- and extrapolate
between the two part-worths and thus obtain a linear relationship (e.g., Pinell (1994)).
When more than two levels are used, practitioners often apply linear regression (cf. Orme
(2001, 2002)). In all of these approaches the relationship between price and utility is
assumed to be linear
95
Price
p2
p1
Utility
p=ku+b
u1 u2
Upper Bound
Lower Bound
1
3
1
4
2
0
4
2
3
Figure 7.2: Estimation of a high and a low reservation price point in the PE scene from
observed upper- or a lower bounds of the price (denoted by the arrows).
In the PE scene a line with slope k and intercept b to describe the mapping of utility on
price is estimated:
p = k · u+ b.
This is done by searching for two points in the utility × price space and interpolating
a straight line. We chose to use a simple interpolation for our experiment, because for
this only two points are required. The reason is that only a limited number of questions
could be asked in the PE scene because our empirical investigation was realized as an
uncontrolled online survey. Too many questions could lead to respondents fatigue and
the discontinuation rate would be high. If more WTP-points are estimated, least squares
fitting can be applied to estimate a linear model.
A graphical presentation of the search procedure for two points and the interpolation
is presented in Figure 7.2. The information each respondent provides by accepting or
refusing a product that has an estimated utility and assigned price is shown in the figure
as an upper or lower bound. The numbers at the bounds denote the order in which
products with corresponding utility and price were presented. The presentation of screens
is continued until two 〈utility, price〉-points are estimated at a predefined accuracy. These
points are 〈u1, p1〉 and 〈u2, p2〉 and the predefined accuracy is denoted by a circle. Between
the two estimated points interpolation heuristics are applied resulting in the straight line.
Note that the intercept between the straight line and the abscissa is the absolute utility
of 0. With the origin given all part-worth utilities from the conjoint analysis can be
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find-reservationprice-point(u, p,∆u,∆p,∆pstop, smax,
i) :
b+ := (u+, p+) := ∅, b− := (u−, p−) := ∅, j := 1
while b+ = ∅ or b− = ∅ do
if purchase(product(u), p)
b− := (u, p)
(u, p) := (u+∆u, p+ j∆p)
else
b+ := (u, p)
(u, p) := (u−∆u, p− j∆p)
fi
j := j + i
od
while p+ − p− > ∆pstop and smax-- > 0 do
(u, p) := (1
2
(u− + u+), 1
2
(p− + p+))
if purchase(product(u), p)
b− := (u, p)
else
b+ := (u, p)
fi
od
return (1
2
(u− + u+), 1
2
(p− + p+))
Figure 7.3: Search algorithm for a 〈utility, price〉-point.
transformed onto a ratio-scale. This is possible because conjoint part-worths are unique
to linear transformation only.
The detailed algorithm for the estimation of the willingness-to-pay for one product and
one respondent is presented as a code fragment in Figure 7.3. The function product(u)
chooses the product configuration closest to a desired utility u from the list of all possible
products. Function purchase(product(u), p) asks whether the user would buy the product
chosen by product(u) at a given price p.
The first while loop in Figure 7.3 starts with an initial guess (u, p). The algorithm tries
to box the probands utility/price exchange ratio by locating an upper and a lower bound
(b+, b−), for example a price point at which the proband would purchase for a given utility
and one at which the proband would decline to purchase.
In the second loop of the algorithm this interval is gradually narrowed by a bisection
search. The bisection search terminates when the found interval, in which the reservation
price lies, is narrowed to a predefined accuracy ∆pstop. To limit the maximal number of
purchasing decisions a participant has to make, a second termination condition restricts
the algorithm to a predefined maximal number of search steps smax.
The initial guesses for acceptable prices are necessary to give the search procedure a
starting point. Optimally they are set by marketing experts of the product domain.
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WTP Data Cable Extra Charger Headset Leather Bag
147,87 e DKU-2 DCV-14 – –
145,26 e – DCV-14 HDW-2 CNT-327
140,84 e DKU-2 – HS-3 –
139,64 e – ACP-12E HS-3 CNT-327
139,39 e – ACP-12E HDW-2 –
136,39 e – DCV-14 HS-3 CNT-327
136,13 e – DCV-14 HDW-2 –
131,92 e DKU-2 – – CNT-327
130,52 e – ACP-12E HS-3 –
127,26 e – DCV-14 HS-3 –
122,79 e DKU-2 – – –
121,60 e – ACP-12E – CNT-327
120,18 e – – HDW-2 CNT-327
118,34 e – DCV-14 – CNT-327
112,47 e – ACP-12E – –
111,30 e – – HS-3 CNT-327
111,05 e – – HDW-2 –
109,21 e – DCV-14 – –
102,18 e – – HS-3 –
93,26 e – – – CNT-327
84,13 e – – – –
Table 7.1: Results for a sample proband.
The possibility that the procedure influences the respondent’s behavior needs attention.
To avoid that the respondents notice that the algorithm attempts to narrow the price
range for one product configuration, the order of the presented product combinations for
the n 〈utility, price〉-points is randomized or alternated. For example, for two points the
algorithm would alternate between high utility and low utility combinations. Furthermore,
the respondents are explicitly asked to view each offer independently.
7.3 Example of one Respondent
The PE scene was implemented for an empirical study with the customers of the online-
shop of Nokia in Germany. The goal of this study was to estimate willingness-to-pay
for mobile phones with a contract bundled together with suitable telephone accessories.
Once, a respondent has performed the conjoint analysis and the PE scene an estimate for
the WTPs of all possible product combinations is obtained.
An example of the resulting WTPs of one respondent is given in Table 7.1. The table
does not contain all possible bundle combinations of the underlying study but only a
fraction, and this serves well for illustrative purpose. The attributes in the example are a
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Attribute Level 1 Level 2 Monetary exchange rate
1 Headset – HS-3 18,04 e
2 Headset – HDW-2 26,91 e
3 Headset HS-3 HDW-2 8,87 e
4 Data Cable – DKU-2 38,66 e
5 Extra Charger DCV-14 ACP-12E 3,25 e
6 Extra Charger – ACP-12E 28,33 e
7 Extra Charger – DCV-14 25,08 e
8 Leather Bag – CNT-327 9,12 e
Table 7.2: Monetary exchange for attribute levels of the sample proband.
“data cable” for the connection between the telephone and a computer, an “extra battery
charger”, a “headset”, and a “leather bag” for the telephone to protect against impacts
and scratches. Due to space limitation of the table another attribute “car accessories”
was left out. All presented different attributes had a “none” level to denote the absence
of the attribute. In Table 7.1 the non level is denoted with a dash, for the other levels
the product name of the accessories are used. Each row in the table denotes one product
bundle and in the first column the estimated willingness-to-pay is given.
Besides estimating the WTPs for the different bundles, the willingness-to-pay for a change
in attribute level can also be calculated. If a none level for an attribute is configured,
the willingness-to-pay for including different types of the attribute can be estimated. In
addition the monetary difference in terms of willingness-to-pay between different types
can be estimated.
The difference in monetary exchange rates for various level changes in the attributes is
given in Table 7.2. For example, for the inclusion of a headset of type “HS-3” the proband
is willing to pay an additional amount of 18,04 e. This can be seen from row 1 in the
table. For a headset of type “HDW-2” the proband is willing to pay an additional amount
of 26,91 e. Because the proband prefers headset “HDW-2” over headset “HS-3” he or she
is willing to pay more for the former. Consequently, the proband is also willing to pay
for the level change from the less preferred headset to the more preferred headset. This
level change for the attribute headset from “HS-3” to “HDW-2” is worth 8,87 e to the
proband. This can be seen from row 3 in the table. Note that this amount is equal to the
difference in valuation between the inclusion of either one of the two headset types.
7.4 Summary
In this chapter a new approach to estimate willingness-to-pay was presented in detail.
This approach is called PE scene and works as an extension to conjoint analysis. Unlike
traditional conjoint approaches price is not included in the conjoint study as an attribute.
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Instead acceptable prices for the products of the conjoint study are estimated in the
subsequent PE scene.
The problems that occur when price is included as an attribute in conjoint analysis, as
discussed in Section 6.3, do not occur with our estimation procedure.
In the PE scene the respondents are presented a sequence of product choices with assigned
prices and indicate whether they would actually purchase the presented product profiles.
Product stimuli as well as price scales that are adapted for each proband to reflect indi-
vidual choice behavior. It was described how the selection of profiles and the dynamic
assignment of prices for each proband is achieved.
Currently, we are not aware of any other surveying method that dynamically assigns prices
to product offerings. Either prices are predefined and assumed to be appropriate for all
respondents, or the respondents are directly asked to indicate their willingness-to-pay.
A search procedure narrows the accurateness of the estimated willingness-to-pay for all
products of the preceding conjoint study. The search procedure was outlined as a pseudo-
code. The result of the estimation is a linear function that maps utility scores on price.
With this function the willingness-to-pay for any product can be estimated based on its
utility score.
The empirical investigation presented in the Chapter 8 implemented the PE scene in the
modular framework of the Java Adaptive Conjoint tool (jAC version 1.1, Schmidt-Thieme
(2004)) which was introduced in Section 5.7.
Partial results of one sample respondent were presented in this chapter, to illustrate the
type of estimation that can be achieved by our method.
We believe that this approach is superior to other techniques. Compared to directly
asking the respondent his or her willingness-to-pay the cognitive overhead is reduced
by offering the respondent products with an assigned price. Empirical investigations in
pricing studies have shown that respondent feel more confident choosing from assigned
prices than assigning prices themselves (Chernev, 2003).
Compared to approaches in which the prices are a priori fixed, the PE scene dynamically
adapts the price scales to reflect different levels of WTPs of the respondents. By doing
this, the problem is avoided that predefined prices might reflect the range of market
prices, but still may be unacceptable for some respondents. This is an important aspect
if not only customer switching effects but also market expansion effects are estimated (cf.
Chapter 6).
100
Chapter 8
Empirical Investigation: Nokia study
The application of the Price Estimation scene (PE scene) in a real-world scenario is the
main objective of this chapter. This was performed among the customers of the online
shop of Nokia in Germany in October 2004. It will be illustrated how this PE scene
delivers individual level estimations for willingness-to-pay (WTP) that can be used for
market simulations. The goal of the simulations is to optimize bundling strategies for
joint sales of a telephone with a contract and suitable accessories in the online shop.
Nokia offers the full product range of their products in the German online shop. In
addition, the shop offers telephone contracts of all German mobile telephone net operators
and providers. Lately, the shop has introduced bundled sales of a telephone with a contract
and suitable telephone accessories. Currently, the online shop offers three different product
bundles. The product bundles are shown in the Figure 8.1.
The first bundle in Figure 8.1 consists of a NOKIA 5140 telephone with a “D2 Vodafone -
Minutenpaket 100” contract. Bundled with this, the shop offers the battery charger cable
“LCH-12” for the use in cars via the cigarette lighter, a stylish NOKIA key fob, and the
exemption of shipping costs. The sum of the prices of the components is 89,50 e. The
bundle is offered at a discounted price of 79,- e.
The second bundle consists of a NOKIA 6230 telephone and a “D1 - Relax 100” contract,
a leather case “CNT-327” for telephones, a stylish NOKIA key fob, and the exemption of
shipping costs are offered. The price of all components is 78,95 e. The bundle is offered
at 69,- e.
The last bundle consists of a NOKIA 3220 with a “O2 Genion” contract. Bundled with
this the shop offers the radio headset “HS-2R”, the battery charger cable “LCH-12”, a
stylish NOKIA key fob, and the exemption of shipping costs. The full price for the bundle
is 47,50 e, the discounted price is set to 1,- e.
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Figure 8.1: Product bundles consisting of different telephones with a contract and suitable
accessories offered in the Nokia online shop. Screenshots http://nokia-online-shop.de,
visited 4th October, 2004.
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In order to design the bundling strategies for the three telephones with the contracts
marketing experts of the online shop are confronted with two important questions:
1. What components should be bundled with the telephones and contracts.
2. At what prices should the bundles be offered.
The objective of the marketing strategies can be to maximize sales, for example to promote
a certain telephone, to increase customer satisfaction, or to maximize profits.
Currently the prices for the three bundles are set manually by marketing experts of the
online-shop. The bundles are composed and priced in view of the cost structure and
possible profits of the components and in view of alternative offerings in the market.
There exist many more accessories that could be offered for bundle sales with the offered
telephones and contracts shown in Figure 8.1. In our study we focused on the telephones
and contracts shown in Figure 8.1 and investigated how different accessories bundled with
the telephones and contracts offered at different prices affect profit and sales.
In order to optimize the bundling strategies for the Nokia online shop a surveying tech-
nique was the only feasible alternative. It was not possible to test all bundle combinations
at various price levels in a field experiment, because there exist too many possible bundles.
To estimate the attractiveness of different product bundles conjoint analysis can be used
(e.g., Wu¨bker and Mahajan (1999)). In order to not only estimate the preference structure
of the customers for different bundles, but also translate this preference structure in
willingness-to-pay (WTP), the price estimation extension for conjoint analysis presented
in Chapter 7 is used.
The use of this scene allows the identification of customers who would accept certain
bundles at specific price levels. This individual level information of the respondents is
used to forecast shares of customers that would accept or refuse to buy a bundle. When
different bundles are presented, it can be identified which one each individual would choose
if the prices of the bundles were acceptable. The information from this type of simulations
of the customers’ price-response behavior can be used to optimize the bundling strategies
in the Nokia online shop.
For the interview the jAC framework developed by Schmidt-Thieme (2004) in which we
have integrated the PE scene was used. This framework implements an adaptive conjoint
analysis as described in Section 5.6. The framework has a powerful web-frontend which
is well suited to perform the survey with the customers of the online shop.
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Conjoint Design I (Telephone NOKIA 3220 with “O2 Genion” contract):
Data cable Additional
battery charger
Car charger
cable
Headset
• DKU-5 • ACP-12E • LCH-12 • HS-2R
• without • without • without • HDS-10
• HS-5
• without
Conjoint Design II (Telephone NOKIA 5140 with “D2 Vodafone - Minutenpaket
100” contract):
Data cable Additional
battery charger
Car charger
cable
Headset
• DKU-5 • ACP-12E • LCH-12 • HS-10
• without • without • without • HDS-3
• HS-5
• without
Conjoint Design III (Telephone NOKIA 6230 with “D1 Relax 100” contract):
Data cable Additional
battery charger
Car
Accessoires
Headset Leather
case
• DKU-2 • DCV-14 • MBC-15S • HDW-2 • CNT-327
• without • ACP-12E • LCH-12 • HS-3 • without
• without • without • without
Table 8.1: Attributes and levels of the three conjoint interviews for the different telephones
and contracts.
8.1 Conjoint Design
Three different conjoint interviews were performed. For each of the telephones with con-
tracts that are offered as bundles with accessories one interview is implemented. In each of
the three interviews the telephone, the contract, and the shipping costs were held constant.
The components of the product bundle other than telephone, contract, and shipping costs
were coded as conjoint attributes. All possible accessories for the telephones being offered
were included in the conjoint interview. By including all possible accessories the product
bundles already for sale in the online shop were also tested. All attributes have a level
with value “without” to denote its absence. Since all attributes represent additional ac-
cessories, a bundle of any combination of attributes makes sense to the respondent. The
attributes and levels for the three interviews are given in Table 8.1.
The attributes support an additive compensatory model and are well suited for conjoint
analysis: The attributes are independent of one another and contribute differently to the
overall valuation of the product bundles. All attributes are relevant to the respondents
and can easily be changed by the online retailer. All telephone accessories are often sold,
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NOKIA 3220 NOKIA 5140 NOKIA 6230 Total
Interviews started 58 67 206 331
Interviews completed 46 (79 %) 53 (79 %) 156 (77 %) 255 (77 %)
Response Rate 6 % 7 % 20 % 33 %
Response first day 62 % 64 % 57 % 59 %
Response second day 16 % 21 % 14 % 16 %
Dismissed interviews 9 (20 %) 11 (21 %) 47 (30 %) 67 (26 %)
Valid interviews 37 (80 %) 42 (79 %) 109 (70 %) 188 (74 %)
Table 8.2: Response behavior to newsletter invitation.
and any bundled product combination can quickly be offered in the online shop.
Non of the attribute levels could possibly be unacceptable, at worst a respondent would
assign some telephone accessories no valuation (he or she would be indifferent between
having the item or not). There is no redundancy in the attributes, so double counting is
avoided in the self-explicated part (cf. Green and Srinivasan (1990)). The duration of the
interview is about 10 minutes which seems to be well suited for an uncontrolled online
survey.
8.2 Online Interview
Out of a much larger customer base 1000 of the newsletter recipients were randomly
selected and invited to participate in the interview. The respondents were contacted via
a newsletter e-mail and directed to the online interview. A screenshot of the HTML-
newsletter is shown in Figure 8.2.
As an incentive to participate the respondents were offered a 10,- e voucher for the Nokia
online shop if they finished the interview. The voucher would be given to the respondents
at the end of the interview. Additionally, the respondents automatically participated in a
lottery in which they could win attractive prices from the online shop. Each e-mail sent
to one of the 1000 participants had an unique link pointing to the online survey. The link
had a unique identifier encoded in the URL to prevent anyone to participate more than
once.
On the first screen of the interview the participants were presented a selection page, where
they could select one of three telephone types for the interview. These telephone types
were the ones the online shop offered for bundled sales at the time of the interview.
The response behavior for the newsletter e-mails and the self-selection into the three
interviews is given in Table 8.2. For the interview with telephone NOKIA 3220 a total
58 interviews were commenced. 61 interviews were commenced for the telephone NOKIA
5240. Undoubtedly the most attractive telephone of the three was the NOKIA 6230 as
206 respondents selected this option for their interview.
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The response rate for 1000 sent e-mails was 33%. Compared to other surveying studies
with contact via e-mail, (cf. Cobanoglu et al. (2001) and Kaplowitz et al. (2004)) this
is a good response. We cannot tell whether all e-mails actually reached the respondents.
It is possible that the response rate would be much higher, if only the e-mails actually
delivered to the respondents were counted (Bachmann et al., 1999).
Since telephone NOKIA 6230 is the most popular choice, the data of this interview is
analyzed in this thesis. For the 206 commenced interviews 156 were completed. Some of
the completed interviews had to be dismissed due to idiosyncratic response behavior. The
dataset of a respondent was rejected if one of the following response behaviors occurred:
1. In the PE scene the respondent accepted prices for product bundles that were more
than 40% higher than the highest possible sum of the list prices of the components.
This means that the respondent did not understand that a product bundle is a
combination of products also available at list price, which is only worth buying if a
discount on the sum of the list prices is given.
2. The respondent accepted any price for the product bundles presented in the PE
scene. When this behavior occurs, the respondent attempted to complete the inter-
view as quickly as possible without providing meaningful answers.
3. The respondent did not accept any price for the product bundles presented in the
PE scene, even though the price was lowered to 1,- e. As before the respondent
attempted to complete the interview as quickly as possible without providing mean-
ingful answers.
Rejecting interviews based on these idiosyncratic response behaviors resulted in 109 out
of 156 valid and meaningful datasets.
The newsletter with the link to the online survey was sent on a Monday late at night. As
illustrated in Table 8.2, for the telephone NOKIA 6230 118 interviews were carried out the
first day, 28 interviews the second day. The interviews were collected over a total period
of 10 days. The response times for the telephones NOKIA 3220 and NOKIA 5140 showed
similar behavior. Again, this seems reasonable response behavior for online surveying
with contact via e-mail (cf. Bachmann et al. (1999) and Cobanoglu et al. (2001)).
For the interview the respondents were first presented with a short introduction and then
a detailed description of the attributes and levels. Help pages with information about the
attributes and levels were accessible to the respondents during the whole interview. After
the introduction and description of the attributes and levels the respondents performed
the conjoint interview. The calibration scene of the classical ACA interview was not used
because the PE scene was appended to the ACA.
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Figure 8.2: Screenshot HTML newsletter, sent 4th October, 2004.
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The result of the conjoint interview is the estimated preference structure for the product
bundles for each respondent. This individual level information is passed to the PE scene
which results in estimated WTPs for all possible product bundles.
8.3 Estimations of Willingness-to-Pay
The respondents’ WTPs for the bundles from the interview with the telephone NOKIA
6230 were analyzed. The dataset contained the WTPs of 109 individuals for all possible
bundle combinations containing the telephone NOKIA 6230, a “D1-Relax 100” contract,
with suitable accessories. The number of possible product bundles is 108. All simulations
in the following are based on the data from the 109 individuals and the 108 product
bundles. The dataset was organized as a 109× 108 matrix. The values of the matrix are
the WTPs that each individual has for each product bundle.
For each of the possible product bundles the WTPs of the respondents were analyzed.
The data of one specific product bundle is represented by the corresponding column in the
data matrix. Each row in that column represents the willingness-to-pay of one individual
for that bundle.
A kernel density function was estimated based on the observed WTPs. For this estimation
a gaussian smoothing kernel was used. Furthermore, a normal density function was fitted
to the WTPs. An example containing the plots of a histogram of the WTPs, the kernel
density, and the normal density for one product bundle is given in Figure 8.3. The bundle
in the example has the number 32 and consists of the telephone NOKIA 6230 with “D1-
Relax 100” contract and the bundled components data cable “DKU-2”, extra battery
charger “ACP-12E”, and headset “HDW-2”.
For every price the percentage of individuals who had a higher willingness-to-pay was
plotted. This plot is shown on the right side of Figure 8.3. In the same plot the estimated
values from the kernel density and the normal density were added. Note that the plot for
the estimated values of the normal density function is 1− the corresponding values of the
cumulated distribution function.
In Figure 8.3 the empirical values are denoted by the solid line. This is the histogram on
the left side and the solid downward-sloping line on the right side. The dashed lines on
the right and the left side are plots based on the data of the kernel density function, and
the dotted lines are the plots based on the normal density function. The solid vertical
lines denote the list price for the sum of the components of the bundle dashed vertical
lines denote the optimal price. The optimal price results in the highest possible profit
and is calculated from the empirical data. For bundle 32 the list price is 251,- e and the
optimal price is 210,- e.
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Figure 8.3: Density function and 1-cumulated distribution function of WTPs for bundle
number 32.
As can be seen from Figure 8.3 the estimations of the WTPs are very reasonable. At a
price close to list price the percentage of respondents who have a greater willingness-to-pay
approaches zero. This is consistent with the definition of the maximum price discussed in
Section 3.1. Nobody would buy a product bundle if he or she could buy the components
of the bundle separately at a lower price.
However, for some product bundles there is a small fraction of respondents that have an
estimated willingness-to-pay that is slightly higher than the sum of the list prices. This
can also be seen in Figure 8.3. Recall that the algorithm in the PE scene estimates the
WTPs for all product bundles based on choice behavior of a much smaller number of
bundles. Due to the estimation algorithm it can happen that some WTPs are estimated
to higher values than the list price. For example, consider a respondent who chose to
accept a price for a certain product bundle which was very close to the list price in the
PE scene. Suppose the conjoint data contains a different bundle with a much higher
preference that only has a slightly higher list price. If the respondent presented no choice
behavior for this bundle in the PE scene, the algorithm could estimate a willingness-to-
pay above the bundle’s list price. Since the share of respondents with WTPs higher than
the list price is very small and the WTPs are only slightly higher, we believe that the
estimation procedure is robust.
It shows clearly in the dataset that the willingness-to-pay for the product bundles is highly
influenced by the sum of the list prices of the components. The list prices are transparent
in the online shop of Nokia. Therefore, they were also visible in the study during the
conjoint analysis as well as during the PE scene. Using Pearson’s correlation coefficient
the correlation between the means of the WTPs of all respondents for the different bundles
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Figure 8.4: Linear Model: Mean WTP explained by list price
and the corresponding list prices has a value of 0.95. Spearman’s ρ has a value of 0.95,
Kendall’s τ has a value of 0.82. A linear model having the WTPs explained by the list
price was fitted. A plot of the fit is presented in Figure 8.4. Each point in the plot
represents the mean of the WTPs of all respondents for one bundle which has a certain
list price. It indicates that the list prices are well suited to explain the average WTPs of
the customer population for the different bundles.
It seems that the respondents’ WTPs are mostly determined by the maximum price and
less by the reservation price. Recall from Chapter 3 that the reservation price is the price
at which an individual is indifferent between consuming or not consuming the good. The
reservation price does not depend on alternative purchase opportunities. Contrarily the
maximum price for a product solely depends on the perceived price of the next best al-
ternative plus the differentiation value to that alternative. In the mobile phone market
perceived high discounts are very common.1 The behavior seems to show that the respon-
dents believe to find product bundles that are highly discounted from the list prices in
the market.
In the literature willingness-to-pay for product bundles is often assumed to be normally
distributed across the consumer population (e.g., Schmalensee (1984), Fu¨rderer (1999),
and Olderog and Skiera (2000)). Based upon the empirical evidence in our data we cannot
prove this assumption to be wrong.
1High discounts are usually regained by rather expensive phone contracts with long-term policies.
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In order to test this the following null- and alternative hypothesis were formulated:
H0 : The WTPs follow a normal distribution with mean and standard
deviation of the empirical data.
Ha : The empirical data does not follow a normal distribution.
A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for normality was performed on the WTPs of the different
respondents for each of the bundles (Chakravarti et al., 1967, pp. 392-394). For bundle
32, which is shown in Figure 8.3, the p-value is 0.97 indicating that H0 cannot be rejected.
At a threshold for the p-value of 0.05 the fraction of bundles for which H0 could not be
rejected was 73 of 108. At a threshold of 0.01 the fraction is 101 out of 108.
To further test the null hypothesis a Shapiro-Wilk normality test was performed (Shapiro
and Wilk, 1965). For bundle 32 H0 cannot be rejected with a p-value of 0.78. At a
threshold for the p-value of 0.05 H0 could not be rejected for 31 out of 108 product
bundles. At a threshold of 0.01 the fraction is 43 of 108.
8.4 Simulating Customer Choice Under Different
Bundling Strategies
From the WTPs of the respondents as well as from the estimated distribution functions the
units of the bundle sold, the resulting revenue and profit at each price can be simulated.
To simulate the units based on the empirical data, the number of individuals who have a
willingness-to-pay which is higher than every possible price point was used. For the data
based on the kernel density and the normal density function the units were simulated by
taking the percentage of the individuals with higher WTPs than the possible price points
times the number of individuals of the sample.
The revenue for the bundles offered at each price could easily be calculated by taking the
estimated number of individuals accepting the price times the price. Since the wholesale
prices for the different products were provided, the profits for different price levels could
also be simulated. The profit was calculated as the revenue at each price minus the sum
of the wholesale prices of the components of the bundle.
In Figure 8.5 the units and the profit at different prices for bundle 32 from Section 8.3
are shown. Again the plots based on the empirical data are denoted by the solid lines.
The dashed lines are the plots based on the kernel density function, the dotted line are
the plots based on the normal density function.
The following sections present simulations for a number of different bundles that could
be offered separately and simultaneously in the online-shop of Nokia in Germany. These
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Figure 8.5: Units and profit for bundle number 32.
simulations were performed based on the empirical data and not based on the data of the
estimated kernel density and normal density function.
In the simulations each individual could choose one of the offered product bundles or
choose none at all.
The choices the individuals make were simulated for three different bundling strategies:
1. Under a pure unbundling strategy all products are offered for separate sales at the list
price. Under pure unbundling each customer can select a combination of products
that best meets his or her needs. The price for a combination of products is the
sum of the single list prices.
2. Under a pure bundling strategy one or more different product combinations are
offered for joint sales as a bundle. The products of these bundles cannot be purchased
separately.
3. Under a mixed bundling strategy all products are offered for separate sales at list
prices as under pure unbundling. At the same time one or more product bundles are
offered at some discounted price. The price has to be discounted, because otherwise
there would be no difference for the customers who can purchase all components of
the bundle separately.
To illustrate how different bundling strategies can be profitably employed, results from 6
different bundles are analyzed in the following. These are the bundles with number 26,
31, 49, 64, 73, and 91. The content of the bundles is given in Table 8.3.
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Bundle Data cable Additional
battery charger
Car
Accessoires
Headset Leather
case
26 DKU-2 ACP-12E LCH-12 HDW-2 –
31 DKU-2 ACP-12E – HDW-2 CNT-327
49 DKU-2 – – HDW-2 CNT-327
64 – DCV-14 LCH-12 HS-3 -
73 – ACP-12E MBC-15S HDW-2 CNT-327
91 – – MBC-15S HDW-2 CNT-327
Table 8.3: Contents of bundles 26, 31, 49, 64, 73, and 91.
The density functions of the WTPs and the corresponding distribution in the population
for the 6 bundles are shown in Figure 8.6 and 8.7. As in the Figures 8.3 and 8.5, the
plots based on the empirical data are denoted by the solid lines. The dashed lines are
the plots based on the kernel density function, the dotted lines are the plots based on the
normal density function. The list prices for the sum of the components of the bundles are
denoted by a vertical solid line. The optimal price is denoted by a vertical dashed line.
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Figure 8.6: Density functions and 1-cumulated distribution functions of WTPs for bundles
26, 31, and 49.
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Density for bundle 64
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Figure 8.7: Density functions and 1-cumulated distribution functions of WTPs for bundles
64, 73, and 91.
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8.4.1 Maximizing Profits Under Different Bundling Strategies
Before the simulations are presented, the behavior of the consumers and the vendor of
the product bundles needs to be described in greater detail. First the individuals’ choice
behavior when they are confronted with different bundles is defined. Second a maximiza-
tion problem for the vendor of the bundles is formulated to find a pricing strategy that
optimizes profits.
In all simulations every consumer i out of the customer space N can select at most one
of the offered product bundles out of the bundle space B. The choice behavior of each
individual i is described as a binary vector ~γi = (γi,1; . . . ; γi,B)
T . Every consumer’s WTPs
for each of the bundles is denoted by the vector ~WTP i = ( ~WTP i,1; . . . ; ~WTP i,B)
T . The
vector of prices for the bundles, the individual is currently confronted with, is denoted
by ~p = (p1; . . . ; pB)
T . The norm for the individual’s choice vector ~γ is defined as
‖~γ‖ =
√
γ21 + . . .+ γ
2
B.
To maximize his or her surplus by selecting zero or one of the offered bundles each con-
sumer i is faced with the following maximization problem for the surplus function:
max ~γi
T · ( ~WTP i − ~p) (8.1)
subject to
~γ ∈ {0, 1}B (8.2)
‖γ‖ ≤ 1. (8.3)
The maximization problem in Equation (8.1) fully describes the choice behavior for each
consumer i confronted with different bundles j each offered at a price pj. The condition
that the individual chooses a bundle only if his or her willingness-to-pay is greater than
the sales price is ensured by (8.1). The constraint (8.3) ensures that the individual can
choose at most one product bundle.
Since the vendor of the bundles can assign different prices, we define a choice function f
for each individual which takes the current prices as an argument:
fi(~p) = argmax
~γi
~γi
T · ( ~WTP i − ~p). (8.4)
This functions has the same constraints as the maximization problem above and returns
the choice behavior ~γi for each individual i that is offered different bundles at prices ~p.
With the choice behavior γi known for each consumer facing the choice between the
bundles in the bundle space B, the vendor can find the optimal pricing strategy for the
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offered bundles. In view of the cost structure for the bundles denoted by vector ~c this is
done by maximizing the following profit function:
argmax
~p
N∑
i=1
(fi(~p))
T · (~p− ~c) (8.5)
subject to
~p ∈ R+B . (8.6)
In the following different simulation are presented in which one or many bundles are
offered. In the cases when only single bundles are offered the bundle space B simply consist
of one bundle only. The consumer’s choice behavior and the maximization problems are
the same for one and many bundles.
8.4.2 One Bundle Under Pure Bundling
The first simulations presented are for the choice of different bundles each offered sepa-
rately under pure bundling. The bundles used in the simulations are 26, 31, 49, 64, 73, and
91. Each simulation was performed separately for the different bundles. At every given
price the share of customers who would buy the bundle is found by counting how many
customers have a willingness-to-pay which is higher than the sales price. This is equal to
empirically solving maximization problem 8.1 for each customer. Simulation for positive
prices and calculating the resulting profits the highest possible profit can be found. This
is equal to empirically solving maximization problem 8.5.
In Figure 8.8 the profits for each bundle offered alone under pure bundling for the 109
customers in the dataset is shown. The solid line denotes the profit at different prices.
The optimal price is denoted by the vertical dashed line, the list price by the vertical solid
line.
The results for the simulations with the six bundles are given in Table 8.4. Bundle 26
yields the highest profit, followed by bundles 31, 64, 73, 49, and 91. If the retailer was
to offer the telephone 6230 with “D1-Relax 100” contract under a pure bundling strategy
and had the choice between the discussed bundles, number 26 should be offered for sale at
a price of 244,- e. At this price a share of around 15% of the customers would accept the
offer, and based on the 109 customers in the dataset this would yield a profit of 1108,80 e.
The retailer could also promote certain accessories. For example to promote the extra
battery charger “DCV-14”, bundle 64 could be offered. At the optimal price of 159,- e
around 13% of the customers would accept the bundle. To attract more customers to the
promotion the retailer could lower the price for bundle 64. Based on the data from the
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Figure 8.8: Profits under pure bundling for bundles 26, 31, 49, 64, 73, and 91.
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Rank Bundle Opt. Price Max. Profit Units Share of Customers
1 26 244,-e 1108,80 e 16 15 %
2 31 218,-e 630,40 e 16 15 %
3 64 159,-e 620,20 e 14 13 %
4 73 233,-e 415,80 e 7 6 %
5 49 195,-e 390,40 e 16 15 %
6 91 210,-e 222,00 e 5 5 %
Table 8.4: Optimal prices and profits under pure bundling for bundles 26, 31, 49, 64, 73,
and 91.
estimation procedure it is also possible to estimate the share of customers for a specific
price. If the retailer wished to increase the sales to slightly above 20% of the customers,
the price would have to be set at 136,- e. For the 109 individuals in the dataset this
would result in a profit of 489,90 e.
Note that the knowledge of the share of customers who accept a product offering at a
given price as well as the knowledge of customers who are not willing to pay the given
price permits the estimation of market expansion and contraction. By lowering the price
from 159,- e to 136,- e for bundle 64 the market is expanded by 9 customers. This is
an expansion of 69%.
8.4.3 N Bundles Under Pure Bundling
At the Nokia online shop different bundles are offered. The dataset can also be used to
simulate choice behavior for competing bundles that are offered simultaneously. Here we
will show how customers behave when two bundles are offered at the same time. Without
loss of generalization simulations for only two bundles are used. The reason is that results
for two competing bundles can be presented graphically which is not possible for more
bundles.
The choice behavior of the consumers who can choose only one of the offered bundles is
also described by the maximization problem 8.1. Unlike the previous section the bundle
space now contains two bundles. The optimal pricing for the two bundles is again found
by empirically solving maximization problem 8.5.
The results for 6 different combinations of two bundles are shown in Figure 8.9. In each
case two bundles are offered simultaneously, and the profit at each price level is calculated
based on the choices of the respondents. The highest possible profit is marked by an
arrow.
The resulting optimal prices and profits from the simulation are shown in Table 8.5.
The most profitable bundle combination of two bundles is 26 and 64 yielding a profit
of 1501,80 e selling to a share of 24% of the customers. The possible profit derived
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Rank Bundles Max. Profit Opt. Prices Units Share
1 26, 64 1501,80 e 244,-e, 159,-e 14, 12 24 %
2 26, 31 1326,60 e 244,-e, 238,-e 14, 6 19 %
3 26, 49 1222,90 e 244,-e, 235,-e 13, 5 17 %
4 64, 73 877,80 e 159,-e, 238,-e 14, 4 17 %
5 31, 49 700,40 e 218,-e, 245,-e 14, 2 15 %
6 73, 91 430,20 e 233,-e, 210,-e 5, 3 7 %
Table 8.5: Simultaneous offering of two Bundles
from offering two bundles simultaneously is higher than offering one. This can be seen
by comparing the possible profits from offering one bundle only shown in Table 8.4.
Compared to the highest possible profit of 1108,8 e from offering bundle 26 alone, the
profit can be increased by 26% (calculated by (1501, 80 e − 1108, 80 e) / 1501, 80 e ≈
26%), when bundle 26 and 64 are offered simultaneously.
However, when more bundles are offered at the same time they might cannibalize one
another. As shown in the last section, when bundle 26 is offered alone at the optimal
price of 244,- e, 16 units of the bundle are requested by the customers. When bundle
26 and 64 are offered simultaneously, the optimal price for bundle 26 remains unchanged.
Nevertheless, 2 customers have switched to buying bundle 64 as can be seen in Table 8.5.
Now only 14 units of bundle 26 are requested. The cannibalization between the two
bundles is even stronger when bundle 26 is offered together with bundle 49. With the
optimal price for bundle 26 unchanged 3 customers switch to bundle 49.
Besides the switching between the two bundles, market expansion occurs when bundles
26 and 64 are offered simultaneously. Compared to offering only bundle 26 at 244,- e,
when 16 customers were served, the market has been expanded by 10 individuals. This is
a market expansion of 63% (calculated by (26− 16)/16 ≈ 63%).
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Figure 8.9: Results for the simultaneous offering of two bundles. The maximum profit is
marked by an arrow.
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8.4.4 One Bundle Under Mixed Bundling
Looking at Figures 8.6 and 8.7 which show the density of the consumers’ WTPs for the
bundles 26, 31, 49, 64, 73, and 91, it can be seen that there is always a share of customers
who would be willing to purchase the bundles at list price. The dataset used for the
simulations contains individual level WTPs for all possible product bundles. Therefore,
when all bundles are offered simultaneously at the regular list price a mixed bundling
strategy can be simulated. Under mixed bundling all possible products are additionally
offered for regular sales at list price. When all possible bundles are offered any combination
of single products is offered.
In this simulation each customer can choose the offered product bundle at discounted
price or any other product combination consisting of telephone, contract and accessories
at list price. Note that the dataset also contains the empty bundle, which consists of only
telephone and contract.
Consumer choice under mixed bundling is also describe by the maximization problem in
Equation (8.1). In this case the bundle space contains all possible product bundles, of
which one has a discounted price. Each customer can choose one product bundle. As
in the previous sections, the optimal pricing for the offered product bundles is found by
empirically solving maximization problem 8.5.
The offering of product bundles at discounted price in the presence of regular sales mimics
the purchase situation in the online shop of Nokia more closely than the simulations for
pure bundling strategies. In the online shop the full product range is always offered at
list price and no exclusive items exist that are only sold in special offerings.
A retailer who offers a product bundle at discounted price that competes with regular
sales faces three situations:
1. Individuals that would buy some other bundle at list price switch to the bundle
offered at discounted price.
2. Individuals that would not buy anything at list price buy the bundle offered at
discounted price.
3. Individuals that are willing to buy the discounted bundle at list price pay only the
discounted price.
In the first situation the retailer can increases or decrease profit. Profit can be increased if
the bundle at discounted price has a higher margin than the bundle the customers would
otherwise buy at the list price. Profit is decreased, if the bundle offered at a discount yields
a lower profit than the offerings the individuals would otherwise buy. Either way this is a
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Figure 8.10: Offering of bundles 26 and 73 in the presence of regular sales.
cannibalization effect. Whether cannibalization increases or decreases profit depends on
the WTPs in the customer population and the cost structure of the different bundles. To
distinguish whether cannibalization leads to a higher or lower profit we refer to the effect
as positive- or negative cannibalization.
In the second situation the profits are always increased because new customers enter the
market. This effect is called market expansion.
In the third situation profits are always decreased because the customers buy the product
bundle at a discounted price, even though they are willing to pay the list price. Therefore,
the sales at list price are cannibalized by the sales at discounted price, and a negative
cannibalization effect occurs.
In Figures 8.10 to 8.12 the results of simulations for the different product bundles in the
presence of regular sales are shown. The solid line in each figure denotes the profit realized
from the sales of the corresponding bundle at discounted price. The dashed line is the
profit from regular sales, and the dotted line is the sum of the two profit lines. The solid
vertical line denotes the list price for the corresponding product bundle and the dashed
vertical line denotes the optimal price.
Figure 8.10 shows that the highest profit for bundles 26 and 73 is realized when the
optimal prices of the bundles denoted by the vertical dashed lines are set so high that no
customer would accept the offer. This can also be seen from the dotted profit line which
never raises above the dashed profit line, meaning that the combined offering of a bundle
at any price in the presence of regular sales can never outperform regular sales alone.
If the price for either bundle is set such that some customers prefer to buy the bundle
over the best alternative at list price, the overall profit is lowered. Therefore, discounting
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bundles 26 and 73 is not profitable for the retailer.
For bundles 31, 49, 64, and 91 the situation is different. As can be seen in Figures 8.11 and
8.12, introducing these bundles the retailer can increase profit, compared to the profits
from sales at list price. The combined profit denoted by the dotted line has a maximum
above the highest profit from sales at list price denoted by the dashed line.
The optimal prices and corresponding profits are summarized in Table 8.6. The most
profitable bundle is number 49 which can increase profit by 2% compared to the sales
from list price alone (calculated by (2670, 35 e − 2605, 95 e) / 2605, 95 e ≈ 2%). Next
best bundles are 31 and 91, also with a 2% profit increase, followed by bundle 64, which
has a 1% profit increase.
Table 8.6 also shows market expansion and switching effects. At list price 50 out of 109
customers would buy a product bundle. When bundle 49 is offered at the optimal price,
the market is expanded by one individual who would not buy anything at list price. This
can be seen in the units of the list price which remain at 50. The same happens for bundle
91. For this bundle the market is expanded by two customers.
If the prices for either one of bundle 49 and 91 were gradually lowered, customers would
start switching away from the alternative offerings for which they were willing to pay the
list price. The cost structure of bundles 49 and 91 is such that switching to the discounted
bundle would produce negative cannibalization.
Apart from market expansion cannibalization effects occur when bundles 31 and 64 are
offered at the optimal prices. As can be seen in Table 8.6, at the optimal prices for bundle
31 the market is expanded by one individual, for bundle 64 by two individuals. In addition
to the market expansion, some customers have switched away from their best offering at
list price to buying the bundle. One individual has switched to buying bundle 31 and
three individuals have switched to buying bundle 64.
The profit is increased for the bundles 31, 49, 64, and 91 even in the presence of customers
switching to the discounted bundles. The reason is that either positive cannibalization
occurred, or negative cannibalization is outweighed by the additional profits from market
expansion.
The difference between bundles 49 and 91, for which only market expansion occurred,
and bundles 31 and 64, for which additionally cannibalization effects occurred, can also
be seen by comparing Figures 8.11 and 8.12. For bundles 31 and 64 shown in Figure 8.12
the profit from regular sales denoted by the dashed line dips under the maximum of the
combined profit denoted by the dotted line. This dip is the decrease in profit in regular
sales from the customers who have switched from regular sales to buying the bundle. For
bundles 49 and 91 there is no cannibalization. Therefore, the profit line for regular sales
remains at the highest level under the maximum of the combined profit as can be seen in
Figure 8.11.
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Figure 8.11: Offering of bundles 49 and 91 in the presence of regular sales.
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Figure 8.12: Offering of bundles 31 and 64 in the presence of regular sales.
Rank Bundle Max.
Profit
Opt. Price Units
R. Sales
Units
Bundle
Max Profit
R. Sales
1 49 2670,35 e 235,- e 50 1 2605,95 e
2 31 2669,90 e 258,- e 49 2 2605,95 e
3 91 2654,75 e 190,- e 50 2 2605,95 e
4 64 2633,20 e 139,- e 47 5 2605,95 e
5 73 2605,95 e 203,- e 50 0 2605,95 e
6 26 2605,95 e 259,- e 50 0 2605,95 e
Table 8.6: Offering of different bundles in the presence of regular sales.
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Note that the simulation for mixed-bundling with one bundle, as presented here, is the
same as for pure-bundling with N bundles, which was the case in the Section 8.4.3, where
concurrent offering of N discounted bundles was simulated. In the simulation in this
section N − 1 bundles were offered without a discount and one bundle was offered with
a discount. In both types of simulations N bundles were simulated, the only difference
stems from the pricing of the bundles.
8.4.5 N Bundles Under Mixed Bundling
The following describes the scenario if the retailer would offer N bundles simultaneously
in the presence of regular sales. This will be illustrate by showing a simulation for two
bundles that are offered at the same time. As in Section 8.4.3, there is no loss of general-
ization and the reason why two bundles are used is that results for two competing bundles
can be presented graphically which is not possible for more bundles.
As in the previous simulations every individual i chooses the alternative that leaves the
highest surplus. This can either be one of the bundles offered at a discount or a combi-
nation of products offered at list price.
Depending on the structure of the WTPs for the different bundles and the corresponding
cost structure, profits can be increased above the profit from just regular sales at list price.
In Figure 8.13 the results of the simulations are shown. The first two bundle combinations,
bundles 49 and 91 and bundles 31 and 91, have one optimal price combination for the two
bundles. The maximum profit for each bundle combination is marked by an arrow.
Note that each of the bundles 31, 49, and 91 can also increases profit when they are offered
as a single bundle under a mixed bundling strategy. This was shown in the previous
section. It is obvious that offering any combination of bundles that would increase profit
if each of them was offered alone will also increase profit if they are offered simultaneously.
In the third bundle combination consisting of bundles 39 and 49 in Figure 8.13 two bundles
are offered that would each increase profit if they were offered alone under mixed bundling.
However, if they are offered together it is optimal to price bundle 31 such that nobody
would buy that bundle. The optimal profit for this bundle combination is at the optimal
price of bundle 49 and any price of 31 which nobody would accept. Because there exist
many optima, each one is denoted by a dot, and the dots form a line along the optimal
price for bundle 49.
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Figure 8.13: Offering of two bundles in the presence of regular sales.
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Rank Bundles Max Profit Opt. Prices Max Profit
R. Sales
Units Units
R. Sales
1 49, 91 2719,15 e 235,-e, 190,-e 2605,95 e 1, 2 50
2 49, 64 2697,60 e 235,-e, 139,-e 2605,95 e 1, 5 47
3 31, 49 2670,35 e 263,-e, 235,-e 2605,95 e 0, 1 50
4 31, 73 2669,90 e 258,-e, 203,-e 2605,95 e 2, 0 49
5 73, 91 2654,75 e 203,-e, 190,-e 2605,95 e 0, 2 50
6 26, 73 2605,95 e 259,-e, 203,-e 2605,95 e 0, 0 50
Table 8.7: Offering two bundles in the presence of regular sales.
In the fourth and the fifth bundle combinations in Figure 8.13 two are offered, of which
only one can increase profit when offered alone under mixed-bundling. The profitable
bundles are 31 and 91, additional profit from offering bundle 73 cannot be gained. When
both bundles are offered simultaneously, it is optimal to offer bundle 73 at a price at
which nobody would accept the bundle. For the profitable bundle it is optimal to set the
same price as if the bundle was offered alone. Therefore, the outcome is the same as in
the previous section, when the bundles 31 and 91 were offered alone. The optimal prices
are again marked by several dots along the optimal prices for the profitable bundle.
For the last bundle combination consisting of 26 and 73 in Figure 8.13 profits cannot be
increased above profits from regular sales. Therefore, it is optimal to set the prices for
the two bundles such that nobody would buy the bundles. There exist different price
combinations such that nobody would choose any of the two bundles. Each one is marked
by a dot, and the dots form a squared surface area.
The results of our simulation are summarized in Table 8.7. The most profitable bundle
combination is 49 and 91. Compared to regular sales the profit is increased by 4% com-
pared to regular sales alone (calculated by (2719, 15 e− 2605, 95 e) / 2605, 95 e ≈ 4%).
The next best combinations are bundles 49 and 64, with a profit increase of 3%, followed
by bundles 49 and 64 and bundles 67 and 91, each with a profit increase of 2%. From
offering the two bundles 67 and 73 simultaneously under mixed bundling no additional
profit can be gained.
However, two profitable bundles offered simultaneously might cannibalize one another.
In this case it is possible that the profit from offering the better bundle is lowered upon
introduction of another bundle. Nevertheless, the profit cannot be decreased below the
profit from offering the second-best bundle alone.
For the simultaneous offering of 49, 91 the two bundles do not cannibalize one another.
The optimal prices for the two bundles and the units of the bundles sold are the same, as
when they were offered alone under mixed-bundling. Comparing the units and prices of
the two bundles in Table 8.7 with the units in Table 8.6 in the last section, this can be
seen.
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Bundles 49 and 91 also do not cannibalize sales at list price, because the units sold at list
price remain at 50, which is the highest possible number of units. When the two bundles
are offered at the optimal prices, the market is expanded by three individuals. The profit
which can be reached by offering the two bundles simultaneously is the sum of the excess
profit when offered separately.
This is different for bundles 49 and 64. These bundles cannibalize the sales of product
combinations at list price. This can be seen in Table 8.7 as the regular sales have decreased
by three individuals to 47 units. Three individuals have switched from buying a product
combination at list price to one of the offered product bundles. The market has further
been expanded by 3 individuals.
The pricing strategy for the two bundles 49, 91 and 49, 64 is the same as if they were
offered separately. Since only the profitable bundle is offered at an acceptable price, the
profit increase is due to that bundle. The increase in profit is therefore the same as if the
profitable bundle was offered alone.
The last row in Table 8.7 shows the unprofitable bundles 67 and 73. Of each bundle 0
units are sold, and the profit solely stems from regular sales.
8.5 Summary
In this chapter the results of our empirical investigation were presented. A web-based con-
joint interview was performed to which the PE scene was appended. In this investigation
WTPs for different product bundles were estimated at the individual level.
In the first two sections the design of our conjoint studies was discussed and the probands’
response behavior to the online survey was presented. The response rates and the behavior
of the participants is similar to other online surveys published in different articles.
In the third section the respondents’ WTPs for one product bundle were graphically
presented. The often found assumption that consumers willingness-to-pay is normally
distributed was also discussed. Our data indicates that this assumption cannot be rejected.
In the fourth section it was shown how price response behavior under different bundling
strategies can be simulated. Based upon the individual level WTPs, estimated by the
PE scene, price response behavior for the different bundling strategies pure-bundling, and
mixed-bundling was simulated. For mixed-bundling any product combination which is
purchased at list price was considered to be the unbundled sales. A pure-unbundling
strategy was implicitly simulated in the cases of mixed-bundling in which a bundle was
offered but not chosen by any individual of the dataset.
For pure-bundling and mixed-bundling the offering of one and many bundles at a dis-
counted price was simulated. For each simulation an optimal pricing strategy was found
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which leads to the maximum profit. Further, the sales volumes, market expansion effects,
and cannibalization were simulated.
However, the optimal pricing strategies could also have been obtained by simulations
based on data elicited by discrete choice analysis. The benefit of the PE scene is that
it provides individual level WTPs. Therefore not only optimal pricing strategies can be
found, but also cannibalization effects can be simulated. Since discrete choice analysis
only provides aggregate level estimations, individual level switching behavior cannot be
analyzed.
130
Chapter 9
Summary and Main Findings
9.1 Summary
This dissertation proposed and tested a new method to estimate willingness-to-pay (WTP).
For practical applications the estimation of willingness-to-pay belongs to the field of strate-
gic marketing planning. Recent developments in marketing show that pricing of products
is driven by a value based approach. In a value based approache the price of a product
is based on the perceived valuation of the target customers. The research in the field of
pricing is of ample importance. The reason is that price is the only element of the mar-
keting mix that generates income. All other elements, such as advertising and promotion,
product development, selling effort, distribution, packaging and so forth, involve expendi-
tures (cf. Nagle and Holden (2002, chapter 1) and Monroe (2003, chapter 1)). In order to
set a good price a marketer has to anticipate the market’s price response behavior. That
is, the marketer needs valid estimations of the consumers’ willingness-to-pay.
To describe willingness-to-pay we discussed different concepts, by which consumers’ re-
actions to price are determined. There exist two concepts which are sometimes used
synonymously in marketing literature. These are the maximum price and the reservation
price. However, both concepts subsume under the more general term willingness-to-pay.
The underlying cognitive processes for the formation of the maximum price and the reser-
vation price are different. The maximum price a consumer has for some product is formed
based on some reference product, which is perceived as the best alternative, plus a dif-
ferentiation value, which reflects the additional valuation for the difference between the
product and the next best alternative. In contrast, the reservation price does not depend
on an alternative offering. It is simply the price at which the consumer is indifferent
between consuming the product or not consuming the product at all.
We have argued that for the two valuation concepts always the lower one determines
the purchase decision of a consumer. Therefore, when a consumer’s willingness-to-pay
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is estimated, the researcher never knows whether the maximum price or the reservation
price determines the estimation.
However, this is not so critical after all. We have shown that the valuation mechanisms
maximum price and reservation price for different product alternatives have a linear rela-
tionship with the products’ utility. Furthermore, the two relationships are also parallel.
Because of the linearity and the parallelism a marketer need not know, which concept
determines willingness-to-pay, as long as a customer’s choice behavior can correctly be
predicted. Therefore, the more general term willingness-to-pay under which the two con-
cepts maximum price and reservation price subsume can be used.
With the concepts maximum price and reservation price discussed and the subsuming
term willingness-to-pay established, different measurement techniques that are applied
in marketing applications were presented. Out of the variety of instruments used in
marketing, due to monetary or time constraints in the practical application surveying
techniques are the preferred choice.
The estimation procedure, that was proposed in this thesis, is a surveying instrument
which is based on conjoint analysis. Because of the connection between our new procedure
and conjoint analysis, the latter is discussed in detail.
Conjoint analysis has a long tradition in pricing studies and especially for the estimation of
willingness-to-pay. A selection of publications was presented to illustrate the developments
in this research area until today. The general approach with conjoint analysis in pricing
studies is to incorporate price as an attribute and estimate part-worth utilities for different
price levels. Based on these estimations a linear function is fitted that maps conjoint
utilities on a price scale (cf. Green and Srinivasan (1978), Pinell (1994), and Orme (2001,
2002)).
Several problems can be identified that arise in traditional pricing studies by conjoint
analysis:
1. Theoretical Problems : By treating price as an attribute in a conjoint study part-worth
utilities are estimated for the presented price levels. By economic definition price does not
have a utility, rather it reflects the foregone alternative consumption (with the associated
utility) if a product is purchased.
2.Practical Problems : The inclusion of price leads to several unwanted effects such as the
price effect, the range effect, and the number of levels effect. These effects occur when the
number of levels of an attribute is changed in a conjoint study. However, price does not
have a natural number of levels. Therefore, the attribute price can often not be configured
as would be best for the objective of the pricing study.
3. Estimation Problems : Traditional conjoint analysis does not incorporate a decision rule.
This makes the estimation of choice behavior difficult. To estimate willingness-to-pay
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choice information is needed. This information is usually added to the data by assuming
or explicitly asking the respondents for a status quo product, that the respondent would
actually purchase. In view of this status quo product all other products of the study
are priced. However, a priori assuming a status quo product can be a great source of
error. Asking each respondent for only one status quo product might not bear sufficient
information to estimate willingness-to-pay for all possible product realizations.
Our new estimation procedure overcomes these problems by not including price in the
conjoint analysis, but rather estimating the linear relationship between conjoint utilities
and willingness-to-pay in an additional interview scene. We call the new scene Price
Estimation scene (PE scene). The PE scene is as a choice scene subsequent to a conjoint
analysis.
The PE scene was tested in an empirical investigation on willingness-to-pay for product
bundles in the Nokia online shop. Before the investigation the shop already offered product
bundles. However, the prices of the product bundles were set based upon the cost structure
of the products and expert knowledge of the target market.
Simulations were performed for different types of bundling strategies. These were pure-
bundling and mixed-bundling. Simulations are a powerful instrument to design pricing
strategies, in this case, for product bundles. We were able to (1) identify product bundles
that yield profit increases compared to regular sales only and (2) to find optimal pricing
strategies for the identified bundles.
Apart from designing novel pricing strategies for new and existing products (or product
bundles), the PE scene can also be used to evaluate current pricing strategies to identify
unexploited profit potentials. Perhaps even more important, the procedure can be used
to select a promising pricing strategy out of many possible strategy candidates.
9.2 Empirical Results
The PE scene is based on conjoint analysis. Conjoint analysis is the preferred choice
when individual level preference structure is estimated based only on data provided by
each respondent. Individual level estimation techniques are especially important when
the preference structures of the individuals in the target is heterogeneous or a marketer
cannot forecast the degree of heterogeneity of the market.
In the PE scene the respondents are presented a sequence of product choices with assigned
prices and indicate whether they would actually purchase the presented product profiles.
Product stimuli as well as price scales that are adapted for each proband to reflect indi-
vidual choice behavior are used. Because the choices are different for every respondent the
PE scene is realized as a computer based adaptive interview. To the best of our knowledge
there is no other surveying method that dynamically assigns prices to product offerings.
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With the sequence of screens in the PE scene we iteratively search for 〈utility, price〉-points
in the utility × price space. Each point represents a respondent’s willingness-to-pay at a
certain utility level. Once a sufficient number of points is found and the accuracy of the
search procedure is narrowed to a predefined threshold, a linear function is fitted, that
represents the relationship between utility and price. With this function the willingness-
to-pay for all product realizations that can be formed by the attributes and levels of the
conjoint analysis can be estimated.
An empirical investigation was carried out estimating the willingness-to-pay for product
bundles at the online shop of Nokia in Germany. The empirical investigation in this
thesis implemented the PE scene in the modular framework of the Java Adaptive Conjoint
tool (jAC version 1.1, Schmidt-Thieme (2004)), which is a re-implementation of adaptive
conjoint analysis written in JavaTM.
A random sample of 1000 customers of the Nokia online shop was drawn, and the individ-
uals were invited via e-mail to participate in an online survey. The response rate for the
interview was 33%. The number of completed interview was 25%, and after dismissing
some interviews due to unreasonable response behavior resulted in 19% valid interviews.
Respondent’s reactions to the PE scene: The participants response behavior shows
that from a respondent’s point of view the PE scene is well suited to estimate
willingness-to-pay. The response rates as well as the rates of the completed and valid
interviews are high for online surveys (cf. Cobanoglu et al. (2001) and Kaplowitz
et al. (2004)). Apparently, since the number of aborted interviews is relatively
low, the search procedure described above converges quickly enough to yield a low
abortion rate.
The bundles in the empirical investigation consist of a mobile phone with a contract
bundled together with suitable telephone accessories. The conjoint analysis had the ac-
cessories to be bundled as attributes and the different types of each accessory were the
levels. All attributes in the conjoint design had a “none” level configured, to represent
the absence of the attribute.
With the resulting estimations of willingness-to-pay for the configured bundles the cus-
tomers’ response behavior was simulated for different bundling strategies.
Face Validity of Estimations: All tested bundles had an unimodal empirical distrib-
ution of the WTPs. The estimations for the respondents’ WTPs yield a high face
validity, because there were almost no estimations for product bundles much above
the list price for the bundles.1 From the setup of the survey this would be unreason-
able behavior, because no respondent should indicate that he or she would accept a
1Face validity is an intuitive test of whether a measurement seems to measure what it is suppose to
measure (cf. Anastasi (1988, p. 144)).
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product offering at a higher price than buying the bundle components at the regular
price in the online shop.
Normal distribution of WTPs: The density and distribution plots for the respon-
dents’ WTPs seem to be more or less close to a normal distribution. In the literature
willingness-to-pay is often assumed to be normally distributed across consumer pop-
ulations (e.g., Schmalensee (1984), Fu¨rderer et al. (1999), and Olderog and Skiera
(2000)). Based upon a Kolmogorov-Smirnov normality test the null hypothesis that
the WTPs were normally distributed could not be rejected for almost all bundles at
a p-value of 0.01. This means, that the cumulated empirical distribution functions
does not differ highly significantly from a normal distribution for almost all bundles.
At a p-value of 0.05 the null hypothesis could not be rejected for 2/3 of all bundles.
The dataset used for the simulations consisted of 109 valid interviews for one bundle
type. A bundle type consists of a telephone with contract and any possible combination
of telephone accessories. For every individual the dataset contained estimations for the
willingness-to-pay for 108 bundle combinations. With this dataset profits and market
shares for four different bundling strategies were simulated.
Single bundles under pure-bundling: With these simulations we were able to show
which bundles produce the highest profit and could simulate market shares for dif-
ferent bundles at different prices. Simulations for 6 bundles were presented. The
most profitable bundle had a maximum profit of 1108,80 e based on the data of the
109 individuals. This is a 76% higher profit than for the second best bundle, that
yields a maximum profit of 630,40 e. Both bundles have a market share of 15%
each. The other bundles had lower maximum profits and different market shares.
N bundles under pure-bundling: With more than one bundle offered, cannibalization
effects between the bundles occur. Depending on the cost structure of the bundles
this can increase or decrease profits compared to offering either bundle alone. Re-
sults for 6 different combinations of 2 bundles were presented. The most profitable
combination yields a maximum profit of 1501,80 e and a market share of 23%. This
is a 13% higher profit than the second best combinations with a maximum profit of
1326,60 e and a market share of 18%. The most profitable bundles offered as com-
binations were the same as the ones offered separately. The results show that profit
can be gained from offering 2 bundles simultaneously compared to only offering one
bundle.
Single bundles under mixed-bundling: To mimic regular sales, all 108 bundles were
offered simultaneously at list price. With this regular sales are imitated, because
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the 108 bundles contain all possible combinations of accessories including the empty
bundle, consisting of telephone and contract only. One of the bundles was offered
at a discount, that is, a price below list price. The same six bundles were used as
in the simulations described above. The most profitable bundle yields a maximum
profit of 2670,35 e. With this strategy 50 bundles are sold at list price and 1 unit
of the discounted bundle is sold serving a share of 46 % of the customers. Note that
the optimal bundle to be offered at a discount is not the same as the optimal bundle
to be offered under pure-bundling.
N bundles under mixed-bundling: Different bundles were selected and offered with
a discount in the presence of regular sales. Besides simulating profits and finding
optimal pricing strategies, we were able to show cannibalization between the bundles
offered at single sales and the discounted bundles as well as between the discounted
bundles among each other. Results for 6 different combinations of 2 bundles were
presented. The most profitable bundle combination yields a maximum profit of
2719,15 e. With this strategy 50 bundles are sold at list price and 1 and 2 units of
the two discounted bundles are sold serving a share of 49% of the customers.
With respect to the practical implications for the bundles offered at the Nokia online
shop, only mixed-bundling is relevant. Because the online shop is the online retailer for
Nokia in Germany, naturally the full product range is offered for single sales at list price.
Our empirical results show that the PE scene can be used to simulate pricing strategies
in real world scenarios. We believe that our approach is superior to other surveying tech-
niques when it comes to the estimation of willingness-to-pay for heterogeneous markets.
Compared to other estimation approaches in which the prices are a priori fixed, the PE
scene dynamically adapts the price scales to reflect different levels of WTPs of the respon-
dents. By doing this, the problem is avoided that predefined prices although they reflect
the range of current market prices, might still be unacceptable for some respondents. This
is an important aspect if market expansion effects are to be predicted.
9.3 Outlook and Future Research
The main advantage of the PE scene is the “on the fly” estimation of willingness-to-pay
during the interview of each respondent based on elicited choice behavior. From our point
of view this cannot be achieved by other conjoint approaches, because in other approaches
willingness-to-pay is usually estimated in a post-processing task. This is done by relying
on strong a priori hypothesis about purchase behavior or by basing the estimations on
few additionally elicited data points.
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Another important instrument to estimate willingness-to-pay is discrete choice analysis,
sometimes referred to as choice based conjoint (CBC). However, this class of methods
does not provide “on the fly” estimations, because the participant’s preference structure is
also estimated in a post processing task. Furthermore, discrete choice analysis estimates
preference structure at the aggregate level, and therefore needs a sufficient number of
participants to perform the estimations. In contrast, the PE scene does not rely on
aggregate level information.
Since the PE scene is a new method, it needs to be benchmarked against existing ap-
proaches. The next step would be to perform comparable studies with conjoint analysis
in combination with the PE scene and the classical approach, which is conjoint analy-
sis with one self-stated status quo product. Furthermore, a comparable discrete choice
analysis should be carried out. The results of the three approaches should be compared to
analyze deviations between the methods. Willingness-to-pay estimated by the PE scene
should also be compared with revealed willingness-to-pay, that is, real purchase behavior.
However, the same holds for the other estimation techniques, because only little research
exists on the external validity of the existing estimation instruments.
Ultimately, we hope that the ideas and motivations behind the PE scene will be picked
up by other researchers and practitioners, and can become part of the marketing toolbox
for the estimation of willingness-to-pay.
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Appendix A
Screenshots of Online-Survey
Figure A.1: The preference scene, screenshot 1 of 2, is the first interview scene in the
adaptive conjoint analysis. The software used is the Java Adaptive Conjoint (jAC) tool
developed by Schmidt-Thieme (2004). In the top part a textual and graphical description
of the ranking task is given. In the bottom part the respondent ranks the levels of the
attribute by clicking on the attribute names.
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Figure A.2: Screenshot 2 of 2, the respondent has ranked the two levels of the attribute
headset. Note, in this case the third level of the attribute headset was a “none” level. The
respondent did not have to rank it, because it was implicitly ranked at the last position.
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Figure A.3: In the importance scene of the adaptive conjoint analysis the respondent
indicates the relative importance for obtaining the most preferred level versus the least
preferred level of each attribute. This is done by clicking on the buttons on the four points
scale for each attribute. The screenshot shows the four attributes of the interview with
the relative importance of each attribute already selected.
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Figure A.4: In the pair scene of the adaptive conjoint analysis the respondent is presented
two product bundles and indicates his or her preference by positioning the slider below
the two configurations. Note, that even though the products are only described on two
attributes, they are not partial products. The products are product bundles and the
missing attributes are simple considered not to be part of the bundle. This is equal to
the constant presentation of the the missing attribute’s “none” level.
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Figure A.5: In the Price Estimation Scene (PE scene), screenshot 1 of 2, the respondent
is presented a product bundle with a dynamically assigned price. The respondent is asked
to indicate whether he or she would purchase the bundle at the given price. This is
done by clicking on one of the buttons below the product bundle. In this screenshot the
respondent indicated that he or she would accept the bundle.
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Figure A.6: Screenshot 2 of 2, the respondent is presented a different product bundle at a
higher price. The selection of product bundles and the assignment of prices is based upon
the prior behavior of the respondent. As the respondent indicated that he or she would
purchase the previous product bundle, this bundle is assigned a higher price.
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